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This dissertation is a study of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s conceptions of citizenship and 
civic education. Its basic conceit is that the former—what it means to be a citizen—can be 
understood fully only in light of the latter—what it means to become a citizen. It argues that 
Rousseau’s conception of civic education—a denaturing, psychically transformative process 
whereby human beings become citizens who virtuously exercise their rights and fulfill their 
duties under the social contract—poses a critical, yet, in a way, friendly, challenge to us as 
liberal democrats. For as radically as Rousseauian civic education differs from ours, it is 
grounded in premises that we, as liberal democrats, affirm, i.e., that human beings are naturally 
free and equal and therefore that the only authority to which human beings may be legitimately 
subject is that to which they consent. Hence, our own premises compel us to confront the 
challenge posed by Rousseau’s writings on citizenship and civic education. Contemporary 
disillusionment with citizenship across the liberal-democratic West makes doing this only 
more urgent and potentially illuminating and fruitful. Consisting in careful textual analysis of 
the various works and passages in which Rousseau treats civic education, the dissertation is 
organized around a heretofore insufficiently examined distinction between a preliminary stage 
 v 
of civic education and civic education proper. Whereas, in the former, future citizens are 
persuaded by legislators effectively to enact wise laws by means of ingenious yet disingenuous 
appeals to divine authority, in the latter, dutifulness to such authority is replaced as the moral 
basis for civic virtue with patriotism. The thesis of the dissertation is that, in order to 
understand the limits and possibilities of Rousseauian citizenship, it is necessary to understand 
this shift that lies at the heart of Rousseauian civic education. 
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This dissertation consists in an examination of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s conceptions 
of citizenship and civic education. Its basic conceit is that the former cannot be adequately 
understood except in light of the latter. The answer to the question of what it is to be a citizen 
for Rousseau will remain in some obscurity if or insofar as the question of what it is to become 
a citizen for him remains unanswered. While this might be said of any political theorist’s 
conception of citizenship, it can rightly be said especially of Rousseau’s, arguably more of his 
than of any other’s. For Rousseau, by contrast with the first great theorists of citizenship, is 
emphatic that man is not by nature a citizen.1 To be a citizen, man must undergo a civic 
education that Rousseau arrestingly describes as a denaturing psychic transformation.2 What 
does this transformation entail? In what way or ways, and to what extent, does it denature 
man? Why is it necessary? Under what conditions is it possible? And finally, given Rousseau’s 
fundamental thesis that the natural condition of man is good,3 what are we to make of the 
goodness of this denatured condition for the citizen himself? These are some of the basic 
questions on which we mean to shed light in what follows. 
The reasons for undertaking such an examination are both political and scholarly. Let 
us begin by anticipating two important arguments against the relevance of Rousseauian 
citizenship and civic education to contemporary liberal-democratic political practice. First, 
Rousseau is not a liberal democrat. For whatever similarities there may be between Rousseau’s 
republicanism and ours, many of the means and ends of his civic education differ radically 
from—to the point of being incompatible with—any kind of civic education that could 
plausibly be described as liberal-democratic. One need only consider the historical instance of 
1 “[T]he city belongs among the things that exist by nature, and…man is by nature a political animal” 
(Aristotle, Politics, 1253a). 
2 E 1 / ŒC 4: 249 / CW 13: 164; SC 2.7 / ŒC 3: 381-82 / CW 4: 155. For an explanation of the system 
according to which Rousseau’s works are here cited, see p. 222 below. 
3 See especially D 3 / ŒC 1: 934 / CW 1: 213 and SD / ŒC 3: 202nIX / CW 3: 74n7 
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civic education to which Rousseau regularly points as his model: Lycurgus’ education of the 
Spartans.4 Those unsettled by Rousseau’s suggestion that civic education ought to denature 
man will not be reassured by this. The first counterargument, then, is that Rousseauian civic 
education is undesirable for us because it is inadmissible by our liberal-democratic principles.5  
The second counterargument is that, even if Rousseauian civic education were not so 
undesirable, it would be impossible for us to undertake. This counterargument is particularly 
weighty as it comes from none other than Rousseau himself. “Public instruction no longer 
exists, and no longer can exist, because where there are no longer fatherlands there can no 
longer be citizens” (E 1 / ŒC 4: 250 / CW 13: 165). Such is Rousseau’s unambiguous 
judgment on the prospects for civic education in the modern West, that is, the West as 
decisively shaped by Christianity and the Enlightenment. Rousseau’s choice, on the basis of 
this judgment, to compose an elaborate treatise on private education, an education that he 
explicitly casts as an alternative to civic education, might reasonably be taken as evidence that 
civic education has ceased, in Rousseau’s own view, to be of practical concern.6 If we in the 
modern West should wish to learn from Rousseau about education, it is precisely not to his 
writings on civic education that we ought to turn. Or so goes the counterargument. 
Over the last couple decades, numerous scholars have taken to arguing for Rousseau’s 
relevance to contemporary political practice by casting doubt on what one might call the 
radicalism of his thought, a radicalism that is presupposed in both of the counterarguments 
articulated above.7 Rousseau’s conception of civic education is not as radically denaturing or 
 
4 See, for example, E 1 / ŒC 4: 249-50 / CW 13: 164-65; GP 2 / ŒC 3: 957 / CW 11: 172; SD / ŒC 3: 187-
88 / CW 4: 62. 
5 It is especially to Rousseau’s writings on civic education that scholars who see the Citizen of Geneva as a 
proponent of totalitarianism point for evidence of their view. See, for example, Crocker, Rousseau’s “Social 
Contract” and Talmon, Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. 
6 Consider E 1, 5 / ŒC 4: 248-51, 858 / CW 13: 163-66, 667. See Cooper, Rousseau, Nature, and the Problem of the 
Good Life, esp. 3-4. 
7 The deepest theoretical ground for this sort of argument has been laid by Marks’s provocative 
reinterpretation of Rousseau’s “thought [as] a reflection on the natural perfection of a naturally disharmonious 
being” (Perfection and Disharmony, 1). 
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psychically transformative—in a word, not as Spartan—as some of his more infamous 
characterizations of it might suggest. It accepts human beings as they are, as distinct individuals 
with self-regarding passions, and cultivates their independent judgment to a much greater 
degree than scholars once appreciated.8 Given this, it is not so obviously inapt as a model for 
civic education in liberal democracies. As for the second counterargument, it has rightly been 
noted that Rousseau’s civic educational recommendations to the Corsicans, the Poles, and his 
fellow Genevans at least complicate, if not altogether belie, his categorical denial of the 
possibility of civic education in the modern West. Given this, we are not mistaken to look to 
Rousseau’s writings on civic education with a view to improving contemporary liberal-
democratic political practice. 
Scholarship in this vein is to be commended for bringing to light important nuances 
of Rousseau’s complex thought on civic education and citizenship more broadly. Nevertheless, 
in our view, it stands in need of a partial corrective. As a theorist of civic education, Rousseau 
may not be simply or altogether the radical that he has been taken to be by some. But we are 
not convinced that he ought not still, in the final analysis, to be regarded more as a radical than 
as a moderate.9 In arguing for a partial return to this older view of Rousseau, we do not mean 
to deny his relevance to contemporary liberal-democratic political practice, however. Our view 
is not that Rousseau must be moderate in order to be relevant. Indeed, we are animated partly 
by the fear that to make Rousseau safer for liberal democracy would be to risk not learning all 
that we might from the challenge that he poses to our way of life. We fear that doing this 
would, more specifically, keep us from fully appreciating the ways in and extent to which the 
 
8 For some studies that display this tendency in different ways, see Hanley, “Enlightened Nation Building,” 
“From Geneva to Glasgow,” “Political Economy and Individual Liberty”; Marks, Perfection and Disharmony, 74-
82; Schaeffer, “Attending to Time and Place,” “Realism, Rhetoric, and the Possibility of Reform,” Rousseau on 
Education, Freedom, and Judgment; and Smith, “Nationalism, Virtue, and the Spirit of Liberty,” “Nature, Nation-
Building, and the Seasons of Justice.” 
9 Marks, it should be noted, does affirm that Rousseau “was a radical” and even concedes that the “claim that 
Rousseau was a moderate” is “implausible” (Perfection and Disharmony, 11). Our disagreement, then, is a matter of 
emphasis. 
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approach to civic education that is typically taken in liberal democracies today would have to 
be transformed in order even to approximate in practice Rousseau’s theoretical conception of 
citizenship. Now, this is not here to argue for or against the desirability or possibility of such 
a transformation. It is rather to argue that what we stand most to gain, in terms of 
contemporary liberal-democratic political practice, from studying Rousseau’s writings on civic 
education is insight into how we might make better citizens by taking a more Rousseauian 
approach to civic education, albeit within the limits imposed by constitutional principles and 
modern conditions that we would be imprudent to try to alter. Connected to our insight into 
this question is, no less importantly, insight into the ways in and extent to which modern 
liberal-democratic citizenship will inevitably—and not entirely without good reason—fall 
short of the sublime alternative held out by Rousseau.  
Even as we emphasize the challenge posed to us by Rousseau’s radically different 
conceptions of citizenship and civic education, we mean to insist that it is on the basis of our 
own premises, premises that Rousseau holds in common with the philosophic founders of 
liberal democracy, that they pose this challenge. It is not because Rousseau disagrees with our 
propositions that human beings are naturally free and equal and can be legitimately subject 
only to that authority to which they have given their consent that he conceives of citizenship 
and civic education as he does. On the contrary, it is precisely on the basis of these 
propositions that he conceives of citizenship and civic education in this way.10 As long as we 
affirm these propositions, the challenge that Rousseau poses to us will remain vital. As long 
as we do this, we must at least entertain his arguments that the only authority to which human 
beings might be legitimately subject is the general will and, therefore, that the practical 
realization of political right depends upon a civic education that makes human beings into 
 
10 It is in view of this very basic consideration, above all others, that we would here at the outset distinguish 
ourselves from those who see in Rousseau’s writings on civic education evidence that he is a proponent of 
totalitarianism. If one were to insist on this view, one would be compelled to concede at the very least that 
Rousseau does not start from totalitarian premises. 
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citizens who, as such, live in accord with the general will. Even if we are not ultimately 
convinced by these arguments, it is unlikely that we will reject two fundamental thoughts that 
underlie them, i.e., that the legitimacy of authority depends somehow upon its promotion of 
the common good and that the achievement of legitimacy in practice depends, at least in part, 
upon educating citizens who have some share in authority to seek the common good. 
This is to say that there is always an argument to be made, among liberal democrats, 
for studying Rousseau’s writings on citizenship and civic education. However, we would also 
submit that this argument can be made with particular force today. For we, in the liberal-
democratic West, have lately come to find ourselves in something of a Rousseauian moment. 
Not long ago, at the end of the Cold War, when liberal democracy seemed to many to have 
achieved a final triumph over all alternative regimes,11 the vitality of Rousseau’s challenge was 
far from obvious. For, at that moment, events seemed to be giving the lie to Rousseau’s 
critique of liberal democracy. At the very least, the liberal-democratic way of life appeared to 
be far more satisfactory and sustainable than that critique suggested it could be. In the eyes of 
many at the time, the best case for Rousseau’s relevance that could be made was that he might 
alert us to certain imperfections of liberal democracy—imperfections, however, that he 
exaggerated, and that could either be corrected or tolerated without departing much from the 
spirit or substance of liberal democracy. Events in the intervening three decades have made 
Rousseau seem rather more reasonable, however. For those imperfections have proved to be 
at once harder to correct and harder to tolerate, so much so that it has become trite to point 
out that the hopes for liberal democracy at the end of the Cold War were overly sanguine. 
That such observations are now commonplace suggests that it may be time to give Rousseau 
another hearing. 
 
11 For the most sophisticated articulation of this view, see Fukuyama, End of History. 
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Many of the doubts about the desirability and sustainability of contemporary liberal 
democracy relate to citizenship. As liberal-democratic citizens, we aspire to be self-governing 
members of free communities, who work together—albeit not uncontentiously—for the 
common good on the basis of shared political principles of freedom and equality as well as, 
though to a lesser extent, shared customs and culture. Yet our experience of citizenship 
increasingly seems to fall short of this aspiration. Various explanations from each and every 
point on the political spectrum have been advanced. As political power has come to be ever 
more concentrated at national and supra-national levels of government and exercised at the 
discretion of democratically unaccountable administrators, citizens have less and less say in 
how they are governed. Structural economic changes such as globalization and automation 
have displaced many in the middle and lower classes. And the failure of government to 
improve their lot has diminished their confidence in its representativeness and public-
spiritedness. Meanwhile, the upper and upper-middle classes, which occupy the commanding 
heights of the economy and culture, enjoy ever greater prosperity and lead lives that are ever 
more alien to those of the middle and lower classes. This socioeconomic inequality makes 
formal political equality seem less and less substantive. And it conspires with other forces of 
division—ideological polarization, media fragmentation, geographic sorting, massive 
immigration, multiculturalism and identity politics—to alienate us from one another and 
deprive us of the consensus upon which we might engage in public life. These explanations 
are hardly exhaustive. And one can debate their accuracy and power. But one cannot debate 
that there is widespread disillusionment with citizenship across the liberal-democratic West. 
Witness the growing strength of populism that has resulted from this disillusionment. 
No matter how one greets this development, one could do worse than to turn to the 
writings of Rousseau. For in them, one gains insight into many of the pathologies that currently 
afflict us. And gaining such insight is the first step toward coping with, if not curing, these 
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pathologies. We might consider some of the cures and coping mechanisms that Rousseau 
proposes worse than the diseases themselves. Yet they might suggest ways of at least mitigating 
some of our regime’s characteristic defects. One of those defects, which we might find ways 
of mitigating, or at least come to think about more clearly, by examining Rousseau’s writings 
on civic education, is liberal democracy’s characteristic overreliance on rational self-interest as 
a motive for citizenship and corresponding inattention to the cultivation of civic virtue. While 
one would be mistaken to suppose that there are not resources for reflection on this defect 
within the liberal-democratic or American traditions, one can safely say that Rousseau treats 
the cultivation of civic virtue through education as a matter of greater political concern than 
most in our traditions. Hence, in this moment in which we feel ourselves suffering from our 
inattention to this matter, Rousseau should be of particular interest to us. 
In view of history since the French Revolution, prudence dictates a certain wariness, 
at least provisionally, of calls to remedy defects of liberal democracy by turning to its late 
modern critics. For, despite the undeniable power of many of these critics’ arguments, their 
influence on political practice—advertent and inadvertent—has, to put it mildly, left much to 
be desired. Here, we would submit in defense of Rousseau, by contrast with some of his 
successors, that his thought does partake of a certain moderation, albeit one that is not always 
obvious or perhaps sufficient. Rousseau’s very intransigence in seeking to understand the 
human problem prevents him from endorsing any solution to that problem without 
reservation. Recognizing that Rousseau himself is acutely aware of the limits of citizenship,12 
 
12 To the extent that our study is informed by a recognition of this, it will differ in the decisive sense from 
others that emphasize the limits of Rousseauian citizenship, e.g., Johnston’s Encountering Tragedy and 
Trachtenberg’s Making Citizens. According to the former, “the tragic dimension in politics” is “concealed” from 
Rousseau and is obscured by “Rousseauian theory.” We favor the alternative view that Johnston is inclined to 
reject, i.e.,“[g]iven the depth and profundity of [Rousseau’s] thought…his texts evince awareness of the tragic 
dimension in politics while assuming that most readers are ill prepared to receive this message directly” (7). See 
Strauss, Natural Right and History, 255. 
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even as he conceives it, should prevent us, his readers, from recklessly giving up what we have 
for what he proposes, if we somehow came to think that that were possible. 
In addition to helping us to reflect more intelligently on our present political crisis, 
examining Rousseau’s writings on civic education will give us occasion to treat some important 
questions about his thought that have arisen among scholars. In these writings, we come to 
the nexus of the two major sides of Rousseau’s political theory, the relation of which has long 
been a source of perplexity and controversy: the modern voluntarism or contractarianism that 
underlies his principles of political right, including his definition of citizenship, and the classical 
republicanism that suffuses his maxims of politics, including those that bear on civic 
education. Leo Strauss identifies the “tension” between the former—Rousseau’s “return to 
the state of nature”—and the latter—his “return to the city”—as “the substance of Rousseau’s 
thought.”13 Maurizio Viroli explains the relation thus: 
If the tradition of natural-law theory seems to [Rousseau] to offer the most satisfying 
solution to the problem of the rational justification of legitimate government, the 
republican tradition, with its insistence on the civic virtues and the need to exercise 
control over the emotions, provides him with most of his ideas concerning the 
preservation of the just political order.14  
That Rousseau should in certain places read like Hobbes or Locke and in others read like Plato 
has understandably raised questions among scholars about the fundamental character and 
ultimate coherence of his political theory. These questions are particularly unavoidable for 
anyone who takes an interest in Rousseau’s conceptions of citizenship and civic education, the 
former of which is derived from Hobbesian or Lockean premises and the latter of which 
resonates in important ways with the Republic and Laws of Plato. To the extent that the 
scholarly debates about these questions bear on our argument for the relevance of Rousseau’s 
writings on civic education to contemporary liberal-democratic political practice, it is 
 
13 Natural Right and History, 254. 
14 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 213. 
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appropriate for us, here at the outset, to distinguish our position from those that would, in our 
view, effectively cast doubt on our argument for this. We will identify three alternative 
explanations of the fundamental character of Rousseau’s political theory with which our study 
will, at various points, take issue.  
On the first view, as articulated by Patrick Riley, the combination of modern 
voluntarism or contractarianism and classical republicanism in Rousseau’s thought is 
contradictory.15 Riley characterizes Rousseau’s doctrine of the general will as an “attempted 
[yet ultimately unsuccessful] amalgam of two extremely important traditions of political 
thought, which may be designated ancient cohesiveness and modern voluntarism.”16 Riley is 
correct to note the tension between the latter tradition’s requirement that subjection be 
consensual in order to be legitimate and the means by which Rousseau, following the former 
tradition, recommends that consent to subjection be elicited. Indeed, we will make much of 
this in what follows. But Riley fails to recognize that it is, as we will show in Chapter 1, on the 
basis of Rousseau’s modern voluntarist or contractarian premises that he insists that legitimate 
authority can belong only to a will that is general, i.e., a will that is objectively and essentially 
directed to the common good, and therefore that rule by legitimate authority depends, in practice, 
upon classical-style civic education that effectively generalizes citizens’ wills. The tension that 
Riley rightly recognizes in Rousseau’s writings on citizenship and civic education is not, as he 
would have it, the avoidable result of independent and contradictory concerns on Rousseau’s 
part,17 but rather the unavoidable result of Rousseau’s radical voluntarism or contractarianism. 
It is important that Riley’s error be corrected lest we think that our liberal-democratic 
principles do not compel us to confront Rousseau’s argument for the necessity of civic 
education or his subtler indications of the problems posed by this necessity. 
 
15 See especially “Possible Explanation of Rousseau’s General Will.”  
16 Ibid., 99. 
17 Ibid., 111. 
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Whereas Riley assigns roughly equal importance to the modern voluntarist or 
contractarian and classical republican sides of Rousseau’s thought, other scholars seek to 
resolve the tension by contending that the importance of one side far outweighs that of the 
other. On one hand, scholars such as David Lay Williams and J.S. Maloy, hold that Rousseau’s 
classical republicanism is not, as we have asserted and will argue in Chapter 1, derivative of 
modern voluntarism or contractarianism but fundamental to his thought.18 While, if Rousseau 
were the fundamentally Platonic philosopher that such scholars characterize him as being, we 
would be no less mistaken to dismiss him than we would be to dismiss Plato. But, then, his 
writings on citizenship and civic education would not pose the dialectical challenge to us that 
we described above. It could not, then, be maintained that our specifically liberal-democratic 
premises compel us to consider those writings.  
On the other hand, scholars such as Joshua Cohen, whose Rousseau resembles 
Immanuel Kant more closely than ours will, tend excessively to diminish the importance of 
classical-style civic education in their characterizations of Rousseauian citizenship.19 In a 
somewhat similar spirit to the scholars who, as we noted above, see a moderate theorist of 
civic education underneath the praise of Spartan denaturing and civic unity, Cohen is too quick 
to chalk this praise up to exaggerating and rhapsodizing.20 Then, he gives an account of the 
conditions under which Rousseau’s principles of political right might be realized—an account 
that emphasizes institutional arrangements, social conditions, and elements of moral education 
that belong more to the private education of the Emile than to civic education—that seems to 
imply that classical-style civic education is not indispensable to Rousseauian citizenship. Thus, 
his approach, too, keeps us from taking seriously enough Rousseau’s argument for the 
necessity of civic education and his indications of the problems posed by this necessity. 
 
18 Williams, Rousseau’s Platonic Enlightenment, esp. Chap. 4; Maloy, “Very Order of Things.” 
19 Cohen, Rousseau. 
20 Ibid., 35-36. 
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Our alternative account of the relation of the sides of Rousseau’s political theory is to 
be recommended—we hope—not only for more sympathetically and accurately representing 
Rousseau’s thought but also for enabling us to gain more than we otherwise might from 
confronting the critical, yet, in a way, friendly, challenge that it poses to us as liberal democrats. 
That account consists of four chapters. In the first, we will elaborate Rousseau’s theoretical 
definition of citizenship along with his other principles of political right, showing that they 
follow from modern voluntarist or contractarian premises, and then explain that the practical 
realization of citizenship, as Rousseau defines it, requires that human beings undergo a 
denaturing, psychically transformative civic education at the hands of extraordinary legislators. 
In the second, we will give an account of some of the key psychological elements of civic 
education that emerge by accident of history prior to the establishment of law and identify 
some of the key preconditions for civic education. In the third, we will discuss the preliminary 
stage of civic education, wherein the legislator persuades future citizens to submit to and thus 
effectively to enact his laws by way of an ingenious but disingenuous appeal to divine authority. 
Then, in the fourth, we will discuss civic education proper, wherein citizens are educated to 
virtue by being educated to patriotism. Finally, we will conclude by returning to the question 
of what we have to learn from Rousseau’s writings on citizenship and civic education. 
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Chapter 1: Citizenship and the Necessity of Civic Education 
What is citizenship, according to Rousseau? The most obvious place to turn for the 
answer to this question is Book I Chapter VI of the Social Contract, the principal chapter of 
Rousseau’s principal work of political theory. Here, in the course of elaborating the terms of 
the social contract—the convention that would render human subjection both legitimate and 
effective—Rousseau defines the citizen as a participant in sovereign authority, the supreme 
ruling body in a legitimately constituted political community. In participating in sovereign 
authority, citizens collectively legislate according to the general will, i.e., the will of every 
citizen, as part of the political community, to the good of the political community as a whole. 
Participation in sovereign authority is one of the two essential aspects of membership in a 
legitimately constituted political community, or, of citizenship. The other is subjection to the 
laws that are promulgated by sovereign authority. Citizens, then, are self-legislators. Subject 
only to laws of their making, which is to say, only to their general will, citizens are free. The 
aim of this chapter is to explain how this definition is derived, what it means, and why it 
depends for its practical realization upon civic education. 
I. PREMISES OF POLITICAL RIGHT 
Before further elaborating on this definition, let us explain how Rousseau derives it, 
along with his other principles of political right. The Social Contract is famous for its opening 
cri de cœur, with which Rousseau succinctly identifies the basic human problem: “Man was/is 
born free, and everywhere he is in chains.”21 Rousseau’s intention in the Social Contract is to 
“resolve [the] question” of “[w]hat can render [this change] legitimate” (SC 1.1 / ŒC 3: 351 
 
21 The tense of the first clause is ambiguous in the original French: “L’homme est né libre.” Following Masters and 
Kelly, we preserve the ambiguity by translating “est” “was/is” on the grounds that each tense reflects an aspect 
of this important thesis. Man is born free in the sense that, at birth, human beings have no obligations of 
obedience. Man was born free in the sense that, originally, the human species was not beset by social 
dependence. For a discussion of the implications of this ambiguity, see Masters and Kelly’s introduction to 
their translation of the Social Contract (CW 4: xiii-xv). 
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/ CW 4: 131). Viewed in this light, citizenship is, in a word, human subjection rendered 
legitimate. Its definition follows deductively from Rousseau’s determination of what can 
render the subjection of originally free human beings legitimate. This means that the ultimate 
grounds of Rousseau’s definition of citizenship, and, for that matter, all his principles of 
political right, are made up of his definition of legitimacy and his conception of human nature. 
If one defines legitimacy and conceives of human nature as Rousseau does, then one will be 
compelled, as if by mathematical necessity, to define citizenship as he does. Our immediate 
task is to explain how the definition of citizenship that we articulated above follows from these 
premises. 
Both the definition of legitimacy and the conception of human nature that underlie 
Rousseau’s principles of political right are treated as axiomatic premises in the Social Contract. 
Neither is demonstrated. The former premise is definitional. Legitimate subjection is ipso facto 
a state of subjection in which the subject is obligated to obey his master by right and thus not 
merely compelled to do so by force. While Rousseau does not state this explicitly, it is clearly 
implied by his refutations of the notion that might makes right—according to which the mere 
fact of subjection serves to legitimate subjection—in Book I Chapters I and III. Hence, in 
determining what can render human subjection legitimate, Rousseau is determining what can 
obligate human beings to obedience. 
The answer to this question is determined by the kind of being that human beings are 
by nature, namely, free beings. This premise is barely explained, let alone demonstrated, in the 
Social Contract. For its explanation and demonstration, one must turn to the Second Discourse. 
Rousseau’s procedure in Book I Chapter II of the Social Contract is to defend it negatively, by 
process of elimination. In a fashion more polemical than theoretically rigorous, Rousseau 
quickly refutes, or at least seems quickly to refute, variants of the opinion that human beings 
are born not free but enduringly subject to some kind of human authority. In doing this, he, 
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as Cohen observes, appeals to multiple conceptions of freedom.22 In Book I Chapter II, man 
is presented as being naturally free to undertake whatever means he judges to be necessary to 
fulfill his natural duty to preserve himself (SC 1.2 / ŒC 3: 352 / CW 4: 132). The notion that 
freedom is thus an indispensable instrument of self-preservation reappears in Book I Chapter 
IV along with the rather different notion that man’s freedom consists in the freedom of his 
will, which renders him a moral being (SC 1.4 / ŒC 3: 355-56 / CW 4: 134-35). The upshot 
of these refutations and of the premise that human beings are naturally free—however their 
freedom is understood—is that the only basis for legitimate subjection among human beings 
is their own will. They can be legitimately subject only to that authority to which they 
voluntarily subject themselves.23 
The answer to the question of what can render human subjection legitimate, then, is a 
convention by which human beings would voluntarily subject themselves to some authority. 
Rousseau reasons, “[s]ince no man has any natural authority over his fellow man [semblable], 
and since force produces no right, conventions therefore remain as the basis of all legitimate 
authority among men” (SC 1.4 / ŒC 3: 355/ CW 4: 134). Now, Rousseau is at pains to deny, 
over and against Thomas Hobbes,24 that the subjection of human beings to the private will of 
another, i.e., the will of another to his own good, or to the corporate will of others, i.e., the 
wills of the members of a group to their common good, in the form of slavery or of despotism 
is or can ever be legitimate.25 He musters an array of different arguments to this end in Book 
I Chapter IV, one of which is that human beings would not voluntarily subject themselves to 
 
22 Rousseau, 29-32. 
23 O’Hagan perceptively notes that the procedure by which Rousseau arrives at this conclusion presumes 
without argument that the human will can generate obligations and that the human will is the only conceivable 
alternative to nature and force that can do this (Rousseau, 95-96). On the status of divine will as such an 
alternative, consider Meier’s provocative interpretation (“Right of Politics,” 121-20). 
24 For an illuminating discussion of Rousseau’s relation to Hobbes, which bears on the issues that we discuss in 
what follows inter alia, see Strauss, Natural Right and History, 266-94. We follow Strauss in taking Rousseau to be 
a critic of Hobbes on the basis of Hobbes’s own premises. 
25 See Hobbes, Leviathan, Chap. XVII. 
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such wills (SC 1.4 / ŒC 3: 356 / CW 4: 134). In order to overcome the obvious, all too 
obvious, difficulty that human beings do, in fact, do this, Rousseau attaches a qualification to 
his argument, which proves decisive for his principles of political right. Legitimate subjection 
is only that subjection that could conceivably elicit the consent of human beings who remain 
as they are by nature, i.e., free and concerned to preserve their freedom. 
For Rousseau, the fact that some human beings consent to their subjection to the private 
or corporate wills of others has no more bearing on the question of the legitimacy of that 
subjection than the fact that they are in a state of such subjection.26 For, according to Rousseau, 
no human being would consent to such subjection who has not already been subjected to 
another or others, which means that the first cause of such subjection can only be the non-
legitimating force or deceit of the master and not the legitimating consent of the subject. It is 
at this point in the argument of the Social Contract that Rousseau’s divergence from Hobbes’s 
conception of human nature leads to his divergence from Hobbes’s conception of legitimate 
subjection. Failing to recognize man’s malleability and therefore his susceptibility to 
transformation in history, Hobbes fails to recognize that the behavior of human beings in 
modern society, or even in society as such, is irrelevant to the determination of political right.27 
This theoretical failure means that, despite the massive improvement on classical political 
theory that Hobbes achieves—from Rousseau’s point of view—in recognizing that man is by 
nature free and therefore legitimately subject only by his consent,28 Hobbes fails to improve 
upon classical political practice. While Hobbes recognizes the falsity of Aristotle’s doctrine 
that slavery is legitimate because some men are slaves by nature,29 he fails to recognize the 
falsity of all arguments for the legitimacy of slavery. Hobbes, no less than Aristotle, fails to 
 
26 Dent also emphasizes this, though, in our view, to such a degree that he understates of the importance of 
freedom, or independence, in Rousseau’s thought (Rousseau, 176-77, 205-206). 
27 See SD / ŒC 3: 122-23, 125-26, 132, 154-55, 218nXII / CW 3: 12-13, 14-15, 18-19, 35-36, 90n10. 
28 See Hobbes, Leviathan, Chaps. XIII, XVII. 
29 See Aristotle, Politics, Book I Chaps. IV-VI. 
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appreciate the significance of the fact that “[e]very man born in slavery is born for slavery” 
because they lose “everything in their chains, even the desire to get out of them” (SC 1.2 / 
ŒC 3: 353 / CW 4: 133).30 Because Hobbes and Aristotle fail to appreciate this, they both are 
led to conclude, albeit on different grounds, that slavery is not, in principle, illegitimate.31 
Why, then, would human beings who remain as they are by nature never voluntarily 
subject themselves to the private or corporate wills of others? The answer, which Rousseau 
gives in the most politically important passage of the Second Discourse, is that such dependence 
is incompatible with the fulfillment of man’s deepest natural need: self-preservation. He writes: 
It would [not be] reasonable to believe that Peoples at first threw themselves into the 
arms of an absolute Master without conditions and without recourse, and that the 
first means of providing for their common security that proud and untamed men 
might have imagined was to leap into slavery. Why, indeed, did they give themselves 
superiors if not to defend themselves against oppression, and to protect their goods, 
their freedoms and their lives, which are, so to speak, the constituent elements of 
their being? Now, in relations between men, the worst that can happen to one is to 
see himself at the discretion of the other. Was it not contrary to good sense to begin 
by divesting into the hands of a Leader [Chef] the very things for the preservation of 
which they needed his help? (SD / ŒC 3: 180-81 / CW 3: 56)32 
Here, in a way that is distinct from but closely related to the one indicated above, we see 
Rousseau correcting Hobbes on the basis of one Hobbes’s own premises. Pro Hobbes, it is 
for the sake of self-preservation that human beings consent to subjection.33 Contra Hobbes, 
the need of self-preservation would prevent them from subjecting themselves absolutely to 
the will of another.34 Hobbes recognizes that self-preservation is our deepest natural need, but 
fails to recognize what it entails, or how it is experienced. He fails to recognize, specifically, 
 
30 The importance that Rousseau attaches to his disagreement with Aristotle on this score is signaled by the 
epigraph to the Second Discourse (SD / ŒC 3: 109 / CW 3: 1). 
31 This explains Rousseau’s otherwise perplexing treatment of Hobbes as an opponent of the thesis that human 
beings are naturally free and therefore legitimately subject only to that authority to which they have consented 
in Book I Chapter I of the Social Contract. 
32 See, in this same vein, Rousseau’s description of the old Swiss (CC / ŒC 3: 914-15 / CW 11: 134-35). 
33 Leviathan, XVII.1. 
34 Ibid., XVII.13. 
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that freedom is indispensable to self-preservation. Note, however, that Rousseau’s criticism of 
Hobbes is more radical than John Locke’s.35 Freedom is indispensable to self-preservation not 
only because it is an indispensable means to the avoidance of death but also and more 
fundamentally because it is constitutive of the very self, or existence, that man is at pains to 
preserve. As one of the “constituent elements” of man’s being, freedom is not merely a means 
to but essential to the end of self-preservation. 
This inextricable connection between freedom and self-preservation reflects the 
transformation undergone by the latter concept in Rousseau’s thought. The avoidance of death 
is not the ultimate end of self-preservation. Man avoids death so that he might exist and sense 
his existence.36 One might say that the meaning of self-preservation in Rousseau’s thought is 
indicated more literally by the term “self-preservation” than it is in Hobbes’s or Locke’s. When 
one recognizes this, one can see why freedom is essential to self-preservation for Rousseau in 
a way that it is not for Hobbes or Locke. One cannot be oneself and, thus, one’s self cannot 
be preserved, if one is not free. This thought is well expressed by Emile’s tutor’s observation 
that the slave “cease[s] to exist before his death” (E 5 /ŒC 4: 839 / CW 13: 651). The slave’s 
loss of freedom is problematic not merely because, as Locke would point out, it makes him 
vulnerable to death at the hands of his master but also because, in preventing him from doing 
as he wills, it prevents him from being himself. To risk one’s life in seeking to avoid slavery is 
therefore to seek preserve oneself. Hence, the examples of savages and animals’ risking their 
lives to avoid subjection that Rousseau produces following the passage from the Second 
Discourse quoted above do not contradict but clarify his claim that self-preservation is man’s 
deepest natural need (SD / ŒC 3: 181-82 / CW 3: 57).37 
 
35 See, for example, Second Treatise, 3.17, 4.23. 
36 See VF 21 / ŒC 2: 1324-25 / CW 12: 279. 
37 Our account here follows Melzer’s illuminating account of Rousseau’s distinctive conception of self-
preservation (Natural Goodness of Man, 35-46) as well as some suggestions of Strauss’s (Natural Right and History, 
278, 292). 
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 To say that the character of legitimate subjection can be determined only from the 
point of view of human beings who have not already been subjected illegitimately by force or 
deceit is to say that it must be determined from the point of human beings concerned 
principally, if not exclusively, with preserving their lives, goods, and freedom as the constituent 
elements of their beings. For that was, according to the Second Discourse, the principal, if not 
exclusive, concern of human beings prior to their being illegitimately subjected to one 
another’s wills. Accordingly, the terms of the convention by which human subjection might 
be rendered legitimate are, as we will now explain, dictated by this concern.38 
II. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE GENERAL WILL 
 Rousseau begins his analysis of the convention by which human subjection might be 
rendered legitimate in Book I Chapter VI with a hypothesis: “I suppose that men have reached 
that point at which the obstacles that are detrimental to their preservation in the state of nature 
prevail by their resistance over the forces that each individual can employ to maintain himself 
in this state” (emphasis added) (SC 1.6 / ŒC 3: 360 / CW 4: 138). We recognize, based on 
the argument of the last section, that, although this condition is not dissimilar to the one 
identified as the historical cause of civil society in the Second Discourse,39 it is Rousseau’s 
conception not of the conditions under which civil society did arise but of the conditions 
under which a legitimate civil society might arise that leads him to begin in this way. The only 
condition under which human beings, taken as they are by nature, would conceivably consent 
to quitting the state of nature for the civil state is the one that Rousseau hypothesizes here. 
Given the unnatural insufficiency of their respective “forces,” men are compelled by 
their natural need of self-preservation “to form by aggregation a sum of forces which can 
 
38 For a concise yet subtle account of the thinking underlying Rousseau’s analysis of the social contract, which 
is consistent with our foregoing account, see Masters, Political Philosophy of Rousseau, 285. 
39 SD / ŒC 3: 175-78 / CW 3: 52-54. 
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prevail over the resistance, to put them into play through a single motive and to make them 
act in concert.” While the need of self-preservation compels each man to “commit” his “force” 
and “freedom” in uniting with his fellows, it also precludes each man from alienating them to 
any other man. For they are “the first instruments of his preservation.” The “fundamental 
problem,” then, is “[t]o find a form of association that defends and protects the person and 
goods of each associate with all the common force and yet by which each, uniting with all, 
obeys only himself and remains as free as before” (SC 1.6 / ŒC 3: 360 / CW 4: 138). This 
problem is fundamental not only in the obvious sense that it concerns the fulfillment of man’s 
most fundamental natural need but also in the sense that, as the last section shows, it is 
tantamount to the problem of legitimating human subjection, that is, to the fundamental 
problem of the Social Contract.  
Rousseau’s characterization of the problem follows from the critique of slavery and 
despotism in the Second Discourse that we elaborated above. Note, though, that, in characterizing 
freedom as an indispensable instrument to preservation à la Locke, he does not appeal to the 
distinctive, and more radical, conception of the inalienability of freedom that we attributed to 
him on the basis of that critique. The persons, goods, and freedom that are to be protected by 
this form of association are the equivalents of “the constituent elements of [man’s] being” 
identified in the Second Discourse, but they are not characterized in this way here. This is true 
also of the preceding characterization of the relation of freedom to the need of self-
preservation in Book I Chapter II: “freedom” is “a consequence of the nature of man,” 
specifically, of his natural duty to seek his preservation by whatever means he judges to be 
appropriate to that end (SC 1.2 / ŒC 3: 352 / CW 4: 132). We would submit that, in reasoning 
on the basis of this conception of freedom and its relation to self-preservation, Rousseau is 
reasoning dialectically for the rhetorical purpose of showing that his principles of political right 
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follow from Hobbesian and Lockean premises, properly understood.40 Although those 
principles can also be established on the basis of Rousseau’s alternative conception of freedom 
as constitutive of the self, one need not accept that conception in order to recognize that they 
are the only sound principles of political right. Additional evidence of such dialectical 
reasoning can be found in Book I Chapter IV, where, as we noted above, Rousseau appeals to 
yet another conception of freedom—freedom of the will, or moral freedom—in order to 
demonstrate from yet another point of view that freedom cannot be legitimately alienated, 
even by consent (SC 1.4 / ŒC 3: 356 / CW 4: 135).41 In all this, Rousseau’s purpose is to 
overwhelm his readers with the impression that, from every point of view, freedom is 
inalienable.42 
The “solution” to the fundamental problem, in both of the senses indicated above, is 
a “social contract” in which each party resolves to put “his person and all his power in common under 
the supreme direction of the general will” and to receive “in a body each member as an indivisible part of the 
whole.” What is the general will? And how does the parties’ submission of their persons and 
power to its supreme direction solve the fundamental problem? Let us approach the first 
question by considering the effect that Rousseau attributes to the parties’ agreement to the 
social contract: “Instantly, in place of the private person of each contracting party, this act of 
 
40 Here, we would offer a qualification to Masters’s claim that, in Book I Chapter VI, Rousseau finally “begins 
to discuss the problem [of the rightful origin of civil society] on his own premises” (Political Philosophy of 
Rousseau, 314). The claim is correct to the extent that Rousseau does agree with Locke that freedom is an 
indispensable means to the avoidance of death; hence, he is not discussing the problem on premises that he 
rejects. But he is discussing the problem on premises that do not fully capture his conception of freedom and 
its relation to the need of self-preservation. See, in this connection, Melzer’s argument that, while Rousseau’s 
political theorizing in the Social Contract is ultimately guided by a concern that extends beyond self-preservation, 
conceived in Hobbesian or Lockean terms, to happiness, that concern can, given Rousseau’s conception of 
happiness and its requirements, be met by a political order that is oriented around self-preservation (Natural 
Goodness of Man, 115-18). Our examination of civic education in Chapter 4 will indicate some of the important 
ways that such a political order does this. 
41 A similar argument is also made in the Second Discourse almost immediately following the passage that we 
discussed above (SD / ŒC 3: 182-84 / CW 3: 58-59). 
42 Thus, we would suggest that Rousseau’s treatment of freedom in the opening chapters of the Social Contract 
ought to be understood more rhetorically than it is by Cohen, who, as we noted above, also recognizes that 
Rousseau appeals to differing conceptions of freedom in these chapters (Rousseau, 29-32). 
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association produces a moral and collective body composed of as many members as the 
assembly has voices, which receives from the same act its unity, its common self, its life and 
its will” (SC 1.6 / ŒC 3: 360-61 / CW 4: 138-39). The general will is the will that this moral 
and collective body receives from the parties’ agreement to the social contract. In order to 
understand what the general will is, then, we need to understand what this moral and collective 
body is.43  
First, though, we would do well to identify two related premises that are crucial in 
informing Rousseau’s conception of the general will, to which he appeals at different points 
in the course of elaborating the principles that follow from the social contract. The more 
fundamental of these premises, which comes from “the law of reason,” is that “nothing is 
done without cause.” The other premise is implicit in the conclusion that Rousseau draws 
from this one, i.e., that the moral and collective body cannot “will” that its members be subject 
to “any chain that is useless to the community,” which is to say, to itself (SC 2.4 / ŒC 3: 373 
/ CW 4: 149). He makes this premise explicit elsewhere, in the assertion that “it is not possible 
for any will to consent to anything contrary to the good of the being that wills” (SC 2.1 / ŒC 
3: 369 / CW 4: 145). Inasmuch as willing is an action, it is the effect of some cause. And the 
cause of which it is the effect is the love of one’s good that moves all beings. Hence, what the 
general will, as the will of the moral and collective body generated by the social contract, wills 
is the good of that moral and collective body. 
 Because this body is only a composite of other bodies, it has no good other than the 
good that its components have in common. Its good, and therefore the object of the general 
will, is, in a word, “the common good.” More specifically, it is the object of the common 
interest that drives private individuals to agree to the social contract, namely, the preservation 
 
43 While we limit ourselves to Rousseau’s particular conception of the general will, we note that the term 
“general will” is not peculiar to Rousseau’s thought. On the intellectual origins and history of this concept, see 
Riley, The General Will before Rousseau. 
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of their lives, goods, and freedom (SC 2.1 / ŒC 3: 368 / CW 4: 145).44 In addition to being 
the object of the general will, this common good is the cause of “the social bond” and 
therewith of the unity that Rousseau attributes to the moral and collective body (SC 2.1 / ŒC 
3: 368 / CW 4: 145). It is what brings and keeps individuals together as members of that body. 
And, inasmuch as the identity and life that Rousseau attributes to that body depend upon its 
unity, they, too, are the effects of the common good. Thus, the common good that consists 
in the preservation of the lives, goods, and freedom of all the contracting parties is the cause 
of all the essential attributes of the moral and collective body generated by the social contract.45 
Rousseau characterizes the will that he attributes to this moral and collective body as 
“general” in two ways. “[I]ts object” and “its essence” are “general” in relation to the members 
of the moral and collective body (SC 2.4 / ŒC 3: 373 / CW 4: 149). Its object is general 
inasmuch as it concerns all the members of the body taken together as a whole and is directed 
to the good that they have in common. Its essence is general in the sense that it exists in each 
member as the will of a part of a whole, i.e., the moral and collective body. Thus, it differs 
essentially from private wills, which exist in individuals as the wills of wholes concerning, and 
directed to the respective goods of, themselves as individuals. One can say that the general 
will is general in its object because it is general in its essence. As the will of parts of a whole, 
 
44 Cohen argues that, strictly speaking, the common good consists only in the contracting parties’ lives and 
goods and not their freedom. For freedom is not so much the object as the byproduct of the general will. This 
is reflected in Rousseau’s formulation of the fundamental problem as the necessity of finding “a form of 
association that defends and protects the person and goods of each associate with all the common force and yet 
by which each, uniting with all, obeys only himself and remains as free as before” (emphasis added) and in his 
subsequent identification of “the end of the political association” as “the preservation and the prosperity of its 
members” (SC 1.6, 3.9 / ŒC 3: 360, 419-20 / CW 4: 138, 185). The associates will remain as free as they were 
before if or insofar as the association defends and protects their persons and goods. Yet this way of thinking 
about the common good obscures the importance of freedom in citizens’ understanding of the good that they 
attain through civic life. See Cohen, Rousseau, 40-53. 
45 Lest we forget that the existence of this common good is not natural but historically contingent, Rousseau 
briefly turns from his analysis of right to observe that, in fact, this common good emerges only as a 
consequence of the “opposition of private interests” that caused the state of war that preceded the 
establishment of civil society. Hence, it is, as Melzer helpfully explains, merely “negative” and “reflexive” 
(“Rousseau, Nationalism, and the Politics of Sympathetic Identification,” 114-16). 
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the general will necessarily concerns, and is directed to the good of, the whole to which those 
parts belong. Hence, Rousseau’s claim that “the general will is always right [droite] and tends 
always toward the public utility” is nothing more than the statement of a definition (SC 2.3 / 
ŒC 3: 371 / CW 4: 147). Inasmuch as every being necessarily wills its good, every partial being 
wills the good of the whole to which it belongs, which in the case of the moral and collective 
body generated by the social contract, consists of the preservation of the lives, goods, and 
freedom of all.  
We can gain additional insight into the general will by reconsidering its genesis through 
the social contract. Above, we saw that the general will, along with the moral and collective 
body to which it belongs, comes into being at the very instant that the social contract is agreed 
to. Partly for this reason, it is tempting to conflate the contracting parties’ wills to enter the 
social contract with the general will. But to do this would be to obscure the crucial 
transformation that their wills undergo as an effect of their willing the social contract. The 
hypothetical parties to the social contract have wills to the preservation of their individual 
lives, goods, and freedom. Once they recognize that the only available means to their 
individual ends is to subject themselves to the general will, they will their entrance into the 
social contract and, by extension, their subjection to the general will. Although they have a 
common object, their wills to these things are private inasmuch as they concern themselves as 
distinct, individual wholes. To put the point less abstractly, each wills the social contract and 
his subjection to the general will for the sake of his life, goods, and freedom. In doing so, none 
is willing the preservation of the lives, goods, and freedom of all. Yet, inasmuch as willing an 
end is tantamount to willing the means to that end,46 willing one’s subjection to the general 
will is, in a sense, to will the existence of the general will. Upon agreeing to the social contract, 
then, the parties necessarily begin to will the preservation of the lives, goods, and freedom of 
 
46 SC 2.5 / ŒC 3: 376 / CW 4: 151. 
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all on some level. Thus, the general will is immediately generated in every party by agreement, 
formal or informal, explicit or implicit, to the social contract. And, as long as the parties 
continue to recognize that the preservation of their individual lives, goods, and freedom 
depends upon their subjection to the general will and, consequently, continue to will the social 
contract, the general will will continue to exist. Hence, the general will is, as Rousseau claims, 
“indestructible,” at least as long as civil society persists (SC 4.1 / ŒC 3: 437-38 / CW 4: 198-
99).47 
Much of the complexity of the general will comes from the complexity of its relation 
to private wills, which we have only begun to clarify. We have seen that the general will is 
derivative of private wills in the sense that it arises out of individuals’ wills to preserve their 
individual lives, goods, and freedom. Yet it differs from private wills in its essence and its 
object. It must do so. It must concern, and be directed to the good of, the parties to the social 
contract as a whole, to them all. For, if it did not concern this, if it were not so directed, the 
contracting parties would be unwilling to subject themselves to it. We would put the thought 
this way: The will to enter the social contact is a private will to will generally and, thus, not to 
will privately. Now, as we will discuss below, this private will to will generally has the effect of 
generating the general will but not of destroying the private will. Once generated, the general 
will exists alongside the private will in the psyches of the contracting parties. The persistence 
of private wills, of wills that differ from the general will in their essence and therefore can 
differ from the general will in their objects, represents the great obstacle to the rule of the 
general will even as it paradoxically guarantees the existence of the general will. Lest we get 
 
47 Rousseau does not explicitly qualify his claim in this way in Book IV Chapter I. But it is implicit in his 
indication in the immediately preceding chapter that the social contract can be “revoke[d]” (SC 3.18 / ŒC 3: 
436 / CW 4: 197). 
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ahead of ourselves, we leave this important point for subsequent elaboration and 
clarification.48 
Now that we understand the object, essence, and origin of the general will, we turn to 
Rousseau’s definition of the “citizen.” The moral and collective body, or “public person,” 
generated by the social contract, to which the general will belongs, and which “in the past took 
the name of City, and now takes that of Republic or of political body,” is both “active” and 
“passive.” When it is active, i.e., when it wills the preservation of the lives, goods, and freedom 
of all its parts, along with the means necessary to that end, it is called “Sovereign”; when it is 
passive, i.e., when it receives the obedience of its parts to this will, it is called “State.” The term 
“Citizens” refers to the members of the public person “as participants in sovereign authority”; 
the term “Subjects” refers to them “as subject to the laws of the State” (SC 1.6 / ŒC 3: 361-
62 / CW 4: 139). Thus, as a principle of political right, citizenship consists in willing generally, 
i.e., in willing the good of the whole to which one belongs as a part, or, more specifically, in 
willing the common preservation of the lives, goods, and freedom of oneself and one’s fellows. 
While, for reasons indicated above, citizenship may in practice be dependent upon a private 
will—to the subjection of oneself to the general will for the preservation of one’s own life, 
goods, and freedom—the will of the man who is a citizen is, in his capacity as citizen, the 
general will. For, given the definition of sovereignty, to participate in sovereign authority, i.e., 
to be a citizen, is necessarily to will generally and not privately. 
Rousseau’s definition of the subject anticipates the important, final part of his 
elaboration of principles of political right in Books I and II of the Social Contract: The general 
will is promulgated and, thus effectively becomes binding on subjects, in the form of law. In 
practice, then, participation in sovereign authority, or citizenship, entails legislating with one’s 
 
48 For a clear and illuminating account of the exact sense in which the general will exists without thereby 
necessarily directing political power in practice, see Melzer, Natural Goodness of Man, 160-65, 168.  
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fellow citizens according to the general will. In Book II Chapter VI, Rousseau makes clear that 
the activity of sovereignty consists in legislation because law is nothing other than an act of 
the general will. He writes:  
when the whole people rules [statue] over the whole people, it considers only itself, 
and if a relation is then formed, it is between the entire object from one point of 
view and the entire object from another point of view without any division of the 
whole. Then the matter on which it rules is general like the will that rules. It is this 
act that I call a law. (SC 2.6 / ŒC 3: 379 / CW 4: 153) 
Rousseau’s definition of law is thus essentially a restatement of his definition of the general 
will. Laws are simply the determinations of a will that is general in its object and essence. The 
legislator, properly understood as a principle of political right, is therefore identical to the 
citizens.49 
 Given this, the locus of citizenship is the legislative assembly. Rousseau alludes to this 
in Book I Chapter VI when he characterizes the members of the public person as “voices” in 
“the assembly” and when he evokes classical republicanism by identifying “City” as the name 
that was used “in the past” for the public person (SC 1.6 / ŒC 3: 361 / CW 4: 138, 139). He 
is emphatic that contra previous social contract theorists such as Hobbes and Locke, legislative 
authority, or sovereignty, cannot be alienated from the citizens themselves to a representative 
or representatives. It is to the general will that the parties to the social contract subject 
themselves. For it is only this will that is general in its essence that can be relied upon always 
to be directed to the common good for the sake of which the parties agreed to the social 
contract (SC 2.1 / ŒC 3: 370-69 / CW 4: 145). A social contract in which the parties agreed 
to subject themselves to any will other than the general will would fail to solve “the 
fundamental problem,” to elicit the consent of human beings, taken as they are by nature, and 
to legitimate human subjection. In this light, the inextricable connection between Rousseau’s 
 
49 This means that, for as much as Rousseau departs from the Thomistic natural-law tradition, Rousseau’s 
definition of law, like Thomas’, is normative (Gildin, Rousseau’s “Social Contract”, 3). 
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insistence on the general will’s generality, or its directedness to the common good, and his 
voluntarism or contractarianism is, contra Riley, clearly evident.50 
It is important to recognize that Rousseau’s insistence that citizens cannot alienate 
sovereignty does not imply that every enactment of a legislative assembly will promote the 
common good. The enactments of a legislative assembly will do this reliably only to the extent 
that the members of the assembly vote as citizens, i.e., in accord with the general will. And 
while, as we argued above, the general will exists in all the members of the legislative assembly, 
it is not, as we will discuss at greater length below, the only or necessarily the most powerful 
will that exists in them, or, therefore, the will that guides them in proposing and voting on 
potential laws. In order for the enactments of a legislative assembly to express the general will 
and thus be genuine acts of sovereignty—or laws, properly so-called—the members of the 
assembly must vote as citizens, strictly speaking, that is, they must vote for or against proposed 
legislation by determining whether “it is advantageous to the State” as distinguished from whether 
“it is advantageous to this man or to this party” (SC 4.1 / ŒC 3: 438 / CW 4: 199).51 Rousseau’s 
citizen is not, then, any voter in a legislative assembly but only that voter who votes in accord 
with the general will and who thus participates in sovereignty, properly understood. 
The strict sense in which Rousseau uses the related terms that are at issue here, i.e., 
“general will,” “sovereignty,” “law,” and “citizen,” is made clear in his observation that “[t]he 
Sovereign, by the sole fact that it is, is always all that it must be” (SC 1.7 / ŒC 3: 363 / CW 
4: 140). In making this observation, Rousseau, the great opponent of the notion that might 
makes right, is certainly not suggesting that whatever any so-called sovereign wills is legitimate. 
Unless one recognizes the strict sense in which he uses terms such as “sovereign” in Book I 
Chapter VI through Book II Chapter VI of the Social Contract, his argument that total 
 
50 See Riley, “Possible Explanation of Rousseau’s General Will.” 
51 Meier, “Right of Politics,” 127, 130-31; Viroli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 162. 
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subjection to the general will, to the sovereign, or to law solves “the fundamental problem” 
will be unconvincing. When one does recognize this, however, one sees that to be a subject to 
the laws under the social contract is, indeed, to be subject only to the requirements of the 
preservation of one’s life, goods, and freedom. For no law, no enactment of citizens 
participating in sovereignty, no determination of the general will can demand anything other 
than what is required for the preservation of the lives, goods, and freedom of all.52   
Two crucial features of subjection under the social contract that signify its legitimacy 
follow from this. First, it is in the subject’s interest to fulfill his duties (SC 1.7 / ŒC 3: 363 / 
CW 4: 140). For the fulfillment of his duties is necessary for the preservation of his life, goods, 
and freedom. Thus, in keeping with his resolution at the beginning of the Social Contract, 
Rousseau “bring[s] together what right permits with what interest prescribes such that justice 
and utility are not found to be divided” (SC 1 / ŒC 3: 351 / CW 4: 131).53 Granted, there is 
a massive difficulty. In practice, the preservation of the lives, goods, and freedom of all 
sometimes requires that all give up at least some of their goods and that at least some risk, and 
ultimately give up, their lives. At these times, justice and utility are divided. This dissertation 
can be understood, in large part, as an explanation of Rousseau’s response to this problem. 
We limit ourselves here, then, to noting the difficulty. Second, in fulfilling his duties, the 
subject remains free. This is true in two distinct but closely related senses. For, in fulfilling his 
duties, the subject is following both the general will that dictates those duties, which exists in 
him, and the private will that moved him to agree to the social contract and subject himself to 
the general will in the first place. Thus, the parties to the social contract “[remain] as free as 
[they were] before [they agreed to the social contract]” (SC 1.6 / ŒC 3: 360 / CW 4: 138). Of 
 
52 One sees, in this light, that Putterman’s contention that, under Rousseau’s social contract, the majority 
faction rules over minority factions is mistaken (“Rousseau on Agenda-Setting,” 464). 
53 For an account of the doctrine of the social contract that emphasizes Rousseau’s resolution to do this, see 
Viroli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 123-32.  
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course, this, too, must be qualified by the difficulty to which we pointed above. To say the 
least, it is not obvious that the subject who is bound to give up his goods or, especially, to risk 
his life over and against his private will to preserve these things is simply or altogether free. 
 If, for the sake of argument, we set this difficulty aside, the totality of the contracting 
parties’ subjection to the general will appears unproblematic. They need not reserve any rights 
against the sovereign because its end is so defined by its essence that it cannot act in ways that 
are prejudicial to subjects (SC 2.4 / ŒC 3: 372-73 / CW 4: 148). In fact, the totality of their 
subjection is essential to the efficacy of the social contract. Rousseau gives three reasons why 
“the total alienation of each associate, with all his rights, to the community” is necessary in 
Book I Chapter VI. First, he argues that the alienation, being total for each, is equal for each 
and, therefore, that no one will have “an interest in making [the condition] onerous for others” 
(SC 1.6 / ŒC 3: 361 / CW 4: 138). But presumably the parties could alienate themselves 
partially without doing so unequally. A concern with equity alone does not quite necessitate 
that all parties alienate themselves totally. Rousseau’s second argument goes further. If all 
parties alienate themselves to the community totally, there will be no reserved rights over 
which there might be contestation between the parties and the community, contestation that 
Rousseau fears would end in anarchy or despotism and thus defeat the very purpose of the 
social contract. Finally, if all are totally subject to the general will, none will be able to subject 
another to his private will. Thus, in totally subjecting themselves to the general will, the 
contracting parties preserve their independence from the private wills of others. 
Despite his contention that subjects have an interest in the fulfillment of their duties 
under the social contract, Rousseau readily concedes that this interest alone cannot be relied 
upon to move them to be dutiful. Here, then, he recognizes the difficulty to which we pointed 
above. The subjects, by the sole fact that they are, are not, by contrast with the sovereign, all 
that they must be. Rousseau explains: 
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each individual can, as a man, have a private will contrary or dissimilar to the general 
will that he has as a Citizen. His private interest can speak to him entirely differently 
from the common interest; his absolute and naturally independent existence can 
make him see what he owes to the common cause as a free contribution, the loss of 
which will be less harmful to others than the payment of which is onerous for 
himself, and seeing the moral person that constitutes the State as a being of reason 
because it is not a man, he might enjoy the rights of the citizen without wanting to 
fulfill the duties of the subject; the progress of such injustice would cause the ruin of 
the political body. (SC 1.7 / ŒC 3: 363 / CW 4: 141) 
There is a limit to the transformation effected by the social contract. In willing the social 
contract, the parties to it do not altogether cease, either physiologically or psychologically, to 
be the distinct, individual wholes that they are by nature. Hence, their wills do not become 
altogether general in their essence or their object. They retain their natural private wills along 
with their artificial general will. And those private wills do not coincide perfectly with the 
general will. The exact reason for this will become clear when one considers the difference 
between the situations of the contracting parties before and after they agree to the social 
contract. Immediately before they agree to the social contract, they recognize that they cannot 
preserve their lives, goods, or freedom without subjecting themselves to the general will. The 
effect of their recognition of this is, as we explained above, the generation of the general will 
in them and the coincidence of the object of their private wills with that of the general will. 
But, to the extent that subjects recognize that they can avoid fulfilling some of the duties 
imposed on them by the sovereign without immediately or necessarily imperiling their own 
individual lives, goods, and freedom, their private wills will not coincide with the general will 
and may even move them to shirk those duties. The problem becomes especially acute in those 
cases in which fulfilling the duties imposed by the sovereign entail risking or even giving up 
one’s own individual life, goods, or freedom. 
Lest the social contract amount to nothing more than “a vain formula,” Rousseau 
holds, “it tacitly includes this commitment which alone can give force to the others, that 
anyone who should refuse to obey the general will, will be constrained to do so by the whole 
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body” (SC 1.7 / ŒC 3: 364 / CW 4: 141). This provision for constraint follows necessarily 
from, and therefore need not be made explicit in, the terms of the social contract. For it is a 
necessary means to the end for the sake of which the contracting parties subject themselves 
to the general will, i.e., the preservation of their individual lives, goods, and freedom. To will 
this end is, by extension, to will this means.54 Rousseau characterizes this provision as nothing 
less than the sine qua non of the social contract. Against those who would object, in view of this 
provision, that the parties to the social contract do not remain as free as they were before, 
Rousseau insists that, in being constrained to obey the general will, the subject is merely being 
“forced to be free.” He explains: 
For this is the condition that, by giving each Citizen to the Fatherland, guarantees 
him against all personal dependence; a condition that makes up the artifice of the 
political machine and puts it into play [condition qui fait l’artifice et le jeu de la machine 
politique], and that alone renders legitimate civil engagements, which, without that 
condition, would be absurd, tyrannical, and subject to the most enormous abuses. 
(SC 1.7 / ŒC 3: 364 / CW 4: 141) 
In effectively rendering all subjects dependent upon the general will, it prevents them from 
becoming dependent on any private will. Thus, it protects them against the worst fate that can 
befall a man in his relations with other men: “see[ing] himself at the discretion of [another]” 
(SD / ŒC 3: 180-81 / CW 3: 56).55 The provision, furthermore, “makes up the artifice of the 
political machine and puts it into play” by guaranteeing that all will in fact be subject to the 
laws that they make as citizens. The guarantee of this will give members of the assembly an 
interest in imposing, through their enactments, only those burdens that are genuinely necessary 
for the common good. Thus, it helps to align their private wills with the general will and 
 
54 Here, as Gildin points out, we see the necessary connection between the imperative of legitimacy and that of 
efficacy, which together determine the social contract. Only an association that effectively preserves the 
associates’ lives, goods, and freedom could conceivably elicit their consent and thus be considered legitimate. 
See Rousseau’s “Social Contract”, 5-6. 
55 See also SC 4.2 / ŒC 3: 440n2 / CW 4: 200-201n2. 
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increases the likelihood that the enactments of the assembly will be laws, properly so-called.56 
Finally, it legitimates civil engagements by guaranteeing that they will be mutually fulfilled (SC 
2.4 / ŒC 3: 373 / CW 4: 148-49). 
III. THE FREEDOM OF THE CITIZEN 
This encomium to the social contract’s provision for constraint, which we will 
reexamine with a more critical eye in the next section, is immediately followed, in Book I 
Chapter VIII, by an account of the transformation effected by the social contract. The chapter 
begins: 
This passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a very remarkable 
change in man, substituting justice for instinct in his conduct and giving his actions 
the morality that they formerly lacked. It is only then, when the voice of duty 
succeeds to physical impulse and right to appetite, that man, who until that time 
considered only himself, sees himself forced to act on other principles, and to 
consult his reason before heeding his inclinations. (SC 1.8 / ŒC 3: 364 / CW 4: 141) 
Note the adjective at the beginning of the first sentence. “This” refers specifically to the 
hypothetical passage of human beings from the state of nature into the legitimate civil state by 
way of the social contract, which Rousseau has described in the two preceding chapters. Thus, 
it distinguishes this passage from the historical passage of already partly denatured human 
beings into the illegitimate civil state. That passage did not produce, or at least did not 
necessarily produce, the change in man that would be produced by this passage, if it were to 
occur.  
Now, the change that Rousseau describes man undergoing in this passage is much 
more radical than the change that man undergoes in the act of agreeing to the social contract. 
Man in the civil state is here contrasted not with man as he is in the very last stage of the state 
of nature but with man as he is in the very first stage of the state of nature, as utterly self-
 
56 For particularly clear statements of this thought, see Gildin, Rousseau’s “Social Contract”, 59; O’Hagan, 
Rousseau, 112; and Viroli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 128-29. 
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absorbed, sub-rational, and amoral. One sees in the Second Discourse that man moved away from 
this condition, for better and for worse, by accident of history. And the human beings that 
Rousseau hypothesized in his analysis of the social contract in Book I Chapter VI would not 
be able to conceive of, let alone be willing to agree to, the social contract if they, too, had not 
already moved away from this condition.57 Still, it is only through man’s agreement to the 
social contract that his will is finally generalized in its essence and its object and that he thus 
becomes a rational and moral being. It is only then that his will and therewith his actions are 
determined by his reason, specifically, by his reasoned judgment about what is advantageous 
for himself as part of the whole of which he has become a part. Rousseau’s description of this 
change makes clearer the distinction we drew above between the will to subject oneself to the 
general will, or the will to enter the social contract, and the general will itself. Whereas the will 
to enter the social contract is determined by the sub-rational, amoral need of one’s own 
individual self-preservation, the general will itself is not determined by this need, even if, as 
we explained above, it comes into being in citizens because of this need. 
Given all this, Book I Chapter VIII calls into question Rousseau’s earlier suggestion 
that, by nature, man’s will is free and that man is therefore, by nature, a moral being possessed 
of rights, duties, and dignity (SC 1.4 / ŒC 3: 356 / CW 4: 135). Thus, it reproduces the 
expression of doubt that immediately follows Rousseau’s attribution of this kind of freedom 
to human nature in the Second Discourse (SD / ŒC 3: 141-42 / CW 3: 26).58 Scholars who hold 
that the hypothetical parties to the social contract are, in Rousseau’s analysis, moved by a 
concern to preserve this kind of freedom do not, in our view, adequately account for the 
 
57 Consider the contrast drawn by Viroli between the hypothetical parties to the social contract and “the poor 
savage [from the Second Discourse] who in the morning sells his cotton bed, and comes back whining in the 
evening hoping to buy it back, all because he has failed to realise that he would need it again the next night” 
(Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 130). See also Strauss, Natural Right and History, 272, 283. 
58 For scholarly debate on of this important passage, see Cullen, Freedom in Rousseau’s Political Philosophy, Chap. 2; 
MacLean, Free Animal, Chap. 1; Masters, Political Philosophy of Rousseau, 147-57; Plattner, Rousseau’s State of Nature, 
41-51. 
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argument of this chapter, or, for that matter, its resonance with the argument of the Second 
Discourse.59 
Among the great goods that man acquires in thus passing from the state of nature into 
the civil state—the exercise and development of his faculties, the extension of his ideas, the 
ennoblement of his sentiments, the elevation of his soul—are two kinds of freedom, i.e., “civil 
freedom” and “moral freedom,” which differ from “natural freedom” in degree and kind, 
respectively. Whereas natural freedom extends as far as “the forces of the individual,” civil 
freedom is “limited by the general will” (SC 1.8 / ŒC 3: 364-65 / CW 4: 141-42). Civil 
freedom is the freedom—now understood as a right possessed by dint of membership in the 
political body—of the subject to act according to his private will if or inasmuch as it does not 
oppose the general will, as promulgated in the law and enforced by the government. Of course, 
the freedom to do this would, like natural freedom, be limited also by the forces of the 
individual. In the civil state, then, man is free to act according to his private will to whatever 
extent the general will and his individual forces admit.60  
When one considers the fact that man’s subjection to the general will in the civil state 
is, or at least originates as, a necessary means to his preservation, one recognizes that, for as 
much as that subjection distinguishes his condition in this state from his condition in the state 
of nature, it arises from the same natural necessity that determines his action and limits his 
freedom in that condition. This thought is reflected in the analogy that Rousseau later draws 
between the subject who gives his life on the orders of the general will with the man who, in 
the state of nature, risks his life in the hope of preserving his life. But the analogy, given its 
imprecision, also exposes the limit of the thought. While the citizen’s choice to risk his life, 
goods, and freedom by subjecting himself to the general will—which might order him to give 
 
59 E.g., Cohen, Rousseau, 11, 90-91; Dent, Rousseau, 188-211; Levine, Politics of Autonomy, 26-28 
60 On the similarity of civil freedom to natural freedom, see Cullen, Freedom in Rousseau’s Political Philosophy, 94-
95; Marks, Perfection and Disharmony, 80-81. 
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those things up—is based on his own judgment about how best to preserve those things, he, 
in making that choice, surrenders his freedom to make such choices for himself in the future 
(SC 2.5 / ŒC 3: 376 / CW 4: 150-51). In those instances in which the sovereign judges that 
subjects must risk their lives for the state and those subjects do not judge that this is necessary 
for the preservation of their lives, their freedom is limited in a way that man’s freedom in the 
state of nature is not. Nevertheless, a crucial point to be made in favor of civil freedom is that 
it is limited only by the general will and, thus, not by any private wills. Civil freedom is that 
freedom “from all personal dependence” that results from the social contract’s provision for 
constraining subjects to obey the general will (SC 1.7 / ŒC 3: 364 / CW 4: 141).  
As for moral freedom, Rousseau writes at the conclusion of the chapter: 
To the preceding acquisitions of the civil state, one could add moral freedom, which 
alone renders man truly master of himself; for the impulsion of appetite alone is 
slavery, and obedience to the law that one has prescribed for oneself is freedom. But 
I have already said only too much about this subject, and the philosophic sense of 
the word freedom is not my subject here. (SC 1.8 / ŒC 3: 365 / CW 4: 142) 
To the extent that the law that the citizen prescribes for himself is the general will, his freedom 
is not, as the definition of civil freedom implies, limited by the general will. For it is he, or, more 
specifically, his reason, that imposes this limit on his action. In obeying the general will, then, 
he is obeying himself and thus exercising his freedom. Note that, if or insofar as citizens come 
to adopt the view of freedom that Rousseau here articulates, their legislating in accord with 
the general will and their obeying the laws that express the general will will not depend upon 
the private wills that moved them to enter the social contract. Conceiving of freedom as 
Rousseau presents it here, the citizen will be moved to legislate in accord with the general will 
and obey the laws that express the general will without regard to their private wills because 
they will believe that, in doing these things, they attain to a more complete freedom than they 
knew before. In suggesting that, as part of their passage into the civil state, citizens will come 
to conceive of their freedom in this way, Rousseau suggests that, as a result of their agreement 
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to the social contract, the general will will not only come into being in them but also that it 
will come to predominate over their private wills.61 
Yet it is not at all clear whether or in what way the will to enter to the social contract 
should effect such a reconception of freedom and thereby make the general will predominate 
over private wills. It is largely in order to avoid this problem that some scholars are at pains to 
insist that the parties to the social contract conceive of their freedom morally prior to entering 
the contract and that a concern to exercise moral freedom, no less than a concern to preserve 
their lives, goods, and independence from private wills, drives them to enter the social 
contract.62 We would submit that, since Rousseau does not, as we argued above, give his 
readers grounds on which to avoid the problem in this way, it is precisely his intention to raise 
this as a problem. In doing so, he begins subtly to indicate the necessity of civic education, a 
necessity from which he has heretofore abstracted. 
 This is hardly the only question raised by Rousseau’s identification of moral freedom 
as an acquisition of the civil state. The statement implies that natural man, as described in the 
Second Discourse, is not free but a slave despite his independence. So was, or is, man not, as 
Rousseau claimed at the beginning of the Social Contract, born free? If moral freedom is 
freedom as such, then is it not more accurate to say that the social contract liberates man from 
his chains than that it merely legitimates his chains? Do the parties to the social contract not 
become freer than they were before rather than merely remaining as free as they were before? 
To these questions can be added questions that arise from the perplexingly tentative manner 
in which Rousseau includes moral freedom among the acquisitions of the civil state. Does he 
 
61 Consider, in this connection, Cullen’s characterization of moral freedom as a means to civil freedom (Freedom 
in Rousseau’s Political Philosophy, 88). We would emphasize that, if this characterization accurately reflects 
Rousseau’s view of the matter, it could not accurately reflect citizens’ conception of freedom. For the efficacy 
of moral freedom as a means to civil freedom is predicated on citizens’ conceiving of moral freedom as their 
ultimate end. Contrast Cullen’s position with Cassirer, Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 55-56. See also Melzer, 
Natural Goodness of Man, 249n19. 
62 E.g., Cohen, Rousseau, 84-96; Dent, Rousseau, 188-89. 
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doubt that man acquires moral freedom, as distinguished from civil freedom, in passing to the 
civil state? If he does, why does he doubt this?63 What, now, are we to make of the non-
tentative attribution of moral freedom to the citizen at the beginning of the chapter? How is 
this not relevant to his subject in the Social Contract? And if it is not relevant, why does Rousseau 
say anything at all about it?64 Why, finally, does he provoke all these questions? 
 Let us, at this point, limit ourselves to raising these questions. Rather than attempting 
to answer them here, we will do so through our proceeding examination of civic education, 
i.e., of the means by which actual human beings, as distinguished from the human beings that 
Rousseau has hypothesized in his analysis of the social contract, might attain to the freedom 
and the other benefits of citizenship that Rousseau attributes to the social contract. It is to the 
practical necessity of such an education that we now turn.  
IV. THE LIMITS OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT’S PROVISION FOR CONSTRAINT 
The concern with the efficacy of the social contract shown in Rousseau’s treatment of 
its provision for constraint threatens to obscure the fact that he remains engaged in a 
theoretical analysis of political right that abstracts, in the main, from questions pertaining to 
political practice. At this point, one might be given to believe that all that would be required 
for the legitimation of human subjection in practice, or for the realization of the principles of 
political right, is for human beings to will the social contract. Now, strictly speaking, this is 
not incorrect. But it is highly misleading inasmuch as it ignores some great obstacles that, in 
practice, stand in the way of human beings’ doing this in the way or to the degree that would 
be required for the reliable execution of the social contract. The social contract’s provision for 
constraint is presented as overcoming one of these obstacles, i.e., the divergence between 
 
63 The question that we raised in the paragraph above suggests one answer. 
64 One’s perplexity only deepens when one discovers that Rousseau chose to add this paragraph in revising the 
Geneva Manuscript for publication as the Social Contract (GM 1.3 / ŒC 3: 292-93 / CW 4: 85). 
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subjects’ respective private wills and the general will. But there are other obstacles about which 
Rousseau has been silent that must be overcome if this provision is to be effective in practice. 
These obstacles come to sight when one turns from the subjects being constrained to 
obedience to what they are being constrained to obey. The fundamental problem that the 
provision for constraint is meant to solve, i.e., the persistence of private wills in the parties to 
the social contract, threatens to keep those parties from fulfilling their duties not only as 
subjects, as Rousseau here admits, but also as citizens. The social contract’s provision for the 
constraint of subjects will cause all the good things that Rousseau attributes to it only if, in 
practice, the contracting parties exercise sovereignty, properly understood, that is, by voting 
as citizens, or in accord with the general will, and thus enact laws, properly understood.65 And 
the very same private wills that can incline them to shirk their duties as subjects can incline 
them not to do this. Rousseau eventually acknowledges this problem in admitting, as we have 
seen, the possibility that members of an assembly will vote with a view to their respective 
private or factional interests (SC 4.1), but he abstracts from it in his initial elaboration of the 
social contract in Book I. Note that, while the social contract’s provision for the constraint of 
subjects mitigates this problem by, as we noted above, effectively inducing members of the 
assembly to vote only for those “laws” to which they are willing to be subject themselves, it 
does not solve this problem. For it is no security against factional majorities’ enacting “laws” 
to which all are equally subject but from which they somehow benefit more than others. Only 
in a community of citizen-subjects who were so similar to one another as to be affected 
identically by their subjection to the laws would it prevent such an eventuality.66 The upshot 
 
65 As Viroli observes, “justice will be served only if the force employed is sanctioned by law and is at the behest 
of a legitimate authority which respects the principles of equality under the law and makes sure that each 
person respects the rights of others” (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 132).  
66 Gildin, “Rousseau’s Social Contract”, 61, 64-65; Meier, “Right of Politics,” 129-30. Overlooking this problem, 
Putterman overestimates the efficacy of social contract’s provision for constraint, of “the principle of equity” it 
embodies (“Rousseau on Agenda-Setting,” 463). This leads him to underestimate the permanent necessity of 
civic education. 
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of this is that the social contract, even, or especially, with its provision for the constraint of 
subjects, will be reliably executed in practice only to the extent that it is supplemented by 
measures that somehow assure that the contracting parties fulfill their duty as citizens to vote 
in accord with the general will.67 
This problem is compounded by another practical complication from which Rousseau 
abstracts in his initial elaboration of the social contract. In introducing the social contract’s 
provision for the constraint of subjects, Rousseau suggests that it is all the citizens acting 
together as sovereign that will constrain subjects to obey the general will. But this is impossible 
because citizens cannot will generally, or thus exercise sovereignty, with respect to any 
particular subject or subjects. It is impossible ipso facto for the whole body to act on any of its 
parts. For these reasons, as Rousseau eventually makes clear, constraining subjects to obey the 
general will is not an act of all the citizens qua sovereign but of a separate and subordinate 
body that executes the laws and is composed of some number of the citizens, namely, 
government.68 The social contract’s provision for the constraint of subjects is tantamount, 
then, to a provision for government. In recognizing this, we confront another obstacle to the 
practical efficacy of this provision arising from the persistence of private wills: It is possible 
that the officers of government will constrain subjects to obey not the general will, as 
promulgated in the laws, but the officers’ respective private wills or their corporate will (SC 
3.10). Indeed, this is “the natural and inevitable tendency of” even “the best constituted 
Governments” (SC 3.11 / ŒC 3: 424 / CW 4: 188).69 In this light, the social contract’s 
provision for the constraint of subjects appears to be the seed of its decay as well as its growth. 
From this, Christopher Kelly extrapolates the principle, which he dubs “Rousseau’s Rule,” 
 
67 According to Viroli, this is “the most difficult problem to be solved” (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 161). For an 
exhaustive account of the various ways that the general will can fail to be formulated, see Trachtenberg, Making 
Citizens, 31-55. 
68 SC 2.5, 3.1 / ŒC 3: 377, 395-400 / CW 4: 151, 166-70. 
69 See also CC / ŒC 3: 901 / CW 11: 123. 
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that “[t]he very need for government creates conditions in which the government will 
eventually rule tyrannically.”70 Hence, even if the contracting parties fulfill their duties as 
citizens and legislate in accord with the general will, the provision for constraint  alone would 
hardly solve the problem arising from the persistence of private wills. It would only ameliorate 
this problem temporarily by altering its character. And it could not do even this without the 
adoption of additional supplementary measures that would keep the officers of government 
from constraining subjects to obey their respective private wills or their corporate will.71 
There is one source of security against these abuses of the social contract’s provision 
for constraint that is inherent in the social contract itself that we have not considered: subjects 
are not obligated to obey any will other than the general will, as promulgated in the laws. 
Should “the social pact [be] violated, each then returns to his first rights and takes back his 
natural freedom, losing the conventional freedom for which he renounced it” (SC 1.6 / ŒC 
3: 360 / CW 4: 138). The principle applies both to abuses of sovereignty by majority factions 
in the legislative assembly and to violations of the law by government. But Rousseau is more 
emphatic about it in relation to the latter: “[T]he instant the Government usurps sovereignty, 
the social pact is broken, and all those who are simply Citizens, having returned to their natural 
freedom, are forced but not obliged to obey” (SC 3.10 / ŒC 3: 422-23 / CW 4: 187).72 In 
thus denying that the social contract obligates citizens to submit to its abuse, Rousseau implies 
that they possess a right of revolution. This leads Roger Masters to conclude that “the principle 
of legitimacy is enforced by an unlimited right of revolution.”73 Yet Rousseau chooses not to 
 
70 “Sovereign versus Government,” 25. The article should be read in its entirety for its illuminating elaboration 
of the basis of this principle and the prescriptions that follow from it. 
71 For an exhaustive account of the various ways that the general will can fail to be enforced, see Trachtenberg, 
Making Citizens, 55-73. 
72 It is striking that Rousseau refrains from making an analogous statement in reference to despotic majority 
factions in his discussion of this problem in Book IV Chapter II. That he refrains from doing so may reflect 
the fact that his fear of despotic government is much greater than his fear of despotic majority factions. We will 
return to this matter in Chapter 4. 
73 Political Philosophy of Rousseau, 322. 
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be explicit about this. There is no equivalent to Chapter XIX of Locke’s Second Treatise in 
Rousseau’s Social Contract. In any case, as a matter of practice, it is no more certain that subjects 
will exercise this right than it is that members of the assembly will vote as citizens, in accord 
with the general will, or that the officers of government will execute the laws. 
We are brought here to the ultimate cause of the challenge that is entailed in attempting 
to put the principles of political right that Rousseau has elaborated into practice. In practice, 
human beings, having been deformed by history in various ways, especially through the 
experience of illegitimate subjection, differ importantly from the hypothetical human beings 
who, in Rousseau’s theoretical analysis, establish and will reliably exercise their rights and fulfill 
their duties under the social contract. The human beings who might actually live under the 
social contract are not such as to be reliably moved by the need of self-preservation to establish 
or to exercise their rights and fulfill their duties under the social contract. For evidence of this, 
we need look no further than the illegitimate subjection that is, as Rousseau observed at the 
beginning of the Social Contract, nigh ubiquitous among men. If human subjection is to be 
legitimated in practice, then, human beings cannot remain as they have become in history. 
Somehow, they must be formed into the citizens that they would become voluntarily if they 
were identical to the human beings that Rousseau hypothesizes in his analysis of the social 
contract, i.e., if they were such as to seek rationally to fulfill their natural need of self-
preservation under the condition that their own forces were insufficient to this end.74 
 
74 Masters’s account of the relation, in Rousseau’s political theory, of “the ‘idea of civil society’ and the ‘science 
of the legislator’,” or between the principles of political right that are developed hypothetically and the maxims 
of politics according to which those principles might be instituted in practice, is illuminating is this regard 
(Political Philosophy of Rousseau, 285-93, esp. 290, 301-306). Given that Rousseau elaborates the latter as well as 
the former in the Social Contract, the insistence on the part of some scholars, e.g., Starobinski, that the Social 
Contract is an exclusively hypothetical work strikes us as an overstatement (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 30). The relation 
between principles of political right and maxims of politics roughly corresponds to the relation that Viroli 
ascribes to the influences of the natural law and republican traditions on Rousseau’s political theory (Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, 13-12, 211-13). 
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V. LEGISLATION AND THE NECESSITY OF CIVIC EDUCATION 
Book II Chapter VI, “On Law,” marks an important turning point in the Social Contract. 
Or rather, it marks two distinct but related turning points, the second more fundamental than 
the first. Rousseau begins the chapter by indicating that he is turning from the social contract, 
the terms and implications of which he has been elaborating since Book I Chapter VI, to 
legislation: 
Through the social pact we have given existence and life to the political body; now it 
is a matter of giving it movement and will through legislation. For the original act by 
which this body is formed and united has not yet determined anything about what it 
ought to do to preserve itself. (SC 2.6 / ŒC 3: 378 / CW 4: 152) 
The characterization of the relation of legislation to the social contract given here is perplexing 
in light of our foregoing discussion. Recall that, in Book I Chapter VI, Rousseau attributed 
not only existence and life but also will to the political body generated by the social contract. 
Indeed, it is in the general will of citizens that the political body exists and lives most 
concretely.75 Our perplexity only increases when we recall that Rousseau is about to define law 
as an expression of the general will and thus, in keeping with the argument of Book I Chapter 
VI, to imply that the will of the political body is not the effect but the cause of legislation. 
Finding this characterization of legislation inexplicable in terms of Rousseau’s 
principles of political right, we would submit that it is meant subtly to anticipate a problem 
that attends the practical realization of those principles, to which Rousseau turns at the end of 
the chapter. The problem, which has been called “the greatest paradox in all of Rousseau,” is 
that human beings, as they are in practice, can scarcely hear the general will.76 They must be 
given laws that, among other things, amplify its voice. But, if laws are laws only because they 
 
75 Meier similarly characterizes will as these most essential attribute of the political body (“Right of Politics,” 
125). 
76 Riley, “Possible Explanation of Rousseau’s General Will,” 110. See also Cullen, Freedom in Rousseau’s Political 
Philosophy, 80. 
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express the general will, then how is this possible or admissible under the principles of political 
right? 
A. The Intellectual and Moral Limits of the People 
Having elaborated his definition of law as an act of the general will, Rousseau restates 
the principle that sovereignty is inalienable: “The laws are strictly speaking only the conditions 
of the civil association. The People subject to the laws must be their author; it is up to only 
those who are associating to regulate the conditions of the society” (SC 2.6 / ŒC 3: 380 / 
CW 4: 154). In the next sentence, Rousseau takes up the question of how this principle is to 
be put into practice. He asks:  
[H]ow will they regulate them? Will it be of a common accord, by a sudden 
inspiration? Does the body politic have an organ for enunciating these wills? Who 
will give it the foresight necessary to formulate acts and publish them in advance, or 
how will it pronounce them in time of need? How would a blind multitude, which 
often does not know what it wants, because it rarely knows what is good for it, 
execute by itself an undertaking as great, as difficult as a system of legislation? (SC 
2.6 / ŒC 3: 380 / CW 4: 154) 
In different ways, these questions cast doubt on whether the people can in fact exercise 
the legislative power that belongs to it by right. While they might agree about their end, i.e., 
the preservation of all their lives, goods, and freedom, will they be in agreement about the 
means to that end? If they do not agree and are not moved to agreement by sudden inspiration, 
how will the object of the general will be identified? This would not be a problem if the people 
had a physical manifestation of its own, apart from the individual citizens that compose it, 
with an organ by which it could enunciate its will. But because it is a merely moral being, it 
can enunciate its will only through the individual citizens that compose it, which do have 
physical manifestations. The second and the third questions in the series thus point to 
obstacles to the expression of the general will that arise from the fact that the people is a 
merely moral and collective being. 
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Up to this point, Rousseau has largely taken it for granted that it suffices for the 
achievement of the goal of the social contract—the preservation of the lives, goods, and 
freedom of the contracting parties—that the forces of the citizens be directed according to 
the general will. He has appeared, as Hilail Gildin puts it, “to suggest if one can guarantee the 
fairness of the general will, its sagacity will also be guaranteed.”77 Hence, the question of how 
to preserve the lives, goods, and freedom of the contracting parties seems to have been 
reduced to the question of how to assure that citizens express the general will, as members of 
the sovereign, and obey it, as subjects. The fourth and fifth questions in the series indicate that 
matters are not so simple. In order for the people to preserve their lives, goods, and freedom, 
it is necessary but not sufficient that they will this. It is necessary also that they know and will 
the means to that end, and that they do so in a timely manner appropriate to the urgency of 
their needs. Otherwise, their will to the preservation of their lives, goods, and freedom will be 
ineffective. What we come to see here is that, even as it supplies all the contracting parties 
with forces sufficient to preserve their lives, goods, and freedom and thus solves the 
fundamental problem articulated in Book I Chapter VI, the establishment of the social 
contract gives rise to a new problem. The effective direction of the forces of a multitude 
requires a degree of knowledge far greater than, and perhaps even a kind of knowledge far 
different from, that required for the effective direction of the forces of an individual. And this 
requisite knowledge evidently cannot, by contrast with the forces requisite for the contracting 
parties’ preservation, be acquired by pooling together the relatively limited knowledge of each 
contracting party.78 
If one takes the members of the people that Rousseau is describing in Book II Chapter 
VI to be the parties to the social contract described in Book I Chapter VI, one would conclude 
 
77 Rousseau’s “Social Contract”, 53. 
78 The problem was acknowledged in passing at the beginning of Book II Chapter III (SC 2.3 / ŒC 3: 371 / 
CW 4: 147) 
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that they are knowledgeable enough to recognize the necessity of establishing the social 
contract as a means to their preservation but not knowledgeable enough to recognize how to 
regulate their society effectively to that same end. While this is not altogether implausible, the 
low estimation of the knowledge of most human beings that Rousseau now discloses casts 
doubt on the prospects of human beings’ establishing a social contract freely, on the basis of 
enlightened self-love, or without undergoing some kind of civic education. Indeed, we take 
the discrepancy between the description of human beings in Book II Chapter VI and the one 
in Book I Chapter VI as evidence of the gulf separating actual human beings from the 
hypothetical human beings that Rousseau stipulates in elaborating his principles of political 
right. Here, then, we find further evidence that Rousseau earlier abstracted from the necessity 
of civic education for the practical realization of those principles. 
The ignorance of the people to which Rousseau points in the fifth and final question 
of the series is the principal obstacle to their exercising legislative power effectively. Even if 
the people were in common accord, even if it had an organ to enunciate its will, even if it had 
the necessary foresight to formulate acts and publish them in advance, even if it had a way to 
pronounce those acts in time of need, its fundamental ignorance would keep it from regulating 
the conditions of society in a way that promoted their common preservation. Rousseau 
explains: 
By itself the people always wants the good, but by itself it does not always see it. The 
general will is always right, but the judgment that guides it is not always enlightened. 
One must make it see objects such as they are, sometimes such as they ought to 
appear to it, show it the good path that it seeks, guarantee it against the seduction of 
private wills, bring closer to its eyes places and times, balance the attraction of 
present and sensed advantages with the danger of distant and hidden evils. (SC 2.6 / 
ŒC III: 380 / CW 4: 154) 
Rousseau’s insistence on the necessary rectitude of the people’s will, or of the general will, 
follows from the premise that a being’s will is determined by its opinion of its good, which, as 
we have seen, is fundamental to the argument of the Social Contract. The people will always will, 
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because it cannot help but will, whatever it judges to be its good, or, more specifically, 
whatever it judges to be conducive to its preservation. But the quality of its judgment is such 
that it is unlikely to attain its good, or to preserve itself effectively, by doing as it wills. The 
people is apt to judge poorly because, as Rousseau indicates here, it does not perceive things 
accurately or as it otherwise ought to,79 account for circumstances adequately, or properly 
weigh long-term goods that can only be thought or imagined against short-term goods that 
can be sensed immediately. What is more, the people is vulnerable to being misled into taking 
the private good of one or some of its members as its own. 
 This final problem begins to complicate the argument that the people’s deficiency is 
entirely intellectual and not at all moral. For this problem is due in part to a moral deficiency 
in certain members of the people who interestedly seek to regulate society with a view to their 
respective private goods and, to that end, deceive other, disinterested members of the people 
into believing that their favored policies will promote the common good. There is no necessity 
that this moral deficiency be limited to a minority of citizens. When it is not, when it extends 
to the majority, failure to regulate the conditions of society effectively for the common good 
is not a failure of judgment on the part of the people as a whole but rather a failure of will on 
the part of the individual citizens who compose the people. For, in such cases, citizens are 
enacting “laws” that serve private or factional interests not unwittingly but wittingly. In such 
cases, there is no people willing its good and merely misjudging what it consists in or how to 
attain it. We are led here to the conclusion that, in practice, the rectitude of the people’s will 
depends upon the rectitude of the wills of its members. 
 
79 This suggestion that the people might be led to their good by a noble lie rather than by the truth will be 
explored in Chapter 3. 
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Although Rousseau does not state this conclusion explicitly, it is implicit in the last 
sentences of the chapter. After explaining how the people’s judgment must be enlightened, he 
writes:  
Private individuals see the good that they reject; the public wants the good that it 
does not see. All equally need guides. One must oblige the former to make their wills 
conform to their reason; one must teach the latter to know what it wants. Then from 
public enlightenment results the union of understanding and will in the social body, 
from that the exact cooperation of the parts, and finally the greatest force of the 
whole. Hence is born the necessity for a Legislator. (SC 2.6 / ŒC 3: 380 / CW 4: 
154) 
Here, Rousseau makes clear that the people’s effective regulation of the conditions of society 
in the common interest depends not only upon enlightening its judgment but also upon 
rectifying the wills of the citizens that compose it. In practice, the people will want the good 
only if the citizens that compose it do not reject that good. Rousseau’s indication that citizens 
are in need of guides if they are not to reject that good, if their wills are to conform to their 
reason, is tantamount to a concession that the establishment of the social contract does not 
suffice to transform men into the dutiful citizens that the social contract depends upon for its 
execution. Here, then, the impression of the transformation effected by the establishment of 
the social contract that Rousseau had given in Book I Chapter VIII is revealed to be false, at 
least as applied to actual human beings, if not the hypothetical human beings of Rousseau’s 
analysis. 
As a matter of right, one is obliged to make one’s will conform to one’s reason once 
one has consented to the social contract. Recall Rousseau’s characterization of moral freedom 
as obedience to the law that one has prescribed for oneself. To prescribe a law for oneself is 
to oblige oneself, by right, to obey that law. A guide is not needed to oblige citizens to make 
their wills conform to their reason in this sense, then. Such a guide is needed rather somehow 
to compel citizens to fulfill the obligation to will in conformity with reason that they incurred 
in consenting to the social contract. In this way, what this guide does to citizens in their 
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capacity as members of the sovereign, i.e., constrain them to fulfill their duty under the social 
contract and vote in accord with the general will, is equivalent to what the government does 
to them in their capacity as subjects, i.e., constrain them to fulfill their duty under the social 
contract and obey the laws. It remains to be seen how this guide does this and what it means 
for citizens’ freedom. We are given some indication of what is not entailed in the guide’s 
obliging citizens to make their wills conform to their reason, however. The sharp distinction 
that Rousseau draws between this task and the other one assigned to the guide, i.e., teaching 
the public to know what it wants, implies that the former does not entail enlightenment. 
Rousseau is emphatic that the problem that private individuals pose to the effective regulation 
of the conditions of society in the common interest does not arise from any intellectual 
deficiency on their parts and thus is not soluble intellectually. They cannot be convinced to 
make their wills conform to their reason on the basis of reason. 
It must be said that Rousseau exaggerates the intellectual sufficiency of private 
individuals here. He suggests that what the people does not know, i.e., what the common good 
consists in or requires, private individuals do know. But, inasmuch as the people is composed 
of those private individuals, it stands to reason that what they know it, too, knows. In truth, 
what private individuals know, what their reason tells them, is merely that the good of the 
people is the common good, or, at most, that this common good consists in the preservation 
of the lives, goods, and freedom of all. With respect to the means necessary to attaining this 
good, they are no more knowledgeable than the people as a whole. Another way of putting 
the point is that, inasmuch as the people does not, in fact, have a mind of its own independent 
of the minds of the private individuals that compose it, the guide’s enlightenment of the people 
entails enlightening its members. Thus, again, we find that the sharp distinction that Rousseau 
draws between the people and private individuals is much blurrier in practice than it is in 
theory. 
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B. The Legislator as Civic Educator 
The solution that Rousseau proposes to the problem posed by the people’s intellectual 
and moral deficiencies is the legislator. What does this legislator do? How does he compensate 
for these deficiencies? These are some of the fundamental questions that will occupy us for 
the remainder of our study. Let us here sketch, in a preliminary fashion, the outlines of an 
answer, which will serve to orient us as we proceed. The legislator first comes to sight as one 
who will guide the people intellectually and morally, teaching them what the common good 
consists in and requires and strengthening their will to that good, i.e., the general will, over 
and against their respective private wills, so that they might exercise their inalienable right of 
legislation effectively and legitimately. But if, as the term “legislator” implies, and the 
subsequent account of the legislator confirms, the people are to be guided by being given laws, 
the question arises whether, or how and to what extent, the people will ever exercise their right 
to make laws themselves. Beginning most notably with Judith N. Shklar, scholars have argued 
that Rousseau’s characterization of and argument for the legislator—among other 
extraordinary figures of de facto authority who rule over others indirectly and deceptively—
betrays a certain authoritarian tendency in his thought.80 The question arises, and scholars have 
extensively debated, whether, or how and to what extent, this tendency is compatible with 
Rousseau’s egalitarian republicanism.81 The conceit of our study is that answering this 
question, and therewith the momentous question of whether, or of how and to what extent, 
human subjection can, in practice, be legitimated, requires us to examine the education that 
the people receive from the legislator and his laws. 
 
80 See Men and Citizens, 127-64, which is a slightly modified version of Shklar’s earlier “Rousseau’s Images of 
Authority.” 
81 Whereas Shklar ascribes a liberating effect to Rousseau’s figures of authority (Men and Citizens, 129, 162), 
Lester G. Crocker takes these figures as evidence of Rousseau’s totalitarianism (Rousseau’s “Social Contract”, 73). 
See also Grant, Hypocrisy and Integrity, 125-39; Melzer, Natural Goodness of Man, 233-36; Riley, “A Possible 
Explanation,” 122-23. 
 50 
In giving the people laws, the legislator educates them in two ways. He does so 
principally through institutions and practices that teach citizens to identify the common good 
with the preservation of the laws and that strengthen their will to this good, i.e., the general 
will, relative to their respective private wills, largely by fostering patriotism. The legislator 
provides for these institutions and practices in the laws he gives to the people; and the officers 
of government, or the magistrates, subsequently administer them. What these institutions and 
practices consist in and how they do these things will be our subject in Chapter 4. It suffices, 
here, to indicate the basic character of the education they effect.  
In Book II Chapter VII of the Social Contract and in Book I of the Emile, Rousseau 
writes that these institutions and practices are meant to denature human beings, to transform 
them so that they come to conceive of themselves not as the distinct, independent wholes that 
they are by nature but as dependent parts of a whole that they compose with their fellow 
citizens—the fatherland. Speaking of the legislator, Rousseau writes: 
One who dares to undertake to found a people must feel that he is capable of 
changing, so to speak, human nature; of transforming each individual, who by 
himself is a perfect and solitary whole, into a part of a larger whole from which this 
individual receives in some sense his life and his being; of altering the constitution of 
man in order to reinforce it; of substituting a partial and moral existence for the 
physical and independent existence that we all received from nature. (SC 2.7 / ŒC 3: 
381 / CW 4: 155) 
Note the similarity between the transformation of human beings that Rousseau here attributes 
to the legislator and the transformation of human beings that, in Book I Chapter VIII, he 
seemed to attribute exclusively to the social contract. The effect of man’s reconceiving himself 
as a mere part of his fatherland is the generalization of his will in its essence and its object. 
That man must be led by the legislator to reconceive of himself in this way indicates that, in 
practice, his passage from the state of nature to the legitimate civil state, and therewith his 
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enjoyment of civil and moral freedom, depends upon his undergoing civic education.82 As 
Rousseau makes clear in the Discourse on Political Economy, the wills of citizens must be made to 
conform to the general will. “[V]irtue,” which he there defines as “only that conformity of the 
particular will to the general,” must be “[made to] reign” through civic education (DPE / ŒC 
3: 252 / CW 3: 149).  
The institutions and practices that denature human beings, generalize their wills, and 
make virtue reign among them do these things, concretely, by reforming, or, in some cases, 
preserving, “mœurs, customs, and opinions.” Mœurs are the habitual practices common among 
members of peoples, or nations, that make up their particular ways of life, especially those that 
reflect their opinion of what is estimable. Thus, they are a certain kind of custom that tends 
to reflect a certain kind of opinion. As we will discuss in Chapter 2, these elements of civic 
education emerge by accident of history prior to the establishment of civil society. In Book II 
Chapter XII of the Social Contract, Rousseau characterizes them as “the most important [laws] 
of all.” Mœurs, in particular, “form…the unshakeable Keystone” of the legislator’s “arch,” 
whereas the other kinds of law, i.e., “political” or constitutional law, “civil” law, and “criminal” 
law, merely form its “sides” (SC 2.12 / ŒC 3: 394 / CW 4: 164-65). As this architectural image 
suggests, the whole work of legislation depends upon mœurs. Without them, other kinds of law 
are ineffective.83 With them, other kinds of law are almost superfluous.84 
This insight is crucial to Rousseau’s analysis of the tendency of governments to 
become despotic in the Second Discourse. Laws, as distinguished from mœurs, are insufficient to 
prevent magistrates from eventually abusing their power. For “[l]aws, in general less strong 
 
82 See Cassirer, Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 62-63; Cullen, Freedom in Rousseau’s Political Philosophy, 100. We 
would adduce this as further evidence against the view of Cohen, Dent, and Levine that, according to 
Rousseau, human beings are moral beings by nature, prior to becoming citizens. 
83 This argument recurs throughout Rousseau’s corpus. See DPE / ŒC 3: 252-54 / CW 3: 149-51. 
84 On the importance of mœurs in Rousseau’s political theory, see Cullen, Freedom in Rousseau’s Political Philosophy, 
118-24; Kelly, Rousseau as Author, 31-33; Trachtenberg, Making Citizens, 1. 
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than passions, contain men without changing them.” Ultimately, laws that would restrain 
magistrates from abusing their power succumb to the passions that incline them to do so. This 
is one of the ways that the arch of legislation crumbles without the keystone of mœurs. Nothing 
testifies to the efficacy of mœurs, and therewith to the promise of civic education, better than 
the example of Sparta, “where the Law took care principally of the education of Children, and 
where Lycurgus established mœurs which almost allowed him to dispense with adding Laws” 
(SD / ŒC 3: 187-88 / CW 4: 62). It is unnecessary to restrain men from being bad citizens if 
they have been transformed into good citizens. 
Legislation depends upon mœurs, customs, and opinions so radically that Rousseau 
identifies them as “the true constitution of the State.” Inasmuch as it is ultimately the general 
will that constitutes the state, and inasmuch as mœurs, customs, and opinions generalize wills, 
this is not an exaggeration. Rousseau writes that the kind of law that consists in mœurs, customs, 
and opinions “takes on new forces every day,” “revives” or “replaces” the other kinds of laws 
when they “age or get snuffed out,” and “preserves a people in the spirit of its institution” (SC 
2.12 / ŒC 3: 394 / CW 4: 164-65). Mœurs, customs, and opinions here come to sight not so 
much as the state’s keystone but as its life-force. 
To the extent that the institutions and practices provided for by the legislator in his 
laws are what generalize citizens’ wills, it does seem that, as Rousseau claimed at the beginning 
of Book II Chapter VI, legislation gives will to the political body. Indeed, that claim, at least 
as applied to political practice, now seems to have understated the political body’s dependence 
on legislation. For the characterizations of civic education that we have considered so far 
suggest that it and, by extension, legislation are the causes not only of the will but also of the 
existence and life of the political body. How can this be consistent with the principles of 
political right? Rousseau’s answer to this question is that the people must consent to the 
legislator’s laws before being subjected to them. This necessity gives rise to the second way 
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that the legislator educates the people in giving them laws: Deploying persuasive, musical 
rhetoric, he teaches the people that they are obligated to enact and obey his laws on the (false) 
grounds that those laws express the authoritative will of God or the gods. Given the means 
by which the legislator elicits the people’s consent, the requirement that he do so does not 
obviously resolve the problem to which that requirement, much like the legislator himself, is 
proposed as a solution. The compatibility of civic education with the principles of political 
right that it is meant to realize will therefore remain in question. 
Before turning to this preliminary stage of civic education, which we will do in Chapter 
3, we need to develop a better understanding of the moral and social psychology that informs 
Rousseau’s conception of civic education in general. To that end, in Chapter 2, we will examine 
the historical development and psychological character of the mœurs, customs, and opinions 
that, as we noted above, make up the element of civic education. 
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Chapter 2: Mœurs and the Psychological Elements of Civic Education 
We saw in the last chapter that, for the purpose of analyzing the social contract, 
Rousseau adopts the perspective of a man who is seeking rationally to fulfill his fundamental, 
natural need of self-preservation under the condition that he is incapable of doing so 
successfully on his own. We argued that Rousseau does this hypothetically, on the grounds 
that the only form of human subjection that could conceivably be legitimate is that which 
might elicit such a man’s consent. That most actual human beings are not of the sort that he 
hypothesizes explains much of why most of mankind finds itself in a state of illegitimate 
subjection and would have to undergo a psychic transformation in order for its subjection to 
be legitimated. In order to understand what the civic education that might effect such a 
transformation would entail, we need to develop an understanding of certain aspects of the 
psychic condition of human beings as formed by history in society. Taking our bearings from 
Rousseau’s identification of mœurs, customs, and opinions as the “laws” that generalize wills 
and thus truly constitute the political body, we will focus our attention on the historical 
development and psychic basis of these features of man’s social existence. In addition to 
enabling us to understand the character of civic education, our examination of these things 
will shed light on the relation between what is wrought haphazardly, for better and for worse, 
by history and what might be wrought by the rational design of a human legislator. 
I. THE PRE-POLITICAL ORIGINS AND CHARACTER OF MŒURS 
Rousseau’s conception of mœurs is bound up with his anthropological conception of 
the people, or the nation. The source of a nation’s character, unity, and distinctiveness are its 
mœurs, i.e., the habitual practices common among its members that make up its particular way 
of life, especially those that reflect their opinion of what is estimable. Accordingly, the 
emergence of nations is linked to the emergence of mœurs in Rousseau’s account of human 
history. We are told in the Second Discourse that, after “[m]en” had been brought together into 
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“more fixed” settlements by various meteorological and geological cataclysms, they 
“[gathered] into different troops, and finally [formed] in each country a particular Nation, 
united by mœurs and character, not by Rules and Laws, but by the same way of life and food, 
and by the common influence of Climate” (SD / ŒC 3: 169 / CW 3: 47). 
Rousseau’s anthropology here serves to correct a misimpression about the origin and 
character of mœurs and of peoples that one might get from his political science.85 In the 
passages that we have considered thus far, the origin of mœurs and of peoples are presented as 
an artificial, political phenomenon caused by rational human choice. In Book I Chapters V 
through VII of the Social Contract, Rousseau suggests that peoples are generated by the 
establishment of social contracts and thus by the choices of the parties to those contracts. In 
Book II Chapters VI through VII of the Social Contract, as well as in Book I of the Emile, he 
suggests, rather, that peoples are generated by institutions of civic education and thus by the 
choices of legislators. He suggests that mœurs, too, are generated in this way in Book II Chapter 
XII of the Social Contract and in his account of Lycurgus in the Second Discourse. Rousseau’s 
anthropological account of the origin of nations reveals what all these suggestions obscure, 
namely, that mœurs and peoples precede, and thus cannot be wholly attributed to, the conscious 
choices of political actors, e.g., parties to social contracts or legislators.86 This means that the 
transformation of human beings from naturally independent wholes into artificially dependent 
parts is begun by various accidents of history. Civic education merely extends and, in a sense, 
rationalizes this transformation. 
Before taking up the question of how mœurs conducive to good citizenship might be 
fostered through civic education, we need to understand the psychic mechanisms by which 
they are determined. Rousseau’s account of the origin of nations points especially to the 
 
85 Plattner, “Rousseau and the Origins of Nationalism,” 190-91. 
86 Note, for example, that the Corsicans “acquired virtues and mœurs” without “[having] any laws” (CC / ŒC 3: 
903 / CW 11: 125). 
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influence that geographic conditions, e.g., climate and available foodstuffs, have over mœurs. 
The principle, which Rousseau elaborates in an unpublished fragment on the “Influence of 
Climates on Civilization,” is that man’s need for nourishment renders him dependent upon 
the things that surround him, e.g., “[t]he climate, the soil, the air, the water, the productions 
of the land and the sea,” which in turn “form” him, or, more specifically, “form his 
temperament, his character” and “determine his tastes, his passions, his labors, his every kind 
of action” (PF 10 / ŒC 3: 530 / CW 4: 54). Inasmuch as geographic conditions differ from 
place to place, this means that human beings in one place inevitably come to differ from those 
who live in another. Thus, out of the interaction of the universal human need for nourishment 
with diverse geographic conditions arise the variety of mœurs and of peoples, or nations.87 
Geographic conditions are not the only determinant of mœurs, however. For the need 
for nourishment is not the only need that besets human beings or renders them dependent 
upon and susceptible to formation by things outside themselves. In the fragment on the 
“Influence of Climates on Civilization,” Rousseau identifies three kinds of needs. The first are 
those whose objects, i.e., “nourishment and sleep,” are necessary for self-preservation. 
Rousseau calls these “physical needs” on the grounds that they are “given to us by nature” 
and that “nothing can deliver us from them” (PF 10 / ŒC 3: 529 / CW 4: 53). Accordingly, 
when he imagines man “as he must have come from the hands of Nature,” that is, “stripped 
of all the supernatural gifts that he could have received, and of all the artificial faculties that 
he could have acquired only by long progress,” Rousseau sees him “sating his hunger under 
an oak, slaking his thirst at the first Stream, finding his bed at the foot of the same tree that 
furnished his meal” and therewith having “[satisfied] his needs” (SD / ŒC 3: 134-35 / CW 3: 
20). Given that “almost [the] only care” of “Savage man” is “his own preservation,” it follows 
 
87 For a statement of this principle in the Second Discourse, see SD / ŒC 3: 143-44 / CW 3: 27. For a vivid 
application of it in the cases of Corsica and Switzerland, see CC / ŒC 3: 913-15 / CW 11: 133-35. 
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that, as Rousseau suggests in his account of the origin of nations, mœurs would at first have 
been determined principally by geographic conditions (SD / ŒC 3: 140 / CW 3: 25).  
The second kind of need that Rousseau identifies in his fragment on the “Influence of 
Climates on Civilization,” comprises the “appetites” that tend to “well-being,” as distinguished 
from “preservation,” and that “have as their object the luxury of sensuality, of softness, the 
union of sexes, and all that flatters our senses” (PF 10 / ŒC 3: 530 / CW 4: 54). This kind of 
need, which is felt, or is compelling, only after the needs for nourishment and rest have been 
satisfied, is not unknown to man in his most primitive condition. While nascent man is not 
asexual or insensitive to pleasure,88 he is not preoccupied with this need in the way that some 
human beings come to be subsequently in their development. Hence, when nascent man has 
eaten and slept, he tends to be given over not to sensual indulgence but rather to “the sole 
sentiment of his present existence” (SD / ŒC 3: 144 / CW 3: 28). It seems from the Second 
Discourse that this began to change after human beings settled into huts and formed families. 
The greater facility with which they then preserved themselves gave them more “leisure.” 
Rather than giving themselves over to the sentiment of their respective existences, they, for 
reasons that Rousseau does not explain, “used [their leisure] to procure several sorts of 
commodities unknown to their Fathers,” some of which were luxuries pleasing to the senses. 
Perhaps the increase in the frequency of sexual intercourse that resulted from familial 
cohabitation resulted in an intensification of the taste and appetite for sensual pleasure 
generally. In any case, by the time that nations arose, human beings were beset by the appetite 
 
88 Rousseau’s exclusion of the sexual appetite from the physical needs, which is to say, from the needs that are 
given by nature and from which man cannot be delivered, might be taken to imply that this appetite is 
unnatural. Of course, Rousseau does not think that this is so. Indeed, at one point in the Second Discourse, he 
includes “a female,” along with “nourishment” and “repose,” among “the only goods in the universe that 
[Savage man] knows” and, in so doing, implicitly identifies the sexual appetite as one of the “Physical needs” 
(SD / ŒC 3: 143 / CW 3: 27). Hence, Rousseau does not characterize self-preservation as savage man’s “only 
care” without attaching the qualification “almost.” Nevertheless, while the sexual appetite is not unnatural, it is 
not, by nature, remotely as compelling as the needs for nourishment or sleep. This is the thought that Rousseau 
conveys, at the risk of exaggeration, by including the sexual appetite with the appetites for luxury, softness, and 
sensual pleasure rather than with the needs for nourishment and sleep. 
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for such pleasure along with the more fundamental needs for nourishment and sleep. It stands 
to reason that the same geographic conditions that shaped a people’s mœurs by shaping the 
ways its members preserved themselves further shaped its mœurs by shaping the ways its 
members delighted their senses. 
Although both the first and second kinds of need thus give geographic conditions 
power over mœurs, the most important determinant of mœurs is opinion. For the third kind of 
need that Rousseau identifies in the fragment on the “Influence of Climates on Civilization,” 
i.e., the need “which come[s] from opinion,” e.g., the need for “honors, reputation, rank, 
nobility, and all that has existence only in the esteem of men,” “does not fail to take precedence 
over [the first two kinds] in the end” (PF 10 / ŒC 3: 530 / CW 4: 54). Fully elaborating the 
complicated historical process by which human beings acquired this need in becoming social 
would compel us to go far beyond the limited scope of our study. We limit ourselves, then, to 
identifying some of the key features in the development of the passion with which this need 
is bound up: amour-propre.89 
Like amour de soi, or self-love, amour-propre entails the love of oneself, as distinguished 
from others. But, in the case of amour-propre, by contrast with that of self-love, one’s love of 
oneself is based upon one’s esteem for oneself relative to others. It entails the opinion, well or 
ill founded, that one is somehow superior to others and the desire that others esteem one 
accordingly. Amour-propre thus entails a consciousness of oneself and others, a capacity for 
making comparisons, and an opinion about what is, and is not, estimable that Rousseau’s 
account of man in the pure state of nature implies are unnatural. Hence, amour-propre, by 
contrast with self-love, is an unnatural passion. 
 
89 There is no adequate word with which to translate amour-propre into English. For the sake of clarity and 
precision, we will therefore leave it in the original.  
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There is, however, a form of amour-propre that emerges so early in man’s historical 
development as to be almost natural. In the Second Discourse, Rousseau identifies the first cause 
of amour-propre in the historical development of the human species as man’s recognition of his 
superiority over other animals. Even in the pure state of nature, their most primitive condition, 
human beings were, all things considered, better at preserving themselves than were other 
animals (SD / ŒC 3: 134-37 / CW 3: 20-22). Their superiority in this respect increased as they 
took their very first steps out of the pure state of nature. For in overcoming the “obstacles” 
to their preservation that “Nature” suddenly presented to them, human beings honed their 
faculties. They came to notice their superiority in part because it became more noticeable and 
in part because their improved mental faculties enabled them to notice it. Rousseau writes that 
“the first glance [man] took at himself produced in him the first movement of pride.” “[I]t is 
thus,” he continues, “that, as yet scarcely knowing how to distinguish ranks, and considering 
himself in the first one by dint of his species, he is prepared from afar to make a claim to it as 
an individual” (SD / ŒC 3: 165-66 / CW 3: 43-44). 
This moment in the history of the human species serves to illustrate the definition of 
pride, as distinguished from vanity, given in an important passage at the end of the Constitution 
for Corsica. “Pride,” Rousseau writes, “is more natural than vanity because it consists in 
esteeming oneself on the basis of truly estimable goods, whereas vanity, which gives value 
instead to what has none, is the work of prejudices slow to be born.” Given that man feels the 
first movement of pride so early in his history and given that it is the effect of his overcoming 
natural obstacles to the object of his most natural need, i.e., his preservation, one can wonder 
whether pride might not be natural simply. 90 Clearly, in any case, Rousseau’s characterization 
of pride as more natural than vanity is supported by its primitive origin.  Rousseau’s 
subsequent identification of the “truly estimable goods” on the basis of which the proud 
 
90 See Marks, Perfection and Disharmony, 6-7. 
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esteem themselves as “independence and power” is also supported by the Second Discourse (CC 
/ ŒC 3: 938 / CW 11: 154). Man’s distinctly human faculties make him more independent 
and powerful than other animals; it is for excelling them in these qualities that he esteems 
himself.  
What makes independence and power truly estimable goods? Rousseau’s account of 
the historical origin of pride tempts the thought that they are estimable as means to self-
preservation. While the faculties that make a man independent and powerful also enable him 
to preserve himself, these qualities are not esteemed as means to this end. Indeed, Rousseau 
characterizes the “proud” man as one who “intensely aspires to power…as an end,” whom he 
distinguishes from one who aspires to it “as a means.” (It stands to reason that the proud man 
aspires to independence also as an end rather than as a means.) The proud man’s aspiration to 
power and independence as ends in themselves is reflected in Rousseau’s characterization of 
these qualities as “beautiful.” Indeed, he asserts arrestingly that “there is nothing more really 
beautiful than independence and power” (CC / ŒC 3: 938 / CW 11: 154). The thought 
underlying this claim, about which we can only speculate, may be that nothing is more 
characteristic of the object of our most fundamental desire, i.e., existence, than independence 
and power. On this view, the proud man’s independence and power appear to him to be not 
so much useful means to his existence as beautiful features of his existence, which, as such, 
have intrinsic worth. 
The incipient amour-propre that arises with man’s recognition of his superiority in 
independence and power over other animals is modified when man enters nascent society. 
The modification begins with the transformation of natural sexuality into romantic love. 
Regularly exposed to various members of the opposite sex outside their respective families, 
human beings in nascent society compare these potential sexual partners to one another, and, 
in so doing, “imperceptibly acquire ideas of merit and of beauty that produce sentiments of 
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preference” (SD / ŒC 3: 169 / CW 3: 47).91 These sentiments of preference distinguish 
romantic love from natural sexuality, which, according to Rousseau, is utterly undiscriminating 
(SD / ŒC 3: 157-58 / CW 3: 38-39). In the Emile, Rousseau tellingly speaks of the lover’s 
preference for his beloved as a choice. Far from being impulsive or thoughtless, it arises from 
comparison and judgment, which Rousseau characterizes as rational. Implicit in any lover’s 
preference for his beloved, then, is an opinion, namely, that she, more than others, conforms 
to his idea of merit and beauty (E 4 / ŒC 4: 493-494 / CW 13: 364-65). 
Immediately after characterizing the lover’s preference for his beloved as a choice 
arising from rational comparison and judgment, Rousseau adds that the lover “wants to obtain 
the preference that [he] accords.” “[L]ove,” he continues, “must be reciprocal” (E 4 / ŒC 4: 
494 / CW 13: 365). Thus, with the emergence of romantic love, human beings come to 
depend, consciously, on the wills and opinions of others. To the limited extent that they 
depended upon other human beings previously, e.g., for care in infancy or for sexual 
satisfaction in adulthood, they did not experience that dependence as dependence on willing, 
esteeming beings. For the first time in history, they concern themselves with being esteemed 
by others and thus with the opinions of others. They also concern themselves, for the first 
time in history, with how they compare to others—specifically, with how they compare to 
other members of their sex with respect to qualities attractive to the opposite sex. Rousseau 
identifies the concern to be loved by one’s beloved as the cause of man’s “first glances at his 
fellows [semblables]” and his “first comparisons with them” (E 4 / ŒC 4: 494 / CW 13: 365).92 
Once the desire to be loved is born, it takes on a life of its own. Rousseau writes that 
“one who feels how sweet it is to be loved would like to be loved by everyone [tout le monde]” 
 
91 Rousseau’s account of the transformation of natural sexuality into romantic love raises difficult questions 
about how morality emerges in naturally amoral beings. Given the limited scope of our study, we pass over 
these questions. 
92 This is something of an exaggeration given Rousseau’s admission that human beings in the state of nature 
would compare themselves to others on the rare occasions on which they found themselves in competition 
(SD / ŒC 3: 166-67 / CW 3: 44-45). 
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(E 4 / ŒC 4: 494 / CW 13: 365). Thus, being loved by his beloved has the effect not of 
satiating the lover’s desire to be loved but of intensifying it and detaching it from the desire to 
possess his beloved and thus from sexual desire altogether. Rousseau does not mean to suggest 
that the lover, in wanting to be loved by everyone, wants to have sex with everyone. Given 
this, his statement can be taken to imply that the sweetness of being loved by one’s beloved 
comes less from sensual pleasure than from the consciousness that one is esteemed and 
preferred by another. This consciousness gives the lover grounds to take pride in himself 
relative to other human beings. Inasmuch as romantic love entails a need for another, being 
beset by this passion testifies against the power and independence for which human beings 
theretofore esteemed themselves relative to other animals. “Every attachment is a sign of 
insufficiency” (E 4 / ŒC 4: 503 / CW 13: 372). To love another, then, may be to suffer a 
wound to one’s pride.93 That wound would be succored, or perhaps even healed, by the 
consciousness that one is esteemed and preferred by one’s beloved, especially given that she 
is the woman one holds in highest esteem. It is striking that, for as much as man is drawn out 
of his natural self-absorption through the experience of romantic love, he does not esteem 
others without desiring to be esteemed by others. Rousseau’s account of this passion thus 
suggests that human beings are at least as much desirers of esteem as they are givers of it. 
That the lover, immediately upon being loved by his beloved, becomes concerned to 
be loved by everyone, i.e., even those whom he does not esteem highly, suggests that his 
concern to be loved by his beloved does not arise from a deep concern to be genuinely 
meritorious or beautiful. This is suggested even more clearly by another development. Man’s 
desire to be loved or esteemed by others is so intense that he reorients his life around others’ 
opinions of what is lovable or estimable. Rousseau reports “[seeing] opinion elevating an 
 
93 In the face of “a happy man,” our “amour-propre…suffers in making us feel that this man has no need of us” 
(E 4 / ŒC 4: 503 / CW 13: 373). 
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unshakeable throne, and stupid mortals, subjected to its empire, basing their own existence 
only on the judgments of others” (E 4 / ŒC 4: 493-494 / CW 13: 364-65). Thus, any concern 
to be meritorious and beautiful quickly gives way to the concern to seem meritorious and 
beautiful, and not only to one’s beloved but to all. 
The connection between romantic love and the desire for esteem that Rousseau draws 
in Book IV of the Emile is evident in his description of human history in the Second Discourse. 
The desire for the esteem of others apart from one’s beloved is presented as arising 
immediately after, and partly as the effect of, romantic love. Rousseau’s description of this 
momentous development is worth quoting at length. He writes: 
As ideas and sentiments follow on one another, as the mind [l’esprit] and heart are 
exercised, the human Race continues to be tamed, connections spread and links 
tighten. People grew accustomed to assembling in front of the Huts or around a 
large Tree; song and dance, true children of love and of leisure, became the 
amusement or rather the occupation of idle and gathered men and women. Each 
began to look at the others and to wish to be looked at himself, and public esteem 
had a value. The one who sang or danced the best, the most beautiful, the strongest, 
the most adroit, or the most eloquent became the most highly considered… As soon 
as men had begun to appreciate one another mutually and the idea of consideration 
was formed in their minds, each claimed to have a right to it, and it was no longer 
possible to lack consideration for others with impunity. From this came the first 
duties of civility, even among the Savages; and from this every voluntary wrong 
became an outrage, because, with the evil that resulted from the injury, the offended 
party saw in it a contempt for his person that was often more unbearable than the 
evil itself. It is thus that, each punishing the contempt that had been shown to him 
by another in a manner proportionate to the importance he attached to himself, 
vengeances became terrible, and men bloodthirsty and cruel. (SD / ŒC 3: 169-70 / 
CW 3: 47-48) 
We note, to begin, that romantic love alters the way that human beings make use of their 
leisure. Singing and dancing together with others is a far cry from giving oneself over in 
solitude to the sentiment of one’s existence. In the Essay on the Origins of Languages, we 
encounter a similar scene in which human beings express the new passion of which they are 
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full by singing and dancing with one another underneath a tree (EOL IX / ŒC 5: 406 / CW 
7: 314).  
We have seen human beings, prior to this moment in their history, giving esteem first 
to themselves and then to their beloveds. This is the first instance in which we see them giving 
esteem to others whom they do not desire somehow to possess for themselves. Human beings 
can and do recognize excellent qualities in others and esteem them accordingly; it seems that 
they even find themselves in substantial agreement about which qualities are estimable and 
who possesses them. Then again, Rousseau’s emphasis on the discord arising from perceived 
slights suggests that the extent to which human beings are willing to give esteem to others is 
limited, specifically, by their desire and somehow also their belief that they are entitled to be 
esteemed by others.94 This is the moment at which human beings finally begin to make 
assertions of and demand recognition for the excellence of their personal qualities. That 
human beings should be moved to make such assertions and demand such recognition 
indicates that the consideration that they desire and believe they are entitled to is not always 
immediately forthcoming. Note that it is only on behalf of themselves and not on behalf of 
others that they are presented as making such assertions and demanding such recognition. 
Each tends to esteem himself more highly than others do. “Amour propre,” Rousseau explains, 
leads each individual to attach more importance to himself than to any other” (SD / ŒC 3: 
219nXV / CW 3: 91n12). 
 Rousseau’s description of the development of amour-propre in nascent society 
complicates his suggestion that this passion enslaves human beings to the opinions of others. 
That those beset by amour-propre make claims to the esteem of others indicates that this passion 
does not make human beings simply or altogether deferential to others’ opinions. Asserting 
 
94 The suggestion in the passage quoted above that a belief that one is entitled to be esteemed by others follows 
from the desire to be esteemed by them is perplexing. As in our discussion of the transformation of natural 
sexuality into romantic love, we pass over the difficult question of how morality emerges in naturally amoral 
beings. 
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and demanding recognition for the excellence of one’s qualities is, manifestly, not to submit 
to others’ opinions completely. It is important to recognize, however, that the man who makes 
a claim to esteem is not altogether independent of others’ opinions. Such a man will not be 
content unless or until others form favorable opinions of him. Hence, in this way, all who are 
beset by amour-propre are dependent upon the opinions of others. 
 The distinction between pride and vanity suggests that all those beset by amour-propre 
do not depend upon the opinions of others in equal measure, however. Inasmuch as the proud 
and the vain alike desire to be esteemed by others, both depend upon the opinions of others.95 
As we will discuss in the next chapter, the legislator himself, or, more broadly, the hero, 
depends upon the opinions of others inasmuch as he desires glory.96 Even “the wise man…is 
not insensitive to glory” (FD / ŒC  3: 26-30 / CW 2: 19-22).97 But, inasmuch as the proud 
esteem themselves and desire to be esteemed by others for qualities that are estimable, they are 
less dependent upon the opinions of others than the vain, who esteem themselves and desire 
to be esteemed by others for qualities that merely seem estimable.98 In a passage of the Emile 
from which we quoted above (E 4 / ŒC 4: 493-494 / CW 13: 364-65), Rousseau implicitly 
attributes the tendency of human beings to orient their lives around others’ opinions of what 
is estimable to their desire to be esteemed by others. To the extent that the proud do not do 
this, their desire to be esteemed by others must be limited by an independent concern to be 
estimable, which prevents them from simply deferring to, and thus from simply depending 
 
95 The human beings who felt the first movements of pride stand as exceptions to this principle. It is not clear 
whether it is possible for human beings in society to esteem themselves without desiring to be esteemed by 
others, too, as their ancestors did. 
96 Rousseau’s reference to the “great soul” of the legislator (SC 2.7 / ŒC 3: 384 / CW 4: 157) and of the hero 
(VH / ŒC 2: 1263 / CW 4: 2) should be noted in connection with his identification of pride as the form that 
amour-propre takes in “great souls” (E 4 / ŒC 4: 494 / CW 13: 365). 
97 Consider Rousseau’s description of himself in the first of his Letters to Malesherbes: “Continued successes 
have rendered me sensitive to glory, and there is no man who has some loftiness of soul [hauteur d’ame] and 
some virtue who could think without the most mortal despair that, after his death, a pernicious work capable of 
dishonoring his memory and of doing much harm could be substituted under his name for a useful work” (LM 
1 / ŒC 1: 1131 / CW 5: 573). 
98 See CC / ŒC 3: 938 / CW 11: 154. 
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upon, others’ opinions of what is estimable. That vanity occurs more frequently than pride 
suggests that this concern tends to be relatively weak and, as such, vulnerable to being 
overcome by the desire for esteem. It is telling that, in the passages from the Constitution for 
Corsica and Book IV of the Emile that we have been considering, Rousseau initially speaks as 
if amour-propre only takes the form of vanity; his indication that it can also take the form of 
pride comes later as an explicit or implicit point of clarification. One gets the impression that 
pride is so much rarer than vanity that he momentarily loses sight of it. The conclusion to be 
drawn from all this, which, as we will see, bears on the task of civic education, is that, while 
human beings moved by amour-propre can retain a certain kind of independence from the 
opinions of others, they tend not to do so because their desire to be esteemed tends to 
overwhelm their concern to be estimable. 
 Inasmuch as the distinction between pride and vanity comes down to a distinction 
between the desire to be esteemed and the concern to be estimable, it presupposes that human 
beings can esteem qualities that are not estimable. The truth of this presupposition is so 
obvious that it seems hardly worth mentioning. Upon reflection, however, it presents an 
interesting perplexity. Rousseau’s accounts of amour-propre in the Second Discourse and the 
Constitution for Corsica suggest that the more primitive, or natural, human beings are, the less 
what they esteem will differ from what is estimable. The qualities that first strike human beings 
as estimable are qualities that are somehow estimable by nature, e.g., independence and power. 
And since these are the qualities that are esteemed among them, the desire to be esteemed, 
once it emerges, leads them to concern themselves with acquiring or displaying qualities that 
do not merely seem but also are estimable. Over time, however, human beings gradually form 
“prejudices” which “[give] value…to what has none,” to “frivolous objects” (CC / ŒC 3: 938 
/ CW 11: 154). What would cause a man to seek to acquire or display such objects is clear 
provided that others have begun to esteem them—he desires their esteem. But what could have 
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caused anyone to esteem such objects in the first place, i.e., prior to there being any grounds 
for hoping that one could win esteem by acquiring or displaying those objects, is unclear.  
This variability in the objects of human esteem is partly explained by, or rather 
exemplifies, the perfectibility of human nature, as Rousseau conceives it.99 Indeed, it bears 
stating here that the broader phenomenon of which this is a part is among the most salient 
examples of human perfectibility. Only a highly malleable creature could go from being so 
self-absorbed and indifferent to its fellows that it does not even recognize that they are willing, 
esteeming beings to being so preoccupied with receiving the esteem of others that it reorients 
its whole life around their opinions. In this light, we see again that a great deal of the denaturing 
that man must undergo in order to become a citizen occurs by accident of history long before 
civic education. 
Given Rousseau’s characterization of their natural condition, human beings’ becoming 
at all concerned with esteem is a remarkable transformation. It is all the more remarkable, 
then, that the “needs…which come from opinion” do “not fail to take precedence over [man’s 
other needs] in the end” (PF 10 / ŒC 3: 530 / CW 4: 54). In the Constitution for Corsica, 
Rousseau affirms that these needs, or, amour-propre, as he there refers to them, make up almost 
the only positive motive for action among human beings. While he admits that men are also 
moved by the desire for “sensual pleasure [la volupté]”—one of the appetites that tend to well-
being and that comprise the second order of needs identified in “On the Influence of Climates 
on Civilization”—he insists that, for most, indulgence in such pleasure is ultimately a form of 
“ostentation” and thus not an end in itself but a means to amour-propre (CC / ŒC 3: 937 / CW 
11: 153-54).100 Even the pleasures that are indulged in for their own sake are not unaffected 
by opinion. Indeed, Rousseau writes: 
 
99 On human perfectibility, see SD / ŒC 3: 142-43 / CW 3: 26-27. 
100 On this point, see also E 4 / ŒC 4: 659 / CW 13: 501 and PF 5.1 / ŒC 3: 501-502 / CW 4: 35-36. 
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Among all peoples of the world, it is not nature but opinion that decides the choice 
of their pleasures. Correct the opinions of men and their mœurs will purify themselves 
on their own. One always loves what is beautiful or what one finds to be so, but it is 
on this judgment that one can be mistaken. It is therefore a question of regulating 
this judgment. (SC 4.7 / ŒC 3: 458 / CW 4: 214-15) 
The extent of the power that Rousseau attributes to opinion comes to sight even more fully 
here than in the Constitution for Corsica. For here he suggests that, even when one is not indulging 
in pleasure with view to being esteemed for doing so, what one takes pleasure in is modified 
by one’s opinions, specifically, about beauty. And, to the extent that human beings are led by 
the desire for esteem to take their opinions about the beautiful from others, this means that 
the desire for esteem affects their actions even when they are not seeking to fulfill that desire. 
In any case, Rousseau holds: “All want to be admired. Here is the secret and final end of the 
actions of men” (PF 5.3 / ŒC 3: 503 / CW 4: 36). Since the desire to be admired, or, amour-
propre, is “the fruit of opinion,” since it is “born from it and nourishes itself on it,” “the arbiters 
of the opinion of a people are the arbiters of its actions” (CC / ŒC 3: 937 / CW 11: 153-54). 
Rousseau’s reference to “the opinion of a people” brings us back to the question that 
led us to inquire into the origins and character of amour-propre in the first place: How are mœurs 
affected by the needs that come from opinion? In speaking of man’s desire for esteem as a 
desire for the esteem of others, and in speaking of his corresponding dependence on opinion 
as a dependence on the opinions of others, we have been abstracting from the particular social 
dispensation that gave rise to that desire and dependence, namely, the nation, or the people. 
The others that human beings are surrounded by and engage with when amour-propre develops 
are their countrymen. In practice, then, it is their countrymen’s esteem that they desire. And, 
therefore, it is their countrymen’s opinions that they depend on. To the extent that the 
opinions about what is meritorious, beautiful, and estimable held by the members of a nation 
converge, and converge in ways that reflect preexisting habitual practices that already unite 
them with one another and distinguish them from members of other nations, those opinions 
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will vary across nations. Thus, the mœurs that are coeval with nations, i.e., those that, as we 
explained above, are determined by the interaction of universal human needs for preservation 
and well-being with particular geographic conditions, interact with the emergent passion amour-
propre in a way that generates distinctive opinions of peoples. Inasmuch as human action is 
determined principally, if not altogether, by opinion about what is estimable, these distinctive 
national opinions in turn affect, nay, become the principal cause of, the habitual common 
practices of nations, i.e., mœurs. Hence, “it is useless to distinguish the mœurs of a nation from 
the object of its esteem, for all these things arise from the same principle and necessarily get 
mixed up” (SC 4.7 / ŒC 3: 458 / CW 4: 214-15).  Over time, the variety of mœurs is 
compounded by the accumulation of differences in the events that transpire within each 
nation, by, in a word, distinctive national histories. Here, then, we see the complex, mutually 
reinforcing dynamic through which human beings are united with some and divided from 
others, that is, through which nations or peoples are formed. 
II. MŒURS AND THE LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES OF CIVIC EDUCATION 
Our investigation into the pre-political origins and character of mœurs has shown that 
the transformation of human beings from naturally independent wholes into unnaturally 
dependent parts begins prior to the institution of law or civic education with the accidental 
development of nations and amour-propre.  There are two distinct senses in which human beings 
are parts of wholes at the end of this development. First, and more simply, they are 
components of their nations. Second, they are dependents on their nations. Specifically, they 
depend upon their countrymen for the esteem that they desire. And, as we have seen, they are, 
or tend to be, led by this need to take the opinions that prevail among their countrymen as 
their own and to determine their actions accordingly.101 
 
101 See Marks, Perfection and Disharmony, 64; Strauss, Natural Right and History, 289. 
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Nevertheless, this development is not sufficient to generalize wills. For there is no 
necessity that the qualities held up as estimable by the public opinion that emerges through, 
and is empowered by, this development are those qualities that serve the good of the nation 
as a whole. If there were such a necessity, the task of the legislator and even of law would be 
obviated. Given the need for citizens to obey the law willingly and given the power public 
opinion exercises over citizens’ wills, law will not be effective unless public opinion does hold 
up civically salutary qualities as estimable. Hence, the task of directing public opinion to do 
this, which falls to the legislator, is indispensable. 
The necessity of rationally directing public opinion can be seen in Rousseau’s critique 
of monetary wealth. When Rousseau addresses himself to economic policy, he consistently 
recommends that the circulation and accumulation of money be minimized.102 He does this 
for a variety of reasons. The most relevant, which he articulates with particular force and clarity 
in his argument against legislative representation in the Social Contract, is that the love of money 
tends to come at the expense of the love of freedom and tends, in elevating private interests, 
to diminish the public-spiritedness that citizens must have in order to fulfill their duties under 
the social contract, specifically, their duties to legislate in accord with the general will, or even 
to participate in legislation, and to assure that the government executes the laws (SC 3.15 / 
ŒC 3: 428-29 / CW 4: 191-92).103 Hence, he admonishes: “Search in every country, in every 
government, and over all the earth. You will not find a great evil in morality or in politics in 
which money is not mixed” (GP 11 / ŒC 3: 1006 / CW 11: 212).  
Rousseau’s critique of money is relevant to our argument inasmuch as money tends, 
in his view, to be sought not so much for its own sake, or even for the material well-being that 
 
102 Rousseau’s principal treatments of economic administration can be found in the Constitution for Corsica, the 
last section of the Discourse on Political Economy (ŒC 3: 262-78 / CW 3: 157-70), and Chapter XI of the 
Government of Poland (ŒC 3: 1003-1012 / CW 11: 209-216). 
103 See also CC / ŒC 3: 911, 915-16 / CW 11: 131, 135-36. 
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can be acquired with it, as for the sake of esteem. Among the many aspersions that Rousseau 
casts on “pecuniary interest” is that it is the weakest form of “self-interest,” felt only when all 
the other passions have been “enervated [and] stifled” (GP 11 / ŒC 3: 1005 / CW 11: 211). 
Most who seek money do so not out of this pecuniary interest but rather out of vanity, or, as 
Rousseau puts it in the first of his illuminating fragments on “Honor and Virtue,” “the love 
of distinctions.” “One does everything to get rich, but it is in order to be considered that one 
wants to be rich” (PF 5.1 / ŒC 3: 502 / CW 4: 34-35).104 This, of course, presupposes that 
public opinion holds up being rich as estimable. And this demonstrates that there is no 
necessity that the dependence on public opinion that arises by accident of history will serve to 
generalize wills. On the contrary, there is a powerful tendency that it will serve to do the 
opposite. Indeed, Rousseau writes in the Second Discourse that, while it is in terms of “personal 
qualities” that men are initially distinguished, they ultimately are distinguished in terms of 
“wealth” (SD / ŒC 3: 189 / CW 3: 63). 105 
 We see here that, having begun to transform human beings from independent wholes 
into dependent parts, history does not merely fail to complete this transformation, it takes it 
in a pernicious direction. Given the objects public opinion tends ultimately to hold up as 
estimable, mœurs in highly developed or civilized societies tend not to generalize wills. The 
irrational, non-teleological character of history appears starkly in this light. And the legislator-
as-civic-educator comes to sight not so much as the indispensable completer of history as the 
indispensable rectifier of history.106 
 In rendering human beings dependent upon public opinion, history arms the legislator 
with a double-edged sword. For the dependence of human beings in society on public opinion 
 
104 This line of thought explains Rousseau’s omission of the desire for monetary wealth from the positive 
motives for action that he identifies in the Constitution for Corsica. 
105 See Viroli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 197-98. 
106 On this issue, see Viroli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 198-99. 
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at once serves as a resource for and poses a challenge to civic education. First, it should be 
said that this is among the things that makes civic education necessary. Thus, this dependence 
poses a challenge to the whole task of legislation, of which civic education is but a part. If 
human beings desire the esteem of others so intensely that their actions are, as Rousseau 
claims, determined by public opinion about what is estimable, then laws will not be observed 
or, for that reason, be effective unless their dictates are consistent with that of public opinion. 
The limits of law relative to mœurs and public opinion are thematic in the Letter to D’Alembert, 
to which we are directed in the brief treatment of censorship in Book IV Chapter VII of the 
Social Contract. In the relevant section of the Letter to D’Alembert,107 Rousseau is concerned to 
refute the argument that any damage to the Genevans’ mœurs that might be done by the 
establishment of a theater in their city could be prevented by the passage of laws designed to 
prevent such damage. Against this argument, he reasons that, since the establishment of a 
theater would alter the Genevans’ mœurs by altering their opinions about what is estimable, and 
since law is ineffective when it is opposed by public opinion, the passage of such laws would 
be futile. Here we encounter some of Rousseau’s most emphatic statements on the power of 
public opinion and, by extension, the desire for esteem. What the law commands and forbids 
must be consistent with “honor,” or, more precisely, with public opinion about what is 
honorable. For “even the law cannot oblige anyone to dishonor himself” (LD / ŒC 5: 63 / 
CW 10: 301). (So much for the power that Rousseau attributes to the social contract’s 
provision for constraint.) It follows that “[o]pinion, which Rousseau coronates “queen of the 
world,” “is not subject to the power of kings.” On the contrary, “they are themselves her first 
slaves” (LD / ŒC 5: 67 / CW 10: 305).108 All this serves further to explain Rousseau’s 
 
107 LD / ŒC 5: 60-68 / CW 10: 299-306. 
108 We note that this thought underlies Rousseau’s insistence that the despot is no freer than his subjects and 
that, by extension, the iniquitous life of the despot is not good for the despot himself (E 2 / ŒC 4: 308-309 / 
CW 13: 214-15; SC 1.1 / ŒC 3: 351 / CW 4: 131) 
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insistence that the arch of legislation will crumble, or the organism of legislation will die, if the 
legislator does not attend to the mœurs, customs, and opinions of the people. 
 We return to our contention that the dependence of human beings on public opinion 
in society at once serves as a resource for and poses a challenge to civic education. It serves as 
a resource inasmuch as it gives the legislator a hold on citizens’ opinions and actions. That 
individuals depend upon and are determined in their opinions and actions by the peoples they 
compose facilitates the task of generalizing their wills and making them virtuous citizens. Then 
again, this only raises the question of how the legislator is to direct public opinion. And, 
inasmuch as public opinion is composed of individual opinions, it is not clear that directing it 
is any different from or easier than directing individual opinions. Given this, it would be more 
accurate to say that the resource made available to the legislator by history is social man’s 
desire to be esteemed by others and, by extension, to seem estimable to others that lies at the 
root of his dependence on public opinion. The work of getting human beings to opine that 
certain qualities are meritorious or beautiful, to esteem themselves and others on the basis of 
those qualities, and to desire and make claims to the esteem of others is, as we have seen, 
accomplished by history before the legislator arrives on the scene. Inasmuch as the legislator 
can make use of the tendency of human beings to engage in this set of behaviors, the work of 
civic education is facilitated for him. 
 The challenge that this development poses to legislators, even as it serves as a resource 
for them, is that any people they might wish to educate will already hold and be determined in 
their actions by opinions about what is estimable, which, as we have seen, may oppose civic 
virtue. In many, indeed, in most cases, this challenge is insuperable. This is one of the most 
basic reasons that Rousseau harbors little hope for political reform except among a few 
peoples, e.g., the Poles and the Corsicans. Rousseau’s account of the legislator in Book II 
Chapter VII of the Social Contract is followed by a series of three chapters on the people, the 
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thrust of which is that only certain peoples, under certain conditions, are suited to receiving 
good laws.109 Extending the architectural analogy from Book II Chapter VII, Rousseau writes: 
“Just as the architect, before raising a great edifice, observes and tests the soil in order to see 
whether it can sustain the weight, the wise founder does not begin by drafting laws that are 
good in themselves, but first examines whether the people for whom he destines them is suited 
to bear them” (SC 2.8 / ŒC 3: 384-85 / CW 4: 157). One of the most important questions 
facing the legislator in his examination of a people is whether its mœurs and opinions are 
civically salutary or susceptible to being made so. Rousseau argues that it is only when they are 
young, or have been rejuvenated by revolution, that peoples have mœurs and opinions of this 
character. For it is only then that peoples tend to possess two seemingly contrary qualities that 
Rousseau regards as necessary for bearing legislation: docility and vigor.  
Peoples must be docile in the sense that they cannot be so set in their ways as to be 
intolerant of innovations introduced by the law,110 as well as in the more basic sense that they 
cannot be so averse to obedience as to violate the law. “Peoples, like men,” Rousseau explains, 
“are docile only in their youth; they become incorrigible in aging.” “Once customs are 
established and prejudices have taken root,” he continues, “it is a dangerous and vain 
enterprise to wish to reform them” (SC 2.8 / ŒC 3: 385 / CW 4: 157). Accordingly, at the 
conclusion of his discussion of peoples and their suitability for legislation, Rousseau 
characterizes the one that is suitable for legislation as, among other things, “[o]ne that, finding 
itself already united by some union of origin, interest, or convention, has not yet borne the 
 
109 “[T]he emphasis on the rarity of success is,” as Meier observes, “the leitmotif” of these chapters (“Right of 
Politics,” 142). 
110 This matters less in the case of peoples set in ways that are civically sound and for whom legislation 
therefore need not entail much innovation. The Poles, “a nation already wholly instituted, whose tastes, mœurs, 
prejudices, and vices are too rooted to be capable of being easily stifled by new seeds,” are such a people (GP 1 
/ ŒC 3: 953 / CW 11: 169). 
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true yoke of the laws” and “that has neither customs nor superstitions that are deeply rooted” 
(SC 2.10 / ŒC 3: 390 / CW 4: 162).111 
The need for youthful vigor is emphasized more in the Constitution for Corsica and the 
Government of Poland than in the Social Contract. It is not altogether absent from the latter, 
however. Rousseau acknowledges it in a discussion of the rejuvenating effects of revolutions. 
The turning against old ways that occurs in revolutions restores peoples to youthful docility 
inasmuch as it makes them susceptible to being reformed. To this, Rousseau adds that, when 
peoples survive the brushes with death that come with revolutions, they are restored to “the 
vigor of youth” (SC 2.8 / ŒC 3: 385 / CW 4: 158). The examples that Rousseau goes on to 
adduce in favor of this claim, along with the examples of the Corsicans and the Poles, indicate 
that what it means for a people to survive a brush with death is for it to liberate itself from, or 
effectively to resist, despots. Youthful vigor in peoples consists in the desire and the capacity 
to acquire or maintain freedom, especially against one or some who would deprive them of it.  
Note that such vigor is characteristic not only of man in his youth but also of the 
human species in its youth. Recall Rousseau’s denial that the “proud and untamed” men who 
established “nascent Government” would have voluntarily subjected themselves without 
reservation to the will of another. The youthfully vigorous peoples identified by Rousseau 
resemble these men, as well as the savages who sacrifice “pleasures, repose, wealth, power, 
and life itself for the preservation of” freedom and the animals that resist taming and captivity 
at all costs (SD / ŒC 3: 180-82 / CW 3: 56-57).112 These comparisons make clear that the 
vigor that Rousseau insists upon as a prerequisite for legislation is natural.113 Inasmuch as this 
 
111 The problem posed by deeply rooted superstitions will become particularly clear in light of our argument, in 
the next chapter, that the legislator cannot elicit the people’s consent to his laws without reforming their 
conception of divine authority. 
112 See also CC / ŒC 3: 1726-27n1 / CW 11: 126n. 
113 To the extent that this vigor arises partly from pride, as Rousseau’s characterization of the founders of 
nascent government implies, it is not simply or altogether natural, however. Then again, as we noted above, 
one can wonder whether pride, as it first manifests itself, might not be natural. 
 76 
quality is to be preserved after and even through legislation,114 this is to say that there is an 
important sense in which civic education does not involve denaturing human beings. Indeed, 
it is to say, on the contrary, that there is an important sense in which civic education involves 
the preservation of human nature. 
As we indicated above, when Rousseau raises the question of what qualities render 
peoples suitable for legislation, he suggests that, in receiving laws, the people come to bear a 
burden. They bear the laws as a plot of ground bears a building. While this analogy captures 
an important aspect of citizenship, namely, citizenship as subjection, it obscures another, 
namely, citizenship as freedom. Rousseau’s insistence on the need for vigor reminds us of this. 
It implies that only a certain degree or kind of docility is to be sought in peoples. Rousseau 
may place greater emphasis on the need for docility than on the need for vigor in the Social 
Contract because his principal concern, immediately following his treatment of the legislator, is 
with the people’s reception of laws, for which they must be docile, rather than with their 
maintenance or alteration of them, for which they must be vigorous. A people must be 
vigorous, which is also to say, it must not be simply or altogether docile, if it is to guard against 
violations of the law, whether by forces from within or from without. The inevitable tendency 
of magistrates to administer government in accord with their respective private wills or with 
their corporate will rather than with the general will, as promulgated in the laws, makes the 
quality of vigor indispensable in the people.115 
For as much as the qualities of docility and vigor are in tension with one another, there 
is reason to think, and to hope, that they might be found together. Inasmuch as vigor tends to 
be found among peoples that are less alienated from nature, it will tend to be found among 
 
114 See Rousseau’s warning to the Poles against undertaking reforms that would stifle the vigor they showed in 
resisting Russian domination (GP 1 / ŒC 3: 954-55 / CW 11: 170). 
115 Rousseau describes this tendency in Book III Chapters 10-11 of the Social Contract. Much of his counsel to 
his fellow Genevans in the Letters Written from the Mountain concerns vigorously opposing this tendency, which 
he observed at work in their city. 
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peoples whose progress in the dynamic of socialization is less advanced and who are less set 
in their mœurs. This means more specifically—and more importantly—that it will tend to be 
found among peoples for whom monetary wealth is not an object of especial esteem. Hence, 
in legislating only for vigorous peoples, legislators will be spared from the daunting, not to say 
futile, task of reforming the pernicious opinion that monetary wealth is estimable and the 
pernicious mœurs that follow from this opinion. 
Nevertheless, the tension between the qualities that Rousseau identifies as 
prerequisites for receiving legislation points us to one of the most basic challenges that 
confronts the legislator. Virtuous citizenship entails a complex and elusive combination of 
docility and vigor. To say that citizens must be docile as subjects and vigorous as members of 
the sovereign would be to understate its complexity and elusiveness considerably. For 
participation in sovereignty alone requires both docility and vigor. Consider what the 
sovereignty of the general will means for the way that citizens are to relate to their private wills 
on one hand and established law on the other. Citizens must be docile inasmuch as they must 
subordinate their private wills to the general will. But they also must be vigorous inasmuch as 
they must assert the general will over and against the very established law that they docilely 
obey outside the assembly as subjects. We are about to see that this problem will be 
exacerbated in the first stage of civic education and will have to be ameliorated in the second 
if the principles of political right are to be realized. 
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Chapter 3: Nascent Citizenship as Dutifulness to Divine Authority 
Now that we have an understanding of Rousseau’s moral and social psychology, of 
the psychic condition of human beings as formed by history in society, and of the qualities 
favorable to citizenship, we turn to Rousseau’s account of civic education. In this chapter, we 
will examine the preliminary stage of civic education wherein the legislator gets the people 
effectively to enact his laws by persuading them, with musical rhetoric, that they are obligated 
to submit to those laws on the false grounds that they express the authoritative will of God or 
the gods. In addition to treating the question of the legitimacy of this stage of civic education, 
we will treat the relatively understudied question of its efficacy. In arguing that the legislator 
gets the people to obey and thereby to consent to his laws by appealing to divine authority, 
Rousseau implies that the people have a conception of and are moved by a sense of obligation 
to divine authority. But given the moral and intellectual limits that Rousseau ascribes to the 
people—limits that make the legislator necessary—the question arises whether the people 
would have such a conception or be moved by such a sense. Ours is the first study of 
Rousseau’s account of the legislator to take up this question. We draw on the Second Discourse 
and the Emile, among other works, to determine how the people would conceive of divine 
authority prior to their encounter with the legislator and how the legislator would have to 
reform that conception in order to move them to obey his laws out of a sense of obligation. 
In answering these questions, we shed light on Rousseau’s moral, religious, and political 
psychologies. Our novel account of the rhetorical substance of the legislator’s appeal to divine 
authority complements scholarship on the rhetorical style of that appeal, i.e., of persuasion, 
and its relation to music.116 And it informs our contribution to the long-running scholarly 
 
116 See Garsten, Saving Persuasion, 55-83; Kelly, Rousseau as Author, 62-73 and “‘To Persuade Without 
Convincing’”; Scott, “Rousseau and the Melodious Language of Freedom”; and Voorhees, “Melodic 
Communities.” 
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debate on the problem that Rousseau’s account of the legislator poses to his principles of 
political right. 
I. LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY 
Before taking up the question of how the legislator is to obtain the people’s consent 
to his laws, we would do well to examine Rousseau’s complicated and perplexing account of 
the legislator’s authority, or lack thereof, at the beginning of Book II Chapter VII of the Social 
Contract. For it is the principle of political right that Rousseau ultimately reaffirms in this 
account, i.e., that no human being may rightfully be subjected to another without his consent, 
that requires the legislator to undertake this preliminary stage of civic education. 
As we noted in Chapter 1, the inherently problematic character of the legislator is 
evident in the very term “legislator.” Rousseau’s principles of political right imply that this 
term is properly reserved to the sovereign, which is to say all the citizens, or the people. For 
legislative power inheres in sovereignty and sovereignty inheres in the people (SC 2.1, 6). In 
certain places, Rousseau uses the term accordingly.117 What, then, are we to make of his use of 
the term to refer to an extraordinary man who stands apart from the people and thus bears no 
legislative authority? Are the doubts about the people’s capacity and willingness to legislate 
prudently for the common good that Rousseau raises in Book II Chapter VI so great as to 
compel him to abandon the principle that legislative power belongs to it and it alone? Does 
the legislator supersede the people as sovereign? In guiding the people, does the legislator 
effectively usurp them? 
In the opening paragraphs of Book II Chapter VII, Rousseau seems to entertain the 
idea that the legislator does possess legislative authority over the people. The first paragraph 
of the chapter, in which Rousseau identifies qualities that one would have to combine in order 
 
117 For instance, see GP / ŒC 3: 975, 978, 1031 / CW 11: 186, 189, 232; LWM / ŒC 3: 845, 894-95 / CW 9: 
263, 304.  
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to be capable of “[discovering] the best rules of society suited to Nations,” culminates in the 
conclusion that “Gods would be needed in order to give laws to men.” Rousseau’s legislator 
appears to be quite literally a deus ex machina. If the legislator were indeed a god and thus not 
equal but superior to human beings, a case could be made for his possession of legislative 
authority over the people. Indeed, Rousseau begins the next paragraph by alluding to precisely 
such a case, observing that “[t]he same reasoning that Caligula used with respect to fact, Plato 
used with respect to right in order to define the civil or royal man he seeks in his book on 
ruling” (SC 2.7 / ŒC 3: 381 / CW 4: 154). Earlier in the Social Contract, Rousseau explained 
that Caligula inferred that rulers must be superhuman from the fact that they rule their human 
subjects as shepherds rule their sheep (SC 1.2 / ŒC 3: 353 / CW 4: 132). Just as the nature 
of the shepherd is superior to that of his sheep, so too must the nature of the ruler be superior 
to that of his subjects. What Rousseau implies here, then, is that Plato holds that only a 
superhuman being could rightfully rule over human beings as a shepherd does over his 
sheep.118 The important point to take from this for our purposes is that, despite their 
differences, Caligula and Plato both have in mind rulers who possess legislative authority. 
Given this, Rousseau’s allusion to their arguments lends support to the thought that his 
legislator does possess legislative authority over the people. It also indicates how this could be 
reconciled with principles of political right that, as presented thus far in the Social Contract, do 
not seem to allow anyone other than the people to exercise legislative power. 
Yet Rousseau goes on to make clear that, contrary to the implications of the term 
“legislator” and the opening paragraphs of the chapter, the legislator does not possess 
legislative authority over the people. It is worthwhile to quote his explanation in full: 
 
118 We pass over the question of whether this is a correct interpretation of Plato’s Statesman. For an account of 
the relation between Rousseau’s conception of the legislator and the Platonic conception, see Masters, Political 
Philosophy of Rousseau, 359-64. 
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The legislator is in all regards an extraordinary man in the State. If he must be one by 
his genius, he is one no less by his job. It is not magistracy, it is not sovereignty. This 
job, which constitutes the republic, does not enter into its constitution. It is a 
particular and superior function which has nothing in common with human rule 
[empire]. For if someone who commands men must not command laws, someone 
who commands laws must no more command men. Otherwise, his laws, ministers of 
his passions, would often only serve to perpetuate his injustices, and he never would 
be able to avoid having his private views alter the sanctity of his work. (SC 2.7 / ŒC 
3: 382 / CW 4: 155) 
The extent to which Rousseau here corrects the argument of the chapter up to this point is 
great but easy to miss. The extraordinariness of the genius required for legislation led Rousseau 
to conclude that the legislator must be a god. This conclusion, combined with Rousseau’s 
allusion to the reasonings of Caligula and Plato, implied that the legislator possesses legislative 
authority over the people. One would have thought that his possession of this essential aspect 
of sovereignty, which seemed to be reserved exclusively to the people, is what makes his job 
extraordinary. Yet Rousseau here discloses that, on the contrary, it is the legislator’s lack of 
legislative authority that makes his job extraordinary. Note that the grounds on which 
Rousseau denies that the legislator can possess legislative authority implies that, however 
extraordinary his genius may be, he is human, all too human. At the beginning of the chapter, 
prior to concluding that gods would be needed in order to give laws to men, Rousseau insisted 
that the “superior intelligence” that would be required for the “[discovery] of the best rules of 
society suited to Nations” could not experience human passions, partake of human nature, or 
depend on human beings for his happiness. Now, in explaining why the legislator lacks 
legislative authority, he makes clear that none of this is true of the legislator, at least of any 
human legislator. Put differently, Rousseau makes clear that, contrary to the apparent 
implication of his conclusion that “Gods would be needed in order to give laws to men,” the 
legislator he is treating in this chapter is not divine but human and, as such, lacks the divine 
qualities that he had suggested would be required for discovering the best laws. 
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But then can the legislator solve the problem that he was introduced to solve? The 
task of the legislator is, as Rousseau put it in Book II Chapter VI, to unify understanding and 
will in the social body, i.e., to make the wills of citizens conform to the general will and to 
enlighten them about the means to their common preservation, the object of the general will. 
Now, if the legislator is to fulfill this task, understanding and will must be unified in him, i.e., 
his will must conform to the general will and he must know what the means to the people’s 
preservation consists in. The three pairs of contrary qualities that Rousseau identifies at the 
beginning of the chapter as required for the discovery of the best laws—seeing all the human 
passions without experiencing any of them, knowing human nature thoroughly without 
partaking of it at all, being willing to attend to the happiness of human beings without 
depending on them for one’s own happiness—contribute to this necessary unity of 
understanding and will in the legislator. Does Rousseau’s denial that any human legislator 
possesses these pairs of qualities not then imply that the problem that the legislator is meant 
to solve is insoluble in the absence of a god or gods? The answer to this question would be 
yes, and Rousseau’s ultimate political teaching utopian, if it were not for the fourth quality that 
Rousseau identifies as required for the discovery of the best laws, namely, a capacity to work 
for a reward, specifically, glory, that one will not live to experience oneself. 
This fourth quality stands apart from the three pairs of contrary qualities that precede 
it in a few distinct but related ways. For one thing, it is not paired with a contrary quality. Partly 
for this reason, it is recognizably human and thus far less elusive than those other qualities. It 
is true that a capacity to undertake extensive work for which one will not be rewarded in one’s 
lifetime is uncommon. But it is hardly without example. Indeed, Rousseau associates it with 
an actual human legislator, namely, Lycurgus.119 This is something he does not do with any of 
 
119 It is true that, according to Rousseau’s beloved Plutarch, Lycurgus presented himself as quasi-divine to the 
Spartans and that the Spartans worshipped him as a god after his death (Plutarch, “Lycurgus,” 5.3, 31.3). But, 
for all his praise of Lycurgus, the legislator par excellence, Rousseau invariably treats him as a mere man. 
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the preceding qualities. Rousseau explains in a footnote: “A people becomes famous only 
when its legislation starts to decline. We do not know for how many centuries the institution 
of Lycurgus caused the happiness of the Spartans before the rest of Greece became aware of 
them” (SC 2.7 / ŒC 3: 381n / CW 4: 154n). Evidently the happiness of the people does not 
suffice as a reward for the legislator. Nor, for that matter, does their esteem. The glory he 
longs for transcends the limits of the state he founds.120 But even if we take it for granted that 
such glory cannot come to the legislator during his lifetime, the happiness of his people and 
their esteem for him may constitute partial rewards and would give him grounds to hope that 
such glory would come to him posthumously. In the anticipation of this glory, the legislator 
would get to enjoy something of the complete reward for which he longs. This is to say that, 
unlike in the case of the other qualities necessary for the discovery of the best laws, one need 
not be a god in order to possess this one. We can take one step further and consider whether 
hope for posthumous glory might not substitute for the other, divine qualities, which, as we 
have seen, Rousseau goes on to admit no human legislator could possess. Note that this more 
human fourth quality is, strictly speaking, incompatible with the divine qualities that precede 
it. A legislator who loves glory and hopes to win it by giving laws to a people experiences at 
least one human passion, partakes of at least one aspect of human nature, and depends upon 
human beings for his happiness. 
 
120 The reason that the legislator will not be satisfied with the esteem of his own people becomes clearer in 
light of Rousseau’s subsequent indication that the legislator’s own people will be under the illusion that their 
laws come not from the legislator but from God or the gods. For reasons that we will discuss below, the 
legislator must “honor the Gods with [his] own wisdom” in order to subject the people to his laws (SC 2.7 / 
ŒC 3: 383 / CW 4: 156). This means, as Gildin has pointed out, that the legislator’s own people will not 
recognize or honor the full extent of the legislator’s genius or achievement (Rousseau’s “Social Contract”, 69-70). 
For a glimpse into the spiritual gulf separating the legislator from his people, see Rousseau’s intriguing 
fragmentary dialogue between a Hebrew legislator, who must be Moses, and another legislator in the afterlife 
(PF 4.26 / ŒC 3: 500 / CW 4: 34-35). Moses’ feeling of greater kinship with his fellow legislators than with his 
fellow Hebrews and the pleasure he hopes to find among them illustrates his dissatisfaction with the happiness 
and esteem of his people. His hope may be informed by the thought that only his peers could recognize and 
honor the full extent of his genius or achievement.  
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In light of all this, the union of will and understanding needed in a legislator no longer 
seems to be impossible for human beings. The human passion amour-propre, of which the love 
of and hope for glory are variants, suffices to supply the legislator with a motive to seek out 
rules for the good of society.121 This is one of many ways in which amour-propre is crucial to 
civic education. It supplies the civic educator’s motive to educate the people. Out of the 
legislator’s amour-propre and the people’s need for guidance emerges a common good. The 
legislator achieves glory for himself by giving good laws to the people.122  
A qualification is in order, however. Recall Rousseau’s insistence that the legislator 
bears no legislative authority over the people. Evidently, Rousseau does not have so much 
confidence that hope for posthumous glory will lead men of genius to devise good laws for 
peoples as to revise the principle that legislative authority, or sovereignty, can be borne 
exclusively by the people.123  Indeed, he reminds us of the argument underlying this principle 
from Book I: Since, “according to the fundamental compact, it is only the general will that 
obligates private individuals” and since “one can never be assured that a private will is in 
conformity with the general will,” the laws proposed by the legislator must be submitted to 
and ratified by “the free votes of a people” before they can go into effect (SC 2.7 / ŒC 3: 383 
/ CW 4: 156). Now, there is something rather problematic about this argument. The thought 
that a popular vote in favor of the legislator’s laws would demonstrate their conformity to the 
general will presupposes that the people would vote in accord with the general will rather than 
 
121 Pace Johnston, who characterizes “[l]egislation” as “an act of generosity first and foremost” and “a gift” 
(Encountering Tragedy, 48). On the ultimately selfish motive of the legislator, see Gildin, Rousseau’s “Social 
Contract”, 70. 
122 Gildin’s argument that, while “the particular will of the legislator and the general will are not in opposition,” 
they do not “coincide,” makes too much of the fact that “the divine glory sought by the legislator and the 
common good [of the people] cannot be at their peak at the same time” and not enough of the fact that “the 
legislator cannot achieve his goal without achieving the common good [of the people] and the common good 
[of the people] cannot be achieved without the legislator’s services” (Rousseau’s “Social Contract”, 70).  
123 In the Discourse on the Virtue Most Necessary for a Hero, Rousseau readily acknowledges that, while the love of 
glory can move men to contribute to the common goods of political communities, it need not do this. Indeed, 
it can move them to undermine the common good (VH / ŒC 2: 1264-65 / CW 4: 3). Given this, it is hardly 
safe for the people to defer to heroic glory-seekers as authorities. Kelly, Rousseau as Author, 91. 
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their respective private wills. But Rousseau made clear, in explaining the need for a legislator 
at the end of Book II Chapter VI, that this cannot be presupposed. It is only after a multitude 
of private individuals has been transformed into a people, properly so-called, only after men 
have become citizens, that a popular vote in favor of the legislator’s laws could be taken as 
proof of their conformity with the general will. Yet this transformation will not occur unless 
or until they have undergone a civic education, which is to say, unless or until they have been 
subjected to the legislator’s laws. 
The one historical example that Rousseau gives in support of his argument, i.e., of the 
Decemvirs’ telling the Roman people that the laws they proposed would not go into effect 
without their consent, is telling. At that point in their history, the Romans had long been 
subject to law and had already undergone civic education. The most important and challenging 
aspect of legislation, the fostering “of mœurs, of customs, and…of opinion,” which transforms 
men into citizens, had, as Rousseau makes clear in his Considerations on the Government of Poland, 
already been carried out by Numa (SC 2.12 / ŒC 3: 394 / CW 164-65; GP 2 / ŒC 3: 957-58 
/ CW 11: 172-73). The Romans confronted by the Decemvirs were not men but citizens, not 
a multitude of private individuals but a people. Hence, their voting in favor of the laws 
proposed by the Decemvirs could, at least arguably, be taken as proof of those laws’ 
conformity to the general will. The example of the Decemvirs does not so much answer as 
raise the question of how the legislator can unite will and understanding in the people without 
violating Rousseau’s principles of political right.124 Answering this question is our task in the 
remainder of the chapter. 
In the course of answering this question, we will ultimately return to another important 
question raised by our treatment of the legislator thus far: What is the meaning and significance 
 
124 Here, we follow Gildin, who distinguishes legislators who subject peoples to law for the first time from 
those who give new laws to peoples who have already been subject to law, e.g., the Decemvirs (Rousseau’s “Social 
Contract”, 73). 
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of Rousseau’s contention that “Gods would be needed in order to give laws to men”? What 
are we to make of this contention given that, as we have come to see, Rousseau is 
contemplating a human legislator who lacks the divine qualities that he initially suggests would 
be necessary for the discovery of the best laws? There are two distinct but related senses in 
which men could be given laws, or, rather the best laws, only by a divine legislator. First, 
although Rousseau’s exact statement is not that gods would be needed in order to give the best 
laws to men, there is some warrant in the paragraph for interpreting it in this way. For it is 
“[i]n order to discover the best rules of society suited to Nations” (emphasis added) that, 
according to Rousseau, it would be necessary to see all the human passions without 
experiencing any of them, know human nature thoroughly without partaking of it at all, and 
be willing to attend to the happiness of human beings without depending on them for one’s 
own happiness. It may be that the human legislator who lacks these divine qualities could, by 
dint of his genius and his hope for posthumous glory, discover good laws but not the best 
laws. Second, only a divine legislator could rightly impose laws on men without first obtaining 
their consent. Given the inherent superiority of gods to human beings, it is at least arguable 
that a divine legislator would have a natural authority over human beings that no man has over 
another, according to Rousseau. It is also arguable that the will of a being that possessed those 
divine qualities would be equivalent to the general will and thus could be taken as authoritative 
over human beings. A divine legislator’s right to impose laws on men without their consent 
points to another reason why his laws would, as we suggested above, be superior to those of 
any human legislator. By contrast with human legislators, he would never be obliged to modify 
and thus lessen the wisdom of his laws in order to obtain the people’s consent. Rousseau’s 
intention in contending that “Gods would be necessary in order to give laws to men” may, 
then, be partly to indicate the limits of the human legislator and therewith of politics more 
broadly. 
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The line of thought that we have just sketched depends upon interpreting the 
contention that “Gods would be necessary in order to give laws to men” to mean that 
legislators, in order to fulfill their task perfectly, must be gods. While this meaning is strongly 
suggested by the paragraph as a whole, Rousseau does not quite say this. Taken in isolation, 
the statement could mean that it would be necessary for gods to exist in order for men to give 
laws to men. Indeed, as we will soon see, Book II Chapter VII culminates in a modified version 
of this very thought, namely, that it would be necessary for men to believe that gods exist in 
order for men to give laws to men. 
II. THE RHETORICAL STYLE OF THE LEGISLATOR’S TEACHING 
Given Rousseau’s own rhetoric in the Social Contract, it might seem that the legislator 
would elicit the people’s consent to his laws by convincing them of their utility, by 
demonstrating through rational argument that his laws will help them to preserve their lives 
and goods without depriving them of their freedom and thus to achieve the goal of the social 
contract. But Rousseau insists that this mode of rhetoric—the language of the wise, as 
distinguished from the language of the people—would fall on deaf ears. So great is the 
difference between the wise and the people that “there are a thousand kinds of ideas that are 
impossible to translate [from the language of the former] into the language [of the latter].” 
Thus, it is not merely the style of wise men’s expression but the substance of their thought 
that the people cannot understand. Rousseau explains: “Overly general views and overly 
distant objects are equally out of their reach; each individual appreciating no scheme of 
government other than that which relates to his private interest, perceives with difficulty the 
advantages he should derive from the continual privations imposed by good laws” (SC 2.7 / 
ŒC 3: 383 / CW 4: 156). 
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In certain obvious ways, this characterization of the people’s intellectual limits 
resembles the characterization of their intellectual limits at the end of Book II Chapter VI. 
Here, as there, Rousseau attributes to the people an inability to distinguish their ultimate goods 
from obviously or immediately felt goods and evils. This, along with an inability to generalize, 
keeps them from recognizing the common good promoted by laws that, obviously and 
immediately, deprive them of goods and subject them to evils, or from recognizing the ways 
in and extent to which they benefit from that common good. Thus, the same deficiencies that 
leave the people incapable of legislating well for themselves and, therewith, dependent upon 
a legislator also make it impossible for them to be convinced of the goodness of the legislator’s 
good laws. We confront a chicken-and-egg problem. As Rousseau puts it: 
In order for a nascent people to be able to appreciate the healthy maxims of politics 
and to follow the fundamental rules of the reason of State, it would be necessary for 
the effect to become the cause, for the social spirit, which should be the work of the 
institution, to preside over the institution itself, and for men to become before the 
laws what they should become by them. (SC 2.7 / ŒC 3: 383 / CW 4: 156) 
Before turning to the solution to this problem, it is worth taking note of one significant 
difference between Rousseau’s account of the limits of the people here and his account of 
their limits at the end of Book II Chapter VI. Rousseau there maintained two distinct but 
related distinctions, one between the people, taken as a whole, and private individuals, and 
another between the intellect and the will. He held that, whereas the people have a will that is 
correct, i.e., a will that conforms to the general will, but are unenlightened, i.e., do not know 
what the common good consists in or requires, private individuals are enlightened, i.e., know 
what the common good consists in and requires, but have incorrect wills, i.e., wills that do not 
conform to the general will. Rousseau now abandons these distinctions. The people that the 
legislator confronts is not a whole but a multitude of private individuals; Rousseau aptly 
identifies them as “a nascent people.” Neither the wills nor the intellects of the private 
individuals that make up this nascent people are correct. This brings to light another, deeper 
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reason that the legislator cannot rely on convincing to obtain the people’s consent to his laws. 
Even if the people were receptive to being convinced, and thus could be led to recognize what 
the common good consisted in and required, the legislator would have to find another way to 
dispose them to will the common good. For, as Christopher Kelly observes, “Rousseau denies 
that there is any necessary connection between possessing a clear understanding of what justice 
is and having a disposition to be just.”125 
There is a remedy for this problem, namely, persuasion. Persuasion is a mode of 
rhetoric that appeals to the imagination, either directly with visual signs or indirectly with 
music, which gives rise to images in the minds of the audience, in ways that rouse the passions 
and prompt men to action. The distinction between this mode of rhetoric and convincing 
recurs consistently in Rousseau’s writings.126 Kelly and Scott have shown that, in order fully to 
understand what Rousseau means by persuasion, we need to turn to his Essay on the Origin of 
Languages.127 The Essay on the Origin of Languages supplements Book II Chapter VII of the Social 
Contract in two important ways. First, it sheds additional light on what persuasion entails as a 
mode of rhetoric. In Book II Chapter VII of the Social Contract, more attention is given to the 
substance of the legislator’s rhetoric, which, as we will discuss in Part III of this chapter, 
consists in an appeal to divine authority, than to its style. The only light that is shed on this 
question in Book II Chapter VII of the Social Contract comes from the contrast that is drawn 
there between persuading and convincing. We are told what persuasion is not; we are not told 
what it is. 
 
125 Rousseau as Author, 63. In support of his observation, Kelly points to Rousseau’s claim, in Book II Chapter 
VI of the Social Contract, that “[p]rivate individuals see the good that they reject,” and the distinction drawn by 
the unjust man, in Book I Chapter II of the Geneva Manuscript, between “teaching [him] what justice is” and 
“showing [him] what interest he has in being just” (SC 2.6 / ŒC 3: 380 / CW 4: 154; GM 1.2 / ŒC 3: 286 / 
CW 4: 80). See also Riley, General Will before Rousseau, 212-13. 
126 For examples outside Book II Chapter VII of the Social Contract, see EOL 4 / ŒC 5: 383 / CW 7: 296 and 
PN / ŒC 2: 959 / CW 2: 186. 
127 See Kelly, “To Persuade without Convincing” and, in its adapted form, Rousseau as Author, 62-77; and Scott, 
“Rousseau and the Melodious Language of Freedom.” Despite differences of emphasis, we largely follow Kelly 
and Scott in this section. 
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Second, Rousseau’s account of the historical development of languages in the Essay on 
the Origin of Languages, along with certain corresponding passages in the Second Discourse, sheds 
additional light on the social and moral psychology of the people before they have been 
subjected to the legislator’s laws or undergone civic education. Although, as Rousseau has 
emphasized in Book II Chapter VI-VII, the people are not, at this stage, so sociable or moral 
as to have a general will that reliably predominates over their respective private wills, they are 
not, as we saw in Chapter 2, altogether asocial or amoral. At the point at which civil society 
becomes necessary or possible, human beings have already acquired certain unnatural 
passions, e.g., romantic love and amour-propre, which have given rise to what Rousseau calls 
“nascent society” and what he might call nascent morality. Indeed, if this were not the case, 
the people would not be open to persuasion. 
The distinctive character of persuasion as a mode of rhetoric is illuminated by 
Rousseau’s account of the historical development of language in the Essay on the Origin of 
Languages. This is partly because the modern, northern languages with which we, like most of 
Rousseau’s readers, are most familiar lend themselves to convincing more than to persuading. 
We can learn about persuasion by learning about the more primitive, southern languages which 
lend themselves, by contrast, to persuading more than to convincing (EOL 4 / ŒC 5: 383 / 
CW 7: 296).128 
The question of how language arose is, for Rousseau, a question of how human beings 
came to associate in supra-familial groups.129 The answer to this question depends upon 
 
128 When Rousseau uses the directions north and south in the Essay on the Origin of Languages, he is speaking 
from the perspective of an inhabitant of the Northern Hemisphere. Hence, what is meant by southern is not 
proximate to the South Pole but proximate to the Equator and, thus, likely to be warm in climate and abundant 
in the necessities of life. 
129 Rousseau holds that, at the stage of development during which human beings lived in exclusively familial 
settlements, they did not yet possess “[g]enuine languages.” Despite their cohabitation, they seldom 
communicated with one another. And when they did, they used mere “gesture” and “inarticulate sounds.” 
Their needs, which were so limited that each could meet them on his own, did not give them cause to 
communicate much with one another. And they had no passions to express to one another. Of course, they 
had sex. But because they did not yet make comparisons among or form preferences for potential mates, their 
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climate. In both warm and cold climates, it was need rather than passion that first drove human 
beings into proximity to one another. In warm climates where water is scarce and concentrated 
in one or a few locations, need brought human beings of different families together. This need 
did not by itself compel them to communicate much with one another.130 But it had the effect 
of introducing the young to unfamiliar members of the opposite sex, which gave rise to a new 
passion that moved them to communicate a great deal with another. Regular exposure to one 
another, which was itself pleasant for its novelty, led them to make comparisons among and 
form preferences for one another. In the parallel account of the origins of romantic love in 
the Second Discourse, Rousseau suggests that these preferences immediately took on a moral 
character of some kind. As we saw in Chapter 2, making comparisons gave rise to “ideas of 
merit and of beauty” (SD / ŒC 3: 169/ CW 3: 47). Sexuality thus was transformed from a 
mere instinctive physical inclination into a moral passion. The ease with which human beings 
could meet their needs in warm southern climates allowed them to give themselves over to 
romantic love. Gesture, which theretofore had sufficed for the expression of their limited 
physical needs, did not suffice for the expression of this new moral passion. For that, they 
made use of their voices. Southern languages, sung rather than spoken, accented rather than 
articulated, thus were born with romantic love (EOL 9 / ŒC 5: 405-407 / CW 7: 313-15).  
Language arose in northern climates, by contrast, not so much for the expression of a 
passion as for the expression of needs connected to self-preservation. In the north, where the 
elements are harsh and the necessities of life are scarce, need drove human beings into more 
than mere proximity to one another. It drove them into cooperative association, for which 
genuine language, that is, more than mere gesture or inarticulate sounds, was required. 
 
sexuality was amoral and dispassionate and, as such, did not give rise to much communication (EOL 9 / ŒC 5: 
395, 406-407 / CW 7: 305, 314-15).  
130 Rousseau concedes that, in some southern locales where water could not be obtained without human 
artifice, need would have driven human beings into some cooperative labor, e.g., the construction of wells. But, 
as in the case of primitive family life, he denies that this would have required so much communication as to 
have generated genuine language (EOL 9 / ŒC 5: 407 / CW 7: 315). 
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Notwithstanding their robustness, none could meet his needs on his own. What the northerner 
saw in another human being was at worst an enemy and at best a helper, never a beloved or 
lover. Preoccupied with their needs, compelled always to be industrious, northerners lacked 
the leisure that would have been necessary for romantic love to emerge among them as it did 
among southerners. Hence, for them, sexuality remained exclusively an instinctive physical 
inclination. The “first word” among northerners, then, was “not ‘love me,’ but ‘help me’” 
(EOL 10 / ŒC 5: 408 / CW 7: 316). From this difference in the “object[s]” of northern and 
southern languages arose a difference in what Rousseau calls their “mechanical aspect[s]” 
(EOL 4 / ŒC 5: 383 / CW 7: 295). Whereas southern languages, which were spoken to make 
passions felt, tended to be energetic and accented, northern languages, which were spoken to 
make ideas understood, tended to be clear and articulated. To the extent that northern 
language was passionate, it was hardly gentle. For the dominant passion of northerners, whose 
difficult lives made them irritable and fiercely protective of themselves and what little they 
possessed, was anger. If “help me” was their first word, a furious threat was their second (EOL 
10 / ŒC 5: 407-408 / CW 7: 315-16). 
We can begin to understand what is entailed in persuasion by considering the 
distinctive musicality of southern languages. For this is a major part of what makes those 
languages more conducive than northern languages to persuasion. When language first 
emerged in the south, speech and music were one and the same in Rousseau’s telling. Words 
were always sung, and music was never without words. Rousseau reasons that the tender 
passion that moved human beings to utter the words “love me” naturally would have been 
expressed gently, more through modifications of the voice by the glottis than through its 
articulation by the tongue and the palate. A man would have expressed his feelings no less by 
the accents and the rhythms of his speech, or rather his song, than by his words (EOL 12 / 
ŒC 5: 410-11 / CW 7: 317-18). And, as tends to be the case with lyrics, his words would have 
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been largely poetic. The “turns of phrase in this language” must, Rousseau infers, have been 
“in images, in feelings, in figures.” Given all this, Rousseau concludes that, “instead of 
arguments [this language] would have sayings [sentences], it would persuade without convincing 
and depict without reasoning” (EOL 4 / ŒC 5: 382-83 / CW 7: 295-96). 
A crucial aspect of persuasion, which has begun to emerge from Rousseau’s 
characterization of southern language, is that it involves the imagination as well as the passions. 
Whereas conviction expresses and appeals to reason through discursive speech, persuasion 
expresses and appeals to passionate imaginings through poetic song. The role played by the 
imagination in persuasion will become clearer if we consider Rousseau’s account of the moral 
effects of melody. Much of Rousseau’s project as a music theorist consisted in demonstrating 
the centrality of melody, as distinguished from harmony, to music. Melody is, according to 
Rousseau’s Dictionary of Music, a “[s]uccession of Sounds so ordered according to the laws of 
Rhythm and of Modulation that it makes a pleasant feeling [sens] to the ear” (DM / ŒC 5: 884 
/ CW 7: 421).131 Rousseau makes clear in the Essay on the Origin of Languages that, in addition to 
producing pleasant physical sensations in the ear, melody produces “moral effects” on the 
listener, that is, it can rouse his passions and, in doing so, even rouse him to action.132 Up to 
now, we have emphasized the unity of language and music at their origins. But, in order to 
follow Rousseau’s account of the power of melody, we need to draw the distinction between 
them with which we are familiar. For Rousseau gives different, though not incompatible, 
 
131 Note that the range of meaning of the word “sens” is broader than the word “feeling” with which we 
translate it. We avoid using the English cognate “sense,” which would be awkward in context. But “sense” 
better conveys the breadth of the word’s meaning, which extends beyond physical sensations to ideas. It is 
important, given the moral effects that Rousseau attributes to melody, to recognize that it has more than 
merely sensory effects on the listener. 
132 The sense in which Rousseau uses the adjective “moral” when he speaks of the “moral effects” of 
melodious music is quite capacious. The effects of melodious music that Rousseau treats as moral include all 
the psychic effects that such music has on the listener other than the sensation of sound in the ear. They do not 
necessarily involve such moral ideas as right and duty. 
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accounts of what melody adds to language and of what it adds to music unaccompanied by 
words. 
In the case of language, fully “half its richness” comes from melody, which conveys 
“feelings” and “images.” Unmelodious language, which consists merely of “articulations” and 
“voices,” could convey only “ideas” (EOL 12 / ŒC 5: 411 / CW 7: 318). Such language might 
convince, but it would not persuade given its incapacity to express or appeal to the passions 
or the imagination. Similarly, in the case of music unaccompanied by words, melody is what 
expresses and appeals to the passions and the imagination. Rousseau explains, “[t]he sounds 
in the melody do not act on us only as sounds, but as signs of our affections, of our feelings; 
it is thus that that they excite in us the movements that they express and the image of which 
we recognize in them” (EOL 15 / ŒC 5: 417 / CW 7: 323). The movements expressed by 
melody are the movements of the passions. Even when music is unaccompanied by words, it 
can, through melody, imitate passionate language (EOL 14 / ŒC 5: 416 / CW 7: 322). And it 
can thus cause the listener to experience the passions that it is imitating. In some cases, this 
effect is mediated through the imagination. Hearing a melody that expresses a passion that the 
listener associates with a certain object will cause him to imagine that object and then to 
experience the associated passion himself. The moral effects that melody can thus produce 
with wordless music might perhaps be greater if it were accompanied by words, which might 
convey ideas corresponding to the passions and images it expressed.133 
Now that we understand how language can, in Rousseau’s view, express and appeal to 
the passions and the imagination, and thus persuade rather than convince, we can return to 
 
133 Kelly argues that “[wordless] imitative music” is “[t]he most powerful, or purest, medium of persuasion” on 
the grounds that it “intensifies the expression of feelings even more than the first language does.” For, unlike 
that language, it expresses only “feelings” and no “thoughts or ideas” (Rousseau as Author, 69). We would qualify 
Kelly’s argument by noting that, inasmuch as the legislator could not achieve his goal without expressing 
thoughts or ideas through his music, the total omission of words from his music would undermine rather than 
enhance its efficacy. This is not to deny that the legislator’s purposes would be served by the use of some 
wordless imitative music. It is only to suggest that such music would have to be complemented by speech.   
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the question of how the legislator is to make use of this mode of rhetoric. We find in the Essay 
on the Origin of Languages numerous affirmations of the claim in Book II Chapter VII of the 
Social Contract that persuasion is the mode of rhetoric appropriate for legislators to use with 
peoples. For example, Rousseau insists that “ministers of the Gods announcing the sacred 
mysteries, the wise giving laws to peoples, [and] leaders leading the multitude must speak 
Arabic or Persian,” i.e., persuasive southern languages rather than convincing northern 
languages. The latter, e.g., “French, English, and German,” are, in keeping with their origins, 
“the private language[s] of men who help one another, who reason among themselves in cold 
blood, or of ill-tempered people who quarrel” (EOL 11 / ŒC 5: 409 / CW 7: 317). 
Before inquiring into how persuasive southern languages can and have been used by 
legislators to persuade peoples to consent to their laws, we would do well to reflect on what 
Rousseau’s recommendation of these languages to legislators indicates about the 
preconditions of politics. To state the obvious, it is among speakers of southern languages, 
which is to say, most likely if not necessarily, inhabitants of warmer, southern climates that 
political life is most likely to flourish. When we recall that, in such climates, where such 
languages originate, human beings tend to be able to meet their needs and preserve themselves 
easily without the help of others, we are struck by the paradoxical implication that political life 
is most likely to flourish where it is least necessary. 
If one were to take Rousseau’s elaboration of the terms of the social contract in Book 
I Chapter VI of the Social Contract as a guide to the factual origins of political life, one would 
expect political life to originate in northern rather than in southern climates. Indeed, the 
necessitous, violently quarrelsome, if not warlike, conditions of life in northern climates are 
precisely the conditions that would, according to the Social Contract, and did, according to the 
Second Discourse, drive human beings, against their natural inclinations, into political life. And 
the language that arises under these circumstances would seem to be well-oriented to the 
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establishment of a social contract. But if it is well-oriented to the establishment of a social 
contract, it is evidently not well-oriented to its effective execution. The people’s straits may be 
so dire that they recognize that they must unite and help one another in order to preserve 
themselves. But, as Rousseau suggests in Book II Chapter VII of the Social Contract, the people 
are not intelligent enough to recognize that it is in their respective interests to suffer the 
privations and bear the burdens that would inevitably come with laws designed to achieve this 
end.134 Hence, if a legislator were to come among a northern people bearing good laws, he 
could not convince them, despite their desperation, to submit voluntarily to those laws. The 
problem, in such a case, would not be that the people did not speak a language conducive to 
convincing but that they were not intelligent enough to be convinced to follow the prudent 
course proposed to them by the legislator. 
All this raises a question about the origins of politics in southern climates too, 
however. For one of the causes of the persuasiveness of southern languages is that it is 
relatively easy for human beings to meet their needs and preserve themselves in southern 
climates. This implies that the places in which language is best suited for a legislator to 
persuade a people to submit to his laws are places in which there is the least need for laws. 
The following conjecture may serve to resolve the difficulty. It may be that, whenever 
conditions changed in ways that made life so hard that laws became necessary, language had 
been established for so long and had become so settled that its persuasive, melodious quality 
did not give way. It also may be that, when some legislators persuaded southern peoples to 
consent to their laws, those laws were not, strictly speaking, necessary for the purpose of self-
preservation. Indeed, it may be that for a people to consent to laws on the basis of persuasion 
rather than conviction is precisely for them do so on the basis of some motive other than self-
 
134 Here, we set aside the question of whether it would in fact be in everyone’s interest to suffer every privation 
and bear every burden imposed by the law. Our point is that, even if it were, the people would not, in 
Rousseau’s view, be intelligent enough to recognize this. 
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preservation. On this view, the people confronted by the legislator would not be searching for 
his guidance or inclined to submit to laws of any kind. They may not even have established a 
social contract. On this view, it would be incumbent on the legislator to persuade the people 
not merely to submit to his laws in particular but also, and more fundamentally, to submit to 
law as such and thus radically to transform their very way of life. 
III. THE RHETORICAL SUBSTANCE OF THE LEGISLATOR’S TEACHING 
We turn now to the substance of the legislator’s persuasive rhetoric, to his teaching. 
In doing so, we turn to an important aspect of Rousseau’s account of the legislator that has 
received scant attention from scholars. What does the legislator say to the people when he 
appeals to their passions and imaginations? To what passions does he appeal? What images 
does he conjure in their imaginations? And how does all this incline them to submit to his 
laws? How does it begin to endow them with, to use Rousseau’s term from Book II Chapter 
VII of the Social Contract, a “social spirit”? As we noted above, Rousseau’s brief elaboration on 
the means by which legislators have gone about persuading peoples to consent to their laws 
in Book II Chapter VII of the Social Contract suggests that the thrust of the legislator’s teaching 
is that his laws come not from him but from God or the gods. Immediately after concluding 
that the legislator must have recourse to persuasion, rather than force or conviction, in order 
for his laws to take effect, Rousseau explains: 
Here, then, is what has forced in all times the fathers of nations to have recourse to 
the intervention of heaven and to honor the Gods with their own wisdom; so that 
peoples, submitting to the laws of the State as to those of nature, and recognizing the 
same power in the formation of man as in that of the city, might obey with freedom 
and bear with docility the yoke of public felicity. This sublime reason, which rises 
above the reach of vulgar men, is the one for which the legislator puts decisions in 
the mouth of the immortals, in order to lead by divine authority those whom human 
prudence could not move. (SC 2.7 / ŒC 3: 383-84 / CW 4: 156-57) 
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What the legislator persuades the people of, then, is not the prudence of his laws, which is 
beyond their ken, but the divinity of their origin. There is a great deal to be examined in this 
passage. In what follows, we determine what it means to submit voluntarily to authority, what 
the people believe about divinity and authority prior to their encounter with the legislator, 
what the legislator teaches the people about divinity and authority, and, finally, how the 
legislator persuades the people that he comes to them as an emissary of divine authority. 
A. Submission to Authority 
We begin with the question of how exactly the belief that the legislator’s laws come 
from a god or the gods rather than from the legislator himself or any mere man for that matter 
will move the people to submit to those laws voluntarily. In characterizing the legislator’s 
appeal to the divine as an appeal to authority, as distinguished from force, Rousseau implies 
that this belief will cause them to submit to those laws out of a sense of obligation. Given the 
distinction between authority and force that Rousseau has heretofore maintained in the Social 
Contract, a distinction which is fundamental to his principles of political right, he would seem 
to mean for us to distinguish this spirit of submission from the inevitable acquiescence of the 
weak to the strong.135 While it may be the case that the god or gods to which the legislator 
appeals is or are believed by the people to be stronger than they are, Rousseau’s 
characterization of that appeal as an appeal to authority, rather than to force, implies that it is 
not so much a belief that submission is necessary as a belief that submission is obligatory that 
moves the people to submit.136 
 
135 See especially SC 1.3. 
136 Pace Trachtenberg, Making Citizens, 240. Consider, in this connection, Rousseau’s implicit endorsement of 
Diderot’s distinction between being “awed by” and having “fear of” God in the First Discourse (FD / ŒC 3: 24 
/ CW 2: 18). (In translating “craindre” as “to be awed by,” we, like Bush, Masters, and Kelly in the Collected 
Writings, depart from contemporary French usage, according to which “craindre” would be translated as “to 
fear.” This is required if any sense is to be made of the distinction Diderot and, by extension, Rousseau are 
drawing between “craindre” and “avoir peur,” which means “to have fear.” See the editorial note in the Œuvres 
Completes: ŒC 3: 1253n3.) 
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Accordingly, Rousseau’s indication that the people will submit to the legislator’s laws 
as they do to “[the laws] of nature” and recognize “the same power in the formation of man 
as in that of the city” implies that the people do not conceive of the laws of nature or the 
formation of mankind as the work of blind necessity or arbitrary will. It implies that the people 
conceive of those things as the work of an authoritative will.137 However, even if the people 
are persuaded that the legislator’s laws come from the same authoritative source as the laws 
of nature, there still would be an important difference between the spirit in which they submit 
to the legislator’s laws and the spirit in which they submit to the laws of nature. It goes without 
saying that subjection to the laws of nature is involuntary. Strictly speaking, human beings do 
not submit to the laws of nature. They simply are subject to them. Of course, this is not and 
cannot be true in the case of the legislator’s laws, which, it goes without saying, are not 
necessities. In being persuaded that the legislator’s laws come from the same divine authority 
as the laws of nature, the people come to believe not that it is somehow physically necessary 
for them to submit to those laws but rather that it is morally necessary for them to do so. 
While they have, and recognize that they have, the capacity to disobey those laws, they come 
to believe they have an obligation to obey them.138 
But would the people, given their moral limits, have any conception of obligation or 
authority? Would their sense of obligation, such as it is, be powerful enough to overcome their 
natural aversion to suffering the privations and bearing the burdens imposed by law? We will 
take up these questions at length in the next section. For now, we note that Rousseau’s 
 
137 Some scholars have been led by Rousseau’s comparison of the people’s conception of the legislator’s laws 
to their conception of the laws of nature to conclude that the people will experience their subjection to the 
former as the prepubescent Emile experiences necessity (Grant, Hypocrisy and Integrity, 126, 137; Garsten, Saving 
Persuasion, 81-83). But the prepubescent Emile’s experience of necessity, his “dependence on things,” does not 
entail the thought that the laws of nature express the will of divine authority or structure a beneficent cosmos 
(E 2 / ŒC 4: 311-17 / CW 13: 216-21). The more apt point of comparison to the people’s conception of the 
laws of nature is, as we will discuss below, that of the Savoyard Vicar and, by extension, the mature Emile. 
138 It is not the case, then, that the people conceive of their accepting the legislator’s laws “as tantamount to 
accepting the law of gravity” (Grant, Hypocrisy and Illusion, 137). 
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characterization of the spirit in which the people submit to the legislator’s laws suggests that 
it is not exclusively a sense of obligation that moves them to submit to those laws. When he 
states that the people bear those laws “with docility,” he characterizes them as “the yoke of 
public felicity.” Thus, he suggests that the people’s opinion that they are obligated to obey 
divine authority carries with it the opinion that obeying that authority will redound to their 
happiness. Recall the superhuman qualities that, at the beginning of Book II Chapter VII, 
Rousseau identified as necessary for legislation: seeing all the human passions without 
experiencing any of them, knowing human nature thoroughly without partaking of it at all, 
being willing to attend to the happiness of human beings without depending on them for one’s 
own happiness. Taken together, these qualities would make the being that possessed them able 
and willing to devise and give laws to human beings that would, if obeyed, make them happy. 
Is this not at least a part of why the possession of these qualities would render such a being 
authoritative? Our line of thought suggests that the essential qualities of authority are such 
that, if human beings were free to give or refuse consent to the rule of a being that they 
recognized as possessing those qualities, they would give their consent. This aspect of 
authority helps to explain the motivating force of the opinion that one is obligated to obey 
authority. And it helps to show the sense in which human beings who obey on the basis of 
such an opinion can be thought to do so freely. 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that, if the legislator’s appeal to divine authority is 
effective, the people will not believe that they may rightly refuse consent to the laws that he 
presents to them. Here we confront one of the principal paradoxes of Rousseau’s teaching on 
the legislator. The legislator elicits the people’s consent to his laws by persuading them that 
they have no right to give or refuse consent to those laws because they derive their legitimacy 
not from the consent of those subject to them but from the authority of the one or ones who 
made them. He persuades them that legislative authority does not inhere in but transcends 
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their wills. Hence, when the people are persuaded by the legislator to submit to his laws, they 
do not believe that, in doing so, they are consenting to those laws in such a way as to legitimate 
them. Thus, there are two distinct but related matters about which the legislator deceives them. 
First, he deceives them that his laws come from a god or gods when, in fact, they come from 
him. Second, he deceives them, if only implicitly, that they are not rightfully in a position to 
give or refuse consent to his laws when, in fact, they are in such a position. This means that 
legislators who persuade peoples to submit to their laws by appealing to divine authority, i.e., 
“the fathers of nations,” cannot approach the people as the Decemvirs approached the 
Romans and tell them that they must consent to their laws in order for those laws to become 
legitimate.139  
In this light, it may appear that the legislator’s persuasive appeal to divine authority 
violates the social contract and, therewith, Rousseau’s principles of political right. Two 
considerations argue against such a conclusion, however. First, there is reason to doubt that 
the legislator’s subjection of the people to his laws is, in fact, preceded by the establishment 
of a social contract among them. It is true that the movement of the Social Contract suggests 
that it is—Rousseau’s account of the legislator’s subjection of the people to his laws is 
preceded by his account of the social contract. But the establishment of the social contract, as 
Rousseau describes it in Book I of the Social Contract, is, as we emphasized in Chapter 1, not 
historical but hypothetical. In none of Rousseau’s writings is there any suggestion that a rightly 
conceived social contract has ever been established prior to a people’s subjection to law.140 
This would suggest that, strictly speaking, there is no sovereignty or legislative authority for 
the people to exercise or for the legislator to usurp. It suggests that, as a matter of right, the 
 
139 Gildin, Rousseau’s “Social Contract”, 73. 
140 In the first draft of the Social Contract, Rousseau explicitly speculates that none has been established before 
this (GM 1.5 / ŒC 3: 297 / CW 4: 88-89). For an account of the rhetorical reasons that drove Rousseau to 
omit this speculation from the published version, see Gildin, Rousseau’s “Social Contract”, 36-41. See also Riley, 
“A Possible Explanation,” 107. 
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people and the legislator remain in the state of nature, where there is no proscription against 
deception. Second, because human beings who have not been subjected to law or undergone 
civic education are, as we have explained, unlikely to vote in accord with the general will over 
and against their respective private wills, there is no reason to think that submitting the 
legislator’s laws to the people for a vote would serve to determine whether they conformed to 
the general will. If the general will is somehow present in the people at this stage of their 
development, its voice is so faint relative to that of their private wills as to be mute. What the 
legislator would hear from the people if he were to ask them to consent to his laws is not the 
voice of the general will. 
This is not to suggest that the means by which the legislator establishes his laws is 
unproblematic. If the reason that the legislator cannot be blamed for violating Rousseau’s 
principles of political right is that those principles are not yet in effect, the question remains 
whether or how they can be brought into effect. Inasmuch as the legislator’s persuasive appeal 
to divine authority is a necessary precondition for subjecting the people to a civic education 
that will give voice to the general will, it is an important step toward bringing those principles 
into effect. It even begins that civic education by habituating the people to subordinate their 
respective private wills to the law. But, precisely in doing this, it gives rise to a new obstacle to 
the realization of the principles of political right. According to those principles, it is only in his 
capacity as a subject, and not in his capacity as a member of the sovereign, that the citizen is 
to subordinate his private will to the law. In the latter capacity, the citizen is to subordinate his 
private will to the general will, as distinguished from the law. Inasmuch as the legislator’s 
persuasive appeal to divine authority fosters the belief that his laws derive their legitimacy from 
a will that transcends the general will, it threatens to keep citizens from becoming fully self-
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legislating.141 Rousseau subtly alerts us to this danger by including Moses and Mohammed 
among the legislators who established laws by way of persuasive appeals to divine authority. 
Neither of their peoples ever broke free of the transcendent authority of God to which they 
appealed in first subjecting their peoples to law.142 Accordingly, we do not find Rousseau 
speaking of the Jews or Muslims as he speaks of the Spartans and the Romans. How and to 
what extent this obstacle can be overcome, or was overcome in Sparta and Rome, are 
important questions that we will address when we turn from the preliminary stage of civic 
education to civic education, proper, in the next chapter. 
However problematic appealing to divine authority may be as a means to the eventual 
establishment of Rousseau’s principles of political right, it is far less problematic than the use 
of force.143 And it is important that we recognize that the use of force is the only viable 
alternative.144 For the sake of clarity, let us assume that the people would indeed benefit from 
being subjected to the laws in question and that the legislator is indeed concerned to benefit 
them. There are multiple ways in which the benefits of these laws to the people would, in 
Rousseau’s view, be diminished if the legislator imposed them by force. First, given man’s 
natural tendency to resist subjection, which arises from the natural love of freedom that man 
shares with other animals, any attempt to impose laws by force on people who retain that 
natural love of freedom would come at a great cost to the lives and goods, not to mention the 
freedom, of the very people whose lives, goods, and freedom those laws were designed to 
 
141 See Johnston, Encountering Tragedy, 55. Garsten associates Rousseau’s identification of persuasion as the 
appropriate mode of rhetoric for republican politics with “the project of internalizing the sovereign perspective 
and creating the autonomous individual” (Saving Persuasion, 80). While this may be true, it is important to 
recognize, as we do here, that what the legislator persuades the people of does not immediately promote this 
project. 
142 On Moses’ limits in this regard, see Harvey, “Exemplarity and the Origins of Legislation,” 229. 
143 For this reason, we do not agree entirely with Strauss’s argument that “Rousseau’s doctrine of the legislator 
is meant to clarify the fundamental problem of civil society rather than to suggest a practical solution” (Natural 
Right and History, 288). See also Meier, “Right of Politics,” 145 and Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 30. It 
strikes us as more accurate to say that Rousseau’s doctrine of the legislator is meant to clarify the fundamental 
problem of civil society and to suggest the best way of ameliorating that problem. 
144 Kelly, “To Persuade without Convincing,” 333-34. 
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preserve.145 Second, given this tendency, and given the instability of the relative forces of 
human beings,146 laws thus imposed would always be at risk of being overthrown and thus of 
failing to achieve their goals. Third, given that being deprived of freedom tends to deprive 
human beings of their natural love of freedom and thus to make them slavish,147 the durable 
imposition of laws by force would make them poor guardians of the laws and leave them 
vulnerable to would-be despots in the future. All this is to say that, in addition to being 
inconsistent with the principles of political right, subjecting human beings to law by force 
defeats the very purpose of law. 
The same cannot be said of subjecting human beings to law by deception, at least not 
by the deception entailed in the legislator’s appeal to divine authority. This is partly and most 
obviously because it, by contrast with subjecting human beings to law by force, does not entail 
harming or threatening to harm those one is trying to subject. Of course, this may be partly 
because an element of the legislator’s appeal to divine authority is that there is a god or there 
are gods that will visit harm on those who do not obey his or their laws. But, as we argued 
above, Rousseau’s suggestion is that the fear of such harm is not the people’s sole or primary 
motive in obeying laws that they have been persuaded come from a god or gods. Rousseau’s 
suggestion is that it is primarily the people’s deference to the divine as authoritative combined 
with a hope for happiness that moves them to voluntarily obey the laws and thereby makes it 
unnecessary for the legislator to harm or threaten to harm them. Hence, if or inasmuch as 
their obedience is animated by a fear of harm from God or the gods, that fear is a fear of just 
 
145 See, again, Rousseau’s argument against the view that, at the origins of political communities, peoples 
voluntarily submitted unreservedly to despots (SD / ŒC 3: 180-82 / CW 3: 56-57). 
146 Rousseau finds evidence of this problem in the attempts that slave-masters and despots make to legitimate 
themselves as authorities by appealing to the specious principle of might makes right. Such attempts to obtain 
voluntary obedience out of a sense of obligation in their subjects serve as evidence of the vulnerability of rule 
established by force alone (SC 1.3). For an instance of this problem in Spartan history, see PF 12.1 / ŒC 3: 
540-41 / CW 4: 61-62. See O’Hagan, Rousseau, 95. 
147 See Rousseau’s critique of Aristotle’s argument that there are slaves by nature (SC 1.2 / ŒC 3: 353 / CW 4: 
133). 
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punishment. This is to say that, even if fear of harm is one of the people’s motives in obeying 
the laws, their obedience is not for that reason equivalent to acquiescing out of mere necessity 
to one superior in strength. This is important because it implies that obedience elicited by 
appeals to divine authority, by contrast with obedience elicited by force, will not necessarily 
habituate men to submitting to the stronger, render them slavish, or diminish their love of 
freedom. 
Not only does the legislator’s appeal to divine authority not have such adverse effects 
on the people’s freedom, it also has an effect favorable to their freedom. Although that appeal 
obviously limits the people’s freedom by effectively subjecting them to his will as manifest in 
his laws, it also helps to prevent their freedom from being further limited by ambitious men 
who might try to rule them by claiming authority for themselves. In attributing authority to 
divinity, the legislator teaches, whether implicitly or explicitly, that the qualities that a being 
must have in order to possess authority, e.g., seeing all the human passions without 
experiencing any of them, knowing human nature thoroughly without partaking of it at all, 
being willing to attend to the happiness of human beings without depending on them for one’s 
own happiness, are superhuman. And, in teaching this, he gives the people reason to reject 
claims to authority by men, who, as merely human beings, lack the qualities that would justify 
such claims. The legislator’s teaching of divine authority strengthens man’s natural resistance 
to submitting to the will of another man by thus supplementing his pre-rational love of 
freedom with a rational understanding of a principle of political right. 
B. The Necessity of Altering the People’s Ideas of Divinity and Authority 
The question arises whether, or in what ways and to what extent, the belief in divine 
authority that moves the people to submit to the legislator’s laws is a precondition or an effect 
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of the legislator’s persuasive teaching.148 Rousseau does not indicate anything about the origins 
of this belief in Book II Chapter VII of the Social Contract. The implication of the passage 
quoted above is that the people’s belief in an authoritative god or authoritative gods precedes 
and thus is not the effect of the legislator’s teaching. It is a resource available to him. This is 
suggested also by the examples of legislators to which Rousseau refers in the chapter, i.e., 
Lycurgus, Calvin, Moses, and Mohammed. Yet the latter three of these examples suggest that 
legislators tend not only to appeal to but also to modify the people’s conception of God or 
the gods. In light of these examples, Rousseau’s legislator would seem to be a religious as well 
as political innovator. 
We find support later in the Social Contract for the view that, prior to being subjected 
to human law, men believed that they were subject to divine authority. Book IV Chapter VIII, 
“On Civil Religion,” begins with the observation that “[m]en at first did not have any Kings 
other than Gods, or any Government other than Theocracy” (SC 4.8 / ŒC 3: 460 / CW 4: 
216).149 In the same vein, Rousseau observes in the Emile that “before force was established, 
Gods were the magistrates of the human race.” In elaborating on this observation, he adds 
that, at that time, men made all their contracts with one another before the gods (E 4 / ŒC 
4: 646 / CW 13: 490). Thus, he implies that if peoples did indeed establish social contracts 
prior to being given laws by legislators, they did so in the belief that these contracts would be 
enforced by gods. Such a belief substituted for the social contract’s provision for forcibly 
constraining parties to obey the laws. It is important to note that Rousseau here seems to 
suggest that it was not only fear of punishment from the gods but also, and more importantly, 
 
148 This question has received little attention, let alone examination, in the scholarly literature. The scholars 
who have addressed it tend to assume without argument that the people’s belief in divine authority is entirely a 
precondition and not at all an effect of the legislator’s work. See Dent, Rousseau, 215; Harvey, “Exemplarity and 
the Origins of Legislation,” 221-23; Johnston, Encountering Tragedy, 54; and Trachtenberg, Making Citizens, 142-
43, 239-40. 
149 Gildin takes this theocracy to be the form of government that the legislator establishes when he first 
subjects the people to law (Rousseau’s “Social Contract”, 72).  
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a sense of duty to the gods that moved men to fulfill their contractual obligations. Thus, the 
account suggests that men believed that they were subject to the gods not merely by force but 
by right, that the gods exercised authority over them. And it suggests that they respected this 
authority. There are reasons at least to wonder whether human beings would have held such 
a view of God or the gods prior to being taught by a legislator, however.150 We need to 
consider, in this connection, how Rousseau understands the historical development of the 
ideas of divinity and authority, neither of which is natural in his view.  
Rousseau refrains from giving an account of the historical development of religion in 
the Second Discourse. Two implications related to religion beg for such an account, however. 
First, Rousseau implies that man was originally and thus is by nature an atheist.151 Second, he 
implies that, when a conventional right to property was posited at the origin of civil society, at 
least among the ancient Greeks, it was proclaimed to have come from the “legislatrix”-goddess 
Ceres (SD / ŒC 3: 173 / CW 3: 51). Evidently, a belief in gods had arisen among the ancient 
Greeks and was appealed to in order to sanctify and thus to strengthen the right to property. 
But how had human beings come to acquire such a belief? 
Rousseau gives an answer to this question in the context of a discussion of how, or, 
more accurately, how not, to educate children in religion in Book IV of the Emile. He 
speculates that human beings inferred from “[t]he sentiment of [their] action on other bodies” 
that other bodies acted on them similarly, i.e., voluntarily. “Thus,” Rousseau explains, “man 
 
150 There are rhetorical reasons that would explain why Rousseau gives the impression that human beings 
believed that they were subject to divine authority, properly understood, prior to being educated by the 
legislator. In Book IV Chapter VIII of the Social Contract, Rousseau is claiming that human beings were at first 
subject only to divine authority partly as a way of emphasizing that at first human beings were not subject to 
human authority. In Book IV of the Emile, he is pointing to the ancients’ sense of obligation to divine authority 
in order to show that, when it comes to governing human beings, there is an alternative to the use of “force” or 
“interest” that prevails in modernity. 
151 This is implied in various ways in the Second Discourse, perhaps most obviously by the assertion that “in our 
primitive state, in the true state of nature…each man in particular [regards] himself as the only Spectator who 
observes him, as the only being in the universe that takes an interest in him, as the only judge of his own merit” 
(SD / ŒC 3: 219n15 / CW 3: 91n12). 
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began by animating all the beings whose action he sensed.” Due to his feeling of weakness 
relative to these beings and his ignorance of the extent of their power, he took their power to 
be unlimited. Man’s first experience of the divine, then, was one of fear before willful, forceful 
beings. “During the first ages, men, frightened by everything, saw nothing dead in nature” (E 
4 / ŒC 4: 552 / CW 13: 413). 
We would be mistaken to take this as Rousseau’s final or complete word on the origins 
of religion, however. The fearful ignorance here identified as a necessary condition for the 
emergence of religion is not, according to the Second Discourse, characteristic of human life 
during the first ages. In the Second Discourse, Rousseau concedes that man in the state of nature 
is “frightened by all new Spectacles presented to him every time he can neither distinguish the 
Physical good and evil to be expected from them, nor compare his forces with the danger that 
he has to run.” But, contrary to the apparent implication of his account of the origins of 
religion in the Emile, he insists that such occasions are “rare in the state of Nature, where all 
things work in so uniform a manner, and where the face of the Earth is not subject to these 
brusque and continual changes that are caused in it by the passions and the inconstancy of 
assembled Peoples” (SD / ŒC 3: 136 / CW 3: 21-22). Given his familiarity with most of the 
objects that surround him and his recognition of his superiority or invulnerability to most of 
those objects, man in the state of nature does not often find himself in the condition of fearful 
ignorance that might make him into an animist.  
It is worth noting here that the pre-pubescent Emile is educated in such a way that, 
partly for the same reasons, he, too, does not find himself in such a condition. Accordingly, 
as Rousseau implies just a few pages after giving his account of the origins of religion, the 
pubescent Emile is not a religious believer of any kind. Rousseau is so ambiguous about the 
age at or way in which Emile or any “cultivated human mind [esprit]” would “naturally” even 
begin to contemplate the “mysteries” of religion as to raise the question whether the natural 
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course for Emile or any such mind would not end precisely where it began, namely, in atheism. 
Of course, Emile does not remain an atheist. But this is because, and perhaps only because, 
the tutor is compelled by the unnatural acceleration of “the progress of the passions” effected 
by society to similarly accelerate “the progress of [Emile’s] enlightenment” lest the natural 
“equilibrium” between his passions and enlightenment be “broken” (E 4 / ŒC 4: 557 / CW 
13: 417). This indication that Emile’s religious education is a diversion from the natural 
progress of enlightenment serves to qualify the sense in which his piety is natural. 
Now, in thus calling into question the seriousness of Rousseau’s suggestion in Book 
IV of the Emile that human beings “began” as or were in “the first ages” animists, we do not 
mean to dismiss that account of the origins of religion entirely. We mean simply to reject its 
implication that religion emerged in the most primitive, and thus the most natural, human 
condition. The passage from the Second Discourse to which we referred above suggests that 
fearful ignorance and therewith animism would have arisen when the passions and 
inconstancies of assembled peoples began to subject the face of the Earth to brusque and 
continual changes. This suggests that religion would have emerged in the last stage of the state 
of nature, or, in nascent Society, prior to the division of labor and establishment of property 
that followed the discovery of metallurgy and agriculture. For it was at this stage that, as we 
have seen, human beings acquired unnatural passions such as romantic love and amour-propre 
and assembled into peoples. Inasmuch as these developments were partly the effect, in 
Rousseau’s telling, of meteorological and geological accidents, they were caused by literal 
changes to the face of the Earth. They proceeded to cause figurative changes to the face of 
the Earth by radically altering human life on Earth. And it was another literal change to the 
face of the Earth, namely, the eruption of a volcano, that, Rousseau conjectures, made possible 
the discovery of metallurgy and therewith the whole chain of events that gave rise to the state 
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of war and, finally, to the need for civil society, i.e., another literal change to the face of the 
Earth (SD /ŒC 3: 168-72 / CW 3: 46-49). 
Although Rousseau does not explicitly include religion among humanity’s acquisitions 
in its movement from the pure state of nature to nascent society, he does so implicitly by 
indicating that this latest stage of the state of nature is the “point” at which “almost all” of the 
“Savages” have been “found” (SD / ŒC 3: 171 / CW 3: 48). For the “Savages” encountered 
by Rousseau’s fellow Europeans in Asia, Africa, and the Americas were not atheistic but 
religious. Indeed, they tended toward precisely the animism that Rousseau identifies in the 
Emile as the most primitive form of religion among human beings. Now, of course, one can 
wonder why Rousseau excludes religion from his account of nascent society in the Second 
Discourse if, as we are suggesting, he thinks that it is present there. We contend that the inclusion 
of primitive animism in his account of nascent society would, given its falsehood and, more 
importantly, its unhappy precondition—fearful ignorance—complicate and qualify Rousseau’s 
encomium to this stage of human history as “the happiest and most durable epoch” and thus 
undermine the most important rhetorical purpose of this account, i.e., condemning civilization 
(SD / ŒC 3: 171 / CW 3: 48). 
All this is to say that pre-political peoples would tend, in Rousseau’s view, to believe 
in gods that are willful, superhumanly powerful, and manifest in various material objects. This, 
then, is the conception of the divine that a legislator would likely confront in a people that has 
not been subject to law or undergone civic education. Note that gods thus conceived could 
not on the basis of Rousseau’s principles of political right be said to rule human beings as 
authorities or by right. Gods thus conceived could be said to rule human beings merely by 
force. This is to say that the legislator could not appeal to such gods as authorities per se in 
order to obtain the people’s consent to his laws. What our examination of Rousseau’s 
understanding of the origins of religion reveals, then, is that, in appealing to divine authority, 
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the legislator must introduce a new conception of the gods if the people are to recognize them 
as genuinely authoritative. 
Whether the people properly understand the concept of authority prior to their 
encounter with the legislator is ambiguous. In Book I Chapter II of the Social Contract, 
Rousseau implies that human beings have experience of a certain kind of authority by nature. 
He argues that children are naturally bound to their fathers as long as they are incapable of 
preserving themselves on their own. Out of the child’s natural neediness and the father’s 
natural love of and capacity to care for his child arise subjection and authority, albeit 
temporary. Does the experience of beneficial subjection to loving and capable fathers 
habituate human beings to recognize and dutifully obey authority? Does this experience help 
to make the legislator’s appeal to divine authority possible and effective? 
Before we can answer these questions, we need to consider elements of Rousseau’s 
argument in the Second Discourse that contradict or complicate his account of paternal authority 
in the Social Contract.152 Rousseau makes clear in the Second Discourse that, contrary to his 
suggestion in the Social Contract, there is no natural basis for paternal authority. Given that, in 
the pure state of nature, men and women part ways after engaging in sexual intercourse, fathers 
do not by nature know, let alone love or care for, their children. Caring for children is the 
exclusive province of mothers in the pure state of nature (SD / ŒC III: 146-47, 214-18nXII 
/ CW III: 30, 86-90n10). We would be mistaken to conclude that children are naturally subject 
to maternal authority, however. For moral relations, such as that between authority and 
subject, are altogether unknown to human beings, children and adults alike, in the pure state 
of nature (SD / ŒC 3: 152 / CW 3: 34). The child’s experience of dependence on his caring 
mother does not entail the opinion that she is an authority he is obliged to obey. He does as 
 
152 For a more extensive discussion of the question of the naturalness of the family than we can give here, see 
Masters, Political Philosophy of Rousseau, 125-32. 
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she wills partly because his weakness and dependence keep him from doing otherwise and 
partly because doing as she wills tends to redound to his benefit. Rousseau’s account of family 
life in the pure state of nature thus indicates, contrary to his account of paternal authority in 
the Social Contract, that the experience of dependence on a loving and caring parent is not 
sufficient for the emergence of the idea of authority.153 The idea of authority was not yet 
present even when human beings came to dwell as families in huts and fathers did finally come 
to know and love their children. For the “only bonds” of the family, at this stage of human 
history, were “reciprocal affection and freedom” (emphasis added) (SD / ŒC 3: 168 / CW 3: 
46). 
As we discussed in the last chapter, moral ideas related to the idea of authority emerged 
as human beings began to esteem one another. Ideas of merit and beauty emerged with 
romantic love. This was followed by the emergence of the unnatural passion amour-propre, 
which led human beings to esteem themselves more highly than others and to desire that 
others do the same. They not only desired the esteem of others but also believed that they had 
a right to it. Accordingly, they became indignant and sought vengeance whenever they felt 
slighted by others (SD / ŒC 3: 170 / CW 3: 47-48). It stands to reason that the idea of 
authority would have emerged as a corollary to the ideas of right and duty that thus emerged 
with amour-propre. But inasmuch as, as Rousseau insists, human beings still retained their natural 
independence even at this stage in their history, the emergence of these moral ideas related to 
 
153 The question arises why does Rousseau treat the patriarchal family as natural in the Social Contract if, as we 
have argued, he does not think that it is natural. Rousseau’s intention in Book I Chapters II-V is to refute a 
variety of arguments that oppose his thesis that the only basis for legitimate authority and subjection among 
human beings is convention or consent. One of those arguments is that, inasmuch as the patriarchal family is 
natural, there is a basis in nature for such authority and subjection. Our surmise is that, for rhetorical purposes, 
Rousseau is content to leave the premise, i.e., that the patriarchal family is natural, unchallenged and limit 
himself to challenging the conclusion. Hence, he argues that, inasmuch as the natural authority of fathers is 
predicated on the incapacity of their children to preserve themselves on their own, the naturalness of the 
patriarchal family does not mean that there is a basis in nature for legitimate authority or subjection that is not 
temporary. Since his intention in these chapters does not compel him to present his subversive and 
controversial view of the family, he refrains from doing so.  
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the idea of authority did not coincide with any experience of subjection to authority. Then 
again, if, as we conjectured above, it was at this stage of human history that the idea of divinity 
emerged, they may, for all their freedom from human authority, have believed that they were 
subject to the authority of the gods in which they had lately come to believe. 
While there is, in this light, reason to think that the idea of divine authority would not 
have been totally foreign to the people prior to their encounter with the legislator, there is also 
reason to think that they would not have conceived of divine authority correctly, or as 
Rousseau does. It is worth noting in this connection Rousseau’s contemptuous 
characterization of the religion of “the multitude,” as distinguished from that of “the wise,” 
as “always” involving “Gods as senseless as itself to which it sacrifices superficial goods in 
order to give itself over in their honor to a thousand horrible and destructive passions” in the 
Geneva Manuscript (GM 1.2 / ŒC 3: 285 / CW 4: 79). If the men of nascent society, who, 
following their acquisition of amour-propre and ideas of right and duty, had become 
“bloodthirsty and cruel,” were pious, it is likely that their piety would have had this character 
(SD / ŒC 3: 170 / CW 3: 48). One imagines a savage possessed of amour-propre indignant at 
having been denied his due esteem bent on exacting vengeance, believing that a wrathful god 
stands behind him. According to Rousseau’s account of the origin of religion in the Emile, 
belief in gods began with the imputation of a faculty that human beings experienced in 
themselves, namely, the will, to all the beings that acted on them. It may be that the next step 
in the historical development in this belief was the imputation of the moral passions that 
human beings had begun to experience in themselves to the gods. Note that what is distinctive 
about divinity, thus conceived, is the possession not of superhuman intellectual and moral 
qualities that might, on the basis of Rousseau’s principles of political right, give them authority 
over human beings but rather of superhuman force that would not, on the basis of those 
principles, give them such authority. If the idea of authority arose and was associated with the 
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idea of divinity that would seem to have arisen in nascent society, then, it would be necessary 
for the legislator to correct the people’s ideas not only of divinity but also of authority. 
Otherwise, his persuasion of the people that his laws come from the gods would be 
tantamount to an appeal to divine force rather than divine authority, properly understood. As 
such, it would, much like recourse to human force, be detrimental to the people’s love of 
freedom and therewith to the prospects of their preserving freedom under law. 
What we have come to see in uncovering the ideas of divinity and authority that a 
legislator would confront in a people is that the legislator’s teaching entails not merely 
appealing to but altering the people’s preexisting idea of divine authority. Inasmuch as the 
alteration the legislator effects is a correction of an erroneous idea adverse to freedom, there 
is an important way in which he, in delivering that teaching, enlightens and promotes the 
freedom of the people even as, in other, more obvious ways, he deceives them and limits their 
freedom. 
C. The Legislator’s Teaching of Divine Authority 
Rousseau gives no account of what the legislator might teach about divinity and 
authority in the Social Contract or any of his other works for that matter. There is an implicit 
indication of an important element of the legislator’s teaching in Book II Chapter VII of the 
Social Contract, however. It stands to reason that the legislator would teach that the superhuman 
qualities identified as necessary for legislation at the beginning of Book II Chapter VII are 
essential to authority as such and inhere in whatever god or gods he claims to be the author 
or authors of his laws. He would teach that the possession of authority is predicated on seeing 
all the passions without experiencing any of them, knowing human nature without partaking 
of it, and being willing to attend to the happiness of human beings without depending on them 
for one’s own happiness. He would teach that, inasmuch as these qualities are superhuman, 
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no man possesses such authority. But he would also teach that the god or gods in which the 
people already believe possesses or possess these qualities and therewith authority. Having 
been taught these lessons, the people would be ready to obey the laws that the legislator 
presents to them as the work of the gods. 
We can gain more insight into the legislator’s teaching by considering the teaching on 
divine authority that the Savoyard Vicar gives in his Profession of Faith. The legislator has 
often, and rightly, been compared to other figures of de facto authority in Rousseau’s corpus, 
e.g., Emile’s tutor and Wolmar, the paterfamilias in Julie.154 The Savoyard Vicar is, for 
understandable reasons, not one of them. But there are certain important and unnoticed ways 
in which the Savoyard Vicar is an analogous figure to the legislator. Most importantly for our 
purposes, both the legislator and the Vicar deliver teachings on divine authority with a view 
to getting their pupils voluntarily to subject themselves to law of some kind. Whereas, in the 
case of the legislator, it is the positive law that the legislator himself devises and presents to 
his pupils as revealed and divine, in the case of the Vicar, it is the moral law that he hears in 
his conscience and believes his pupil, too, would hear if he were to listen. The rhetoric that 
the Vicar adopts to this end is, like that of the legislator, persuasive rather than convincing. 
Indeed, he is tellingly compared by his pupil to “the divine Orpheus singing the first hymns 
and teaching men the worship of the Gods” (E 4 / ŒC 4: 606 / CW 13: 458). The comparison, 
which calls to mind the Essay on the Origin of Languages and its account of the use by ancient 
legislators of persuasively musical southern languages in founding states and religions, speaks 
at once to the similarity and difference between the Vicar and the legislator. The Vicar, like 
the legislator, adopts a persuasively musical rhetoric in educating his pupil in religion and 
morality, but, unlike the legislator, he does not, in doing this, also educate his pupil for 
 
154 See Crocker, Rousseau’s “Social Contract”; Grant, Hypocrisy and Integrity, 125-39; Melzer, Natural Goodness of Man, 
233-52; and Shklar, Men and Citizens, 127-64. 
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citizenship. To the extent that he gives his pupil a political education, it is to prepare him to 
live as a pious and moral man under conditions in which civic life is impossible. The Vicar, or, 
more accurately, Rousseau as author of the Vicar’s Profession of Faith, is properly understood 
as a successor to the legislator. He provides an apolitical moral and religious education aimed 
at recovering in a new form something of the natural freedom and therewith the natural 
goodness of life for men in societies that cannot be transformed into legitimate republics. 
Rousseau gives a hint of his ambition to succeed the legislator in this way when he predicts 
that the Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar “may one day make a revolution among 
men, if good sense and good faith are ever reborn among them” (R 3 / ŒC 1: 1018/ CW 8: 
23). 
There is reason to think that, despite the important differences between the teachings 
of the Vicar and the legislator, there is some similarity between the ideas of divine authority 
they propound. We note, for one thing, that the superhuman qualities identified as necessary 
for legislation in Book II Chapter VII of the Social Contract and that we speculated the legislator 
would ascribe to God or the gods belong to the Vicar’s god. The Vicar explains that his idea 
of “God” combines “the ideas of intelligence, of power, of will,” and therefore also “of 
goodness.” The Vicar infers the existence of a being that combines these qualities from the 
order that he observes in nature. It is scarcely conceivable to him that this order could have 
arisen from anything other than an intelligent and powerful will. His god, then, is the author 
of the universe, which the Vicar sees as an ordered whole, or a cosmos (E 4 / ŒC 4: 580-81 
/ CW 13: 437-38). Although Rousseau discloses little about the idea of God or the gods that 
the legislator would impart to the people, his indication that the legislator’s appeal to divine 
authority would lead them to submit to his laws as they do to the laws of nature implies that 
he, like the Vicar, would teach that God is the author, or that the gods are the authors, of the 
cosmos.    
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For the Vicar, the most important feature of the cosmos is that mankind is at its center 
and its peak. He reasons:  
I find myself incontestably in the first rank by my species. For, by my will and by the 
instruments that are in my power for executing it, I have more force for acting on all 
the bodies that surround me, or for yielding to or eluding their action as I please, 
than any of them has for acting on me against my will by physical impulsion alone; 
and, by my intelligence, I am the only one that can inspect the whole. (E 4 / ŒC 4: 
582 / CW 13: 438) 
Thus, the Vicar finds that human beings excel all the other beings in the three qualities that he 
ascribes to divinity and that he identifies as the source of goodness, namely, will, power, and 
intelligence. God has formed man, and man alone, in his own image. Rousseau’s indication 
that the legislator’s appeal to divine authority would lead the people to recognize the same 
power in the formation of man and of the city suggests that this aspect of the Vicar’s god may 
also be an aspect of the legislator’s god or gods. 
The belief that God has conferred an extraordinary benefit on human beings by 
placing them in the first rank in the cosmos is crucial to the Vicar’s willingness to recognize 
and obey him as an authority. The Vicar explains that the recognition of God’s beneficence 
moves him to be grateful to, to love, and to honor him. He frankly characterizes his “worship” 
of God as “a natural consequence of self-love, of honoring what protects us, and of loving 
what wishes us well” (E 4 / ŒC 4: 583 / CW 13: 439). Here, the Vicar echoes the tutor who, 
earlier in Book IV of the Emile, identified “gratitude” as the “natural sentiment” arising from 
self-love to which one can appeal in order to get one’s pupil to recognize one as an “authority” 
(E 4 / ŒC 4: 519-22 / CW 13: 386-88). The similarity between the Vicar’s grateful obedience 
to divine authority and Emile’s grateful obedience to tutelary authority extends further. For 
the tutor indicates that it is Emile’s recognition not merely that he has benefitted from the 
tutor’s guidance but also that, because of the superiority of his tutor to other tutors, he has 
been made better than other pupils that makes him grateful. In both cases, then, the unnatural 
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passion amour-propre plays an important role in producing gratitude out of the natural passion 
self-love. There is reason to think that the role played by amour-propre in each case is not 
incidental. Amour-propre would tend to make human beings reluctant to recognize that they 
have been benefitted by superiors. For, as we have seen, to be possessed of amour-propre is to 
believe that one is superior and to desire that others esteem one accordingly.155 Human beings’ 
reluctance to recognize this would be lessened if they believed that they had been benefitted 
in a way that made them superior to others. For, then, the wound to their amour-propre would 
be succored by a simultaneous flattery of their amour-propre. In order to overcome the obstacle 
that amour-propre poses to the grateful recognition of authority, it is necessary that the 
experience not be altogether debasing. 
The recurring identification of gratitude born of self-love and amour-propre as the 
passion underlying obedience to authority in the Emile suggests that the legislator’s persuasive 
rhetoric would evoke images of God or gods that provoked this passion among the people. 
Given Rousseau’s account of the origin of religious belief, doing this would involve getting 
the people to reimagine the gods and their relation to the gods. As we discussed above, it was 
the experience of vulnerability to apparently malign and disordered external forces that, in 
Rousseau’s view, gave rise to belief in gods. It would be part of the legislator’s task to teach 
the people that the gods are not merely powerful and willful but also intelligent and good by 
pointing to the order of nature and identifying the gods as the authors of that order.  
It would also be part of the legislator’s task to draw the people’s attention to their 
superior status relative to other beings in the cosmos and to attribute their superiority to the 
god or gods that formed them. In doing this, the legislator would partly be appealing to the 
pride that, as we discussed in Chapter 2, human beings felt when they became aware of their 
 
155 Recall that, as we noted in Chapter 2, Rousseau writes that, in the face of “a happy man,” our “amour-
propre…suffers in making us feel that this man has no need of us” (E 4 / ŒC 4: 503 / CW 13: 373). 
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“superiority over the other animals” (SD / ŒC 3: 165-66 / CW 3: 44). In appealing to this 
sentiment, the legislator, like the Vicar, would attach to it the idea that their superiority was 
due to their formation by God or the gods. It is likely that the legislator would differ from the 
Vicar in teaching the people that God or the gods made them superior not only to non-human 
beings by dint of their humanity but also to other human beings by dint of their particular 
national characteristics. In this way, fostering patriotic pride, which, as we will see, is an 
important function of the institutions and practices of civic education prescribed by the 
legislator’s laws, is likely a part of civic education at its earliest stage. 
While gratitude is an important part of the Vicar’s recognition of God as an authority, 
it is not his only or even most important motive for obeying God, which, for him, means 
obeying the laws that God has written on his heart, or conscience. Hope for happiness, 
specifically the happiness that comes from the consciousness that one deserves to be happy 
on account one’s virtue, is the Vicar’s principal motive (E 4 / ŒC 4: 602-606 / CW 13: 455-
58). Rousseau’s indication that, when the people have been persuaded by the legislator to 
submit to his laws, they will bear those laws docilely as “the yoke of public felicity” implies 
that their obedience to divine authority, too, will be animated by a hope for happiness (SC 2.7 
/ ŒC 3: 383 / CW 4: 157). The obedience that the Vicar or the people give to divine authority 
in gratitude for past benefactions is understood by him or them as a sacrifice of his or their 
good or goods only initially, not ultimately. For their obedience is animated not only by 
gratitude for past benefactions but also by hope for future benefactions. 
It follows that an important part of the legislator’s teaching would be that happiness 
is promised to the people if they obey God’s or the gods’ laws. Appealing to the hope for 
happiness by evoking images of this happiness would be an important part of his persuasive 
rhetoric. However, Rousseau indicates nothing in Book II Chapter VII of the Social Contract 
about the happiness that the people would hope to achieve by submitting to the ostensibly 
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divine laws given to them by the legislator other than that it is somehow public. One 
possibility, which is suggested by Rousseau’s principles of political right as elaborated in the 
Social Contract, is that it is the happiness that each citizen derives, or ostensibly derives, from 
the preservation of his life, goods, and freedom. The legislator would teach the people that 
they will ultimately benefit from submitting to the laws because they have been devised by 
God or the gods with a view to the preservation of the people’s lives, goods, and freedom. On 
this view, the legislator’s persuasive appeal to divine authority would not involve a 
reorientation of the needs and desires by which human beings are naturally motivated. He 
would follow Rousseau in taking men as they are by nature. For as much as the legislator’s 
teaching would differ in style and substance from Rousseau’s teaching in the Social Contract, it 
would not differ with respect to the ultimate ends of politics, which would remain the ultimate 
ends of nature. However, two passages, one on the way to move peoples to action in the 
Constitution for Corsica and another on the effects of Mohammed’s persuasive rhetoric in the 
Essay on the Origin of Languages, argue against this view and suggest that the happiness held out 
by the legislator appeals to the unnatural passion amour-propre more than to the natural passion 
self-love. 
The Constitution for Corsica concludes with an important statement on the two psychic 
“instruments with which one governs men,” namely, “fear and hope.” Rousseau devotes more 
attention to hope, which he considers more effective at rousing men to action than fear. “[I]n 
order to awaken the activity of a nation,” Rousseau reasons, “it is necessary to present it with 
great desires, great hopes, and great positive motives for acting.” The objects of great hope 
that ought to be held out by one seeking to “to form the body of a nation” are “independence 
and power.” Rousseau recommends these two objects on the grounds that, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, they are the sort of “truly estimable goods” that a people can take collective pride 
in possessing together. This suggests that the legislator would promise the people that, in 
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obeying the laws that have been ostensibly handed down to him from God or the gods, they 
will collectively achieve independence and power. One might think that such a promise would 
be meant to appeal primarily to their self-love, or, more specifically their concern to preserve 
their lives, goods, and freedom. In fact, it is meant to appeal primarily to their “pride” (CC / 
ŒC 3: 937-38 / CW 11: 153-54). This means that, even though the objects of hope held out 
by the legislator would tend to be conducive to self-preservation, the legislator would, in 
holding out those objects, be appealing primarily not to this natural concern, the concern 
around which Rousseau orients politics in the Social Contract, but to an unnatural concern with 
esteem. This is important partly because it would give citizens a motive to do their parts for 
the independence and power of the nation in those cases in which that required them to risk 
their lives, e.g., in war.  
The predominance of amour-propre over self-love among the passions to which the 
legislator appeals is even more evident in Rousseau’s characterization of the effect of 
Mohammed’s persuasive rhetoric in the Essay on the Origin of Languages. Given Rousseau’s 
inclusion of Mohammed among the four historical legislators to whom he refers in Book II 
Chapter VII of the Social Contract, his description of Mohammed’s persuasive rhetoric can be 
taken to shed light on the persuasive rhetoric of the legislator as such. Rousseau describes the 
effect of Mohammed’s persuasive rhetoric in the context of the contrast that he draws between 
northern and southern languages in Chapter XI. As we discussed above, southern languages, 
such as Mohammed’s Arabic, are better suited, in Rousseau’s view, to “the ministers of the 
Gods proclaiming the sacred mysteries, the wise giving laws to peoples, and leaders leading 
the multitude” than northern languages. He specifies that the rhetorical power of these 
languages can be appreciated only by being heard and not by being read. He offers the 
following revealing illustration: 
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Someone who can read a little Arabic and smiles in leafing through the Koran would, 
if he had heard Mohammed proclaim in person in that eloquent, cadenced language, 
with that sonorous and persuasive voice that seduced the ear before the heart and 
incessantly animated his phrases with the accent of enthusiasm, have prostrated 
himself on the ground while crying: great Prophet, Envoy of God, lead us to glory, 
to martyrdom; we want to conquer or die for you. (EOL 11 / ŒC 5: 409-10 / CW 7: 
317) 
The passage suggests that, far from appealing to self-love with a promise of self-preservation, 
the legislator’s persuasive appeal to divine authority appeals to amour-propre with a promise of 
glory achieved by risking, if not giving, one’s life for God or the gods. Note that the one who 
has listened to Mohammed speaks in the first-person plural rather than the first-person 
singular. The listener partly forgets himself not only in the sense that he becomes eager to risk 
or even give his life in obedience to God but also in the sense that he imagines doing this not 
individually but collectively with God’s other followers. 
While Mohammed’s rhetoric, like the rhetoric recommended by Rousseau in the 
Constitution for Corsica, appeals to amour-propre, it does so in a different way. The listener and his 
fellow Muslims may take pride in their collective power and independence and they may hope 
to win glory partly for the possession of these qualities. But the strong and clear implication 
of Rousseau’s description of the effect of Mohammed’s rhetoric on the listener is that it is the 
devotion to God that he and his fellow Muslims show in their eagerness to risk their lives for 
him in which they take pride and for which they hope to win glory. In this respect, the 
happiness for which the Muslim hopes bears some similarity to the happiness for which the 
Vicar hopes. The Vicar explains that, because he is not merely an ensouled being but also an 
embodied being and because his care for his bodily preservation inclines him to seek his private 
good over and against the general good, virtuously obeying god’s law as dictated by his 
conscience, which demands that he seek the general good over and against his private good, 
is a struggle. But the difficulty of this struggle gives his “virtue” its “glory” and gives him 
“good witness of [himself],” and, in so doing, raises his “happiness” to “the most sublime 
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degree” (E 4 / ŒC 4: 603 / CW 13: 456). In this light, it seems that the difficulty of struggling 
against the inclination to preserve his body in obeying God and his law is what makes 
Mohammed’s followers glorious. Now, inasmuch as their obedience to God and his law would 
testify to their power over and independence from the inclination to preserve their bodies, the 
happiness for which they hope may ultimately arise partly from pride in and glory for power 
and independence. Thus, the way that Mohammed appeals to amour-propre is not as different 
from the way that Rousseau recommends in the Constitution for Corsica as it initially seemed. 
Both Rousseau’s recommendation in the Constitution for Corsica and his description of 
the effect of Mohammed’s persuasive rhetoric suggest that the people’s motivation in obeying 
the laws presented to them by the legislator differ radically from the motivation that Rousseau 
ascribes to the hypothetical parties to the social contract in Book I Chapter VI. These passages 
thus suggest that the practical realization of the principles of political right, which Rousseau 
discovers by taking men as they are by nature, depends upon transforming men contrary to 
nature, partly by fostering their unnatural amour-propre at the expense of their natural self-love 
and partly by getting them to reimagine themselves as parts of wholes rather than as individual 
wholes unto themselves. The extent and character of this transformation, which we have only 
just begun to see, will become clearer when we turn, in the next chapter, to the institutions 
and practices of civic education provided for by the legislator in his laws. 
We have attempted to determine what the legislator would teach the people about 
divine authority in order to determine how the legislator would persuade them that they are 
obliged to submit to his laws. But what we have determined about the legislator’s teaching 
about divine authority calls into question in what way it is a sense of obligation per se that 
moves the people to submit to the legislator’s laws. It has become clear that, in Rousseau’s 
view, the belief that one is obliged to obey an authority is inextricably connected to the belief 
that obedience to that authority will ultimately make one happy, even or especially if it is 
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experienced as a burden. The Vicar and the Muslim convert both consciously hope for a 
happiness that will redeem the burdens of obedience to God’s law. What Rousseau envisions 
by obedience to authority does not therefore entail transcending oneself or one’s concern with 
one’s own good, at least not in the final analysis. In this way, his vision of obedience to 
authority is consistent with his insistence on the invincible power of self-love in the human 
psyche. An important implication of this is, as we suggested above, that to submit to a law out 
of a sense of obligation is almost tantamount to willing that law oneself. Thus, the inextricable 
connection between the sense of obligation and hope for happiness in Rousseau’s thought 
helps to explain how obligatory obedience can be understood as free obedience. 
D. The Great Soul of the Legislator as Proof of his Divine Mission 
One aspect of the legislator’s persuasive appeal to divine authority remains for us to 
discuss, namely, the means by which he persuades the people that his laws come from God or 
the gods. Rousseau identifies two means of doing this in Book II Chapter VII of the Social 
Contract. The first is for the legislator to demonstrate the greatness of his soul. The second is 
for him to perform ostensible miracles. Rousseau emphatically favors the former: “The great 
soul of the Legislator is the true miracle that should prove his mission” (SC 2.7 / ŒC 3: 384 
/ CW 4: 157). Rousseau’s brief account of the greatness of the legislator’s soul in Book II 
Chapter VII suggests that this quality consists primarily in wisdom and genius. His argument 
for the superiority of demonstrating the greatness of one’s soul to performing ostensible 
miracles, which we will examine below, is that it will make the state that one is establishing 
more durable. He asserts that “only wisdom will make [the bond among the people] durable” 
and refers to the “great and powerful genius that presides over lasting establishments” (SC 2.7 
/ ŒC 3: 384 / CW 4: 157).  
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Wisdom and genius are both forms of intellectual excellence, but they are not identical. 
As one of the four cardinal virtues, wisdom has a moral dimension that distinguishes it from 
genius, which Rousseau identifies as a “personal qualit[y]” not a “virtue” (VH / ŒC 2: 1264 
/ CW 4: 2). More than mere intelligence, genius entails a quasi-divine creativity. Later in the 
Social Contract, Rousseau defines “true genius,” which he distinguishes from “the genius of 
imitation,” as “that which creates and makes everything from nothing” (SC 2.8 / ŒC 3: 386 
/ CW 4: 158). Rousseau’s definition of genius in his Dictionary of Music and his attribution of 
genius to the hero, whom he distinguishes from the wise man, in his Discourse on the Virtue Most 
Necessary for a Hero similarly suggest that genius entails creativity and a capacity to impose one’s 
will on the world. “The Genius of the Musician submits the entire Universe to his Art” (DM / 
ŒC 5: 837 / CW 406). The musical genius depicts many, if not all, phenomena through his 
art and, in doing so, provokes many, if not all, the passions in his listeners. Thus, he creates a 
kind of universe in the imagination, which elicits deeply felt, impassioned reactions from his 
audience. The hero does something similar through political or martial action. The legislator, 
whose creative political action involves musical rhetoric, combines something of the genius of 
the musician with that of the hero. 
There are multiple important similarities, in addition to the possession of genius, 
between the hero of the Discourse on the Virtue Most Necessary for a Hero and the legislator of 
Book II Chapter VII of the Social Contract.156 Indeed, Rousseau refers to Lycurgus and Solon 
as heroes (VH / ŒC 2: 1267-68/ CW 4: 7). And he credits the hero, like the legislator, with 
having “a great soul” (VH / ŒC 2: 1263 / CW 4: 2).  The virtue that Rousseau identifies as 
most necessary for a hero, “strength of soul,” sheds light on, and may be equivalent to, 
greatness of soul. Rousseau defines strength of soul as “the ability always to act forcefully” 
 
156 In looking to the Discourse on the Virtue Most Necessary for a Hero for insight into the legislator, we follow 
Kelly, Rousseau as Author, 83-88 and Masters, Political Philosophy of Rousseau, 367. 
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against others as well as against his own inclinations.157 The strong-souled man can always act 
forcefully as his psychic strength enables him to overcome the “petty present interests which 
make us forget more important and more distant things.” Overcoming those interests, he 
resolutely follows the course of action that he, keeping those more important and more distant 
things in mind, has determined to be best. On account of its capacity “to distinguish the 
beautiful from the specious, reality from appearance” and “to fix itself to its object with that 
firmness which removes illusions and surmounts the greatest obstacles,” “all is great and 
generous in a strong soul.” For the object of the strong-souled hero is, like that of the great-
souled legislator, glory, which he, like the legislator, achieves by “working for the happiness of 
others.” In pursuit of this object, the strong-souled hero is indomitable. Capable of acting 
gloriously in any circumstance, however adverse, he even transcends the vicissitudes of 
“fortune” (VH / ŒC 2: 1273-74 / CW 4: 10). Even if he cannot direct events entirely 
according to his will, he can do so in such a way or to such an extent that he always achieves 
his object. 
In light of all this, the greatness of soul that the legislator must demonstrate in order 
to persuade the people of the divinity of his laws appears to be constituted by precisely the 
qualities that the legislator must actually possess in order to devise and establish those laws. 
Of course, the legislator cannot rely on the excellence of his laws for evidence of the greatness 
of his soul with the people. For the conclusion that the people are meant to draw from the 
greatness of his soul is precisely that he is not the author of the laws that he has given them. 
Hence, the legislator will have to demonstrate the greatness of his soul in other ways, through 
extraordinary speeches and deeds that testify to the greatness of his soul.  
 
157 The slight difference in nuance between “forcefully” and “strongly” leads us to use the former in translating 
“fortement.” But since we use “strength of soul” rather than “force of soul” in translating “la force de l’âme,” this 
choice obscures the close etymological connection that appears in the original French. In order to make this 
clear, we note here that the sentence could be rendered “Force of soul…consists in the ability always to act 
forcefully” or “Strength of soul…consists in the ability always to act strongly.” 
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It is significant that both musical genius and heroic strength of soul are godlike 
qualities.158 Both are creative. Both enable one to move human beings or things according to 
one’s will, and thus to do great and impressive things. If or inasmuch as the great-souled 
legislator possesses these qualities, he may appear to transcend necessities that ordinarily 
constrain human action. Given this, the great soul of the legislator may indeed appear to be a 
kind of miracle. If the legislator’s soul, as revealed in his speeches and deeds, appears 
superhumanly extraordinary to the people, then they may well believe that he is favored or 
supported by God or the gods and, furthermore, that his laws come from God or the gods. It 
is in this way that the greatness of the legislator’s soul can, as Rousseau puts it, serve as “the 
true miracle that [proves] his mission.” 
In this connection, it is worth considering an account of the characteristics by which 
God makes revelation recognizable to men that Rousseau gives in the Letters Written from the 
Mountain.159 Rousseau’s intention in the Third Letter is to defend himself against the charge 
that his doubts about the miracles attributed to Jesus means that he rejects revelation and is 
not a Christian. To this end, he argues that, inasmuch as miracles do not constitute the only 
possible proof of revelation and inasmuch as he accepts the alternative proofs, he does accept 
revelation and is a Christian (LWM 3 / ŒC 3: 729-30/ CW 9: 168). Rousseau begins from the 
moral premise that “[w]hen God gives men a Revelation that all are obliged to believe, it is 
necessary that he establish it on proofs that are good for all and, as a consequence, are as 
diverse as the manners of seeing of those who must adopt them.” He reduces this variety of 
human perspectives to three—that of “the wise,” that of “the good,” and that of “the 
people”—and identifies three alternatives proofs, one suitable to each perspective—the moral 
and intellectual soundness of the doctrine contained in the revelation, the moral and 
 
158 On the god-like character of the legislator, see Scott, “Politics as the Imitation of the Divine,” 496-97; 
Shklar Men and Citizens, 154-61; and Viroli, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 188-89. 
159 Kelly, Rousseau as Author, 65-66. 
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intellectual character of the man proclaiming the revelation, and miracles performed by the 
man proclaiming the revelation (LWM 3 / ŒC 3: 727-29 / CW 9: 166-67).  
This threefold classification partly conforms to and partly diverges from distinctions 
that Rousseau draws in Book II Chapter VII of the Social Contract. Here, as in the Social Contract, 
Rousseau emphatically distinguishes the people from the wise. Recall that the necessity of 
making a persuasive appeal to divine authority arises from the ignorance of the people. It 
follows that the legislator does not attempt to prove his divine mission by demonstrating the 
moral or intellectual soundness of his laws. That the legislator should do so by demonstrating 
the greatness of his soul is not clearly supported by the threefold classification, however. For 
that classification indicates that miracles are more persuasive with the people than moral or 
intellectual qualities. Because the people are not good, they are unlikely to recognize or to be 
moved by the moral and intellectual qualities of the legislator. They are far more likely to 
recognize and be moved by apparent miracles, which are immediately perceived by the senses 
and which can therefore make impressions without being reflected on. For “the people” are 
“incapable of ordered reasonings, of slow and sure observations” and are “in all things slaves 
of the senses” (LWM 3 / ŒC 3: 728-29 / CW 9: 167). 
The apparent tension between the threefold classification in the Letters Written from the 
Mountain and the argument of Book II Chapter VII of the Social Contract is not irresolvable, 
however. When one considers the latter carefully, one finds that Rousseau is not as critical of 
the use of false miracles as he initially seems. Strictly speaking, his position is that the 
performance of false miracles ought not to be the only means by which the legislator persuades 
the people of his divine mission. He does not argue that it ought not to have any part in this. 
On the contrary, he implies that it at least may have some part in this. For he identifies Moses 
and Mohammed, both of whom ostensibly performed miracles, as examples of legislators 
whose establishments endured because of their great souls. Rousseau even directs our 
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attention to this fact by including the “[engraving of] stone tablets” and the “[training of] a 
bird to speak in his ear” among the false miracles that he claims “any man” can perform (SC 
2.7 / ŒC 3: 384 / CW 4: 157).160 The other false miracles to which Rousseau refers here—
buying an oracle and pretending to have a secret relationship with a divinity—were performed 
by Lycurgus and Numa, respectively.161 This is to say that Rousseau does not give a single 
example of a great-souled legislator who founded an enduring political community who did 
not ostensibly perform miracles in order to persuade the people of his divine mission.162 
Rousseau’s threefold classification in the Letters Written from the Mountain would suggest that 
this is because there is no example of such a legislator. The people are so limited—morally 
and intellectually—that no legislator could establish his laws without taking recourse to 
performing false miracles. 
What are we to make of Rousseau’s insistence that the legislator ought to prove his 
divine mission principally by demonstrating the greatness of his soul in light of his suggestion 
that the people are unlikely to recognize or be moved by this? The qualities that constitute the 
greatness of the legislator’s soul may not be entirely the same as the qualities that the good 
would recognize as proof of a divine mission. The latter include a set of moral virtues—
“sanctity,” “veracity,” “justice,” “pure and spotless mœurs,” “virtues inaccessible to the human 
 
160 The reference to engraving stone tablets is, of course, a debunking reference to Moses’ handing down of 
the Ten Commandments. According to Jacobus de Voragine’s Golden Legend, an extremely popular medieval 
history of the Christian saints and their miracles, Mohammed trained a dove to stick its beak in his ear and then 
pretended that, when it would do this, it was communicating messages to him from God (756). We know that 
Rousseau was familiar with this work, and presumably this account of Mohammed, from a reference to it in the 
Reveries (R 6 / ŒC 1: 1058 / CW 8: 55). 
161 There is disagreement among the classical sources over whether Lycurgus presented his laws as having been 
authored or merely sanctioned by the god Apollo. In any case, all attest to his having consulted the Delphic 
oracle before giving his laws to the Spartans. See Herodotus, The Histories, 1.65; Plato, Laws, 624a, 632d; 
Plutarch, “Lycurgus,” V.3; Plutarch, “Numa,” IV.7-8; Xenophon, The Regime of the Lacedaemonians, 8.5. Only in 
Plutarch’s Lives do we find speculation that this, like Numa’s claim of having a secret relationship with a 
divinity, was disingenuous (“Numa,” IV.7-8.). On Numa, see Livy, The History of Rome from its Foundations, 1.19 
and Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 1.11 p. 34. 
162 See Harvey, “Exemplarity and the Origins of Legislation,” 233-36. This perceptive discussion is marred 
only by Harvey’s inexplicable association of training a bird to talk in one’s ear with Socrates rather than 
Mohammed. 
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passions”—and intellectual qualities—“understanding,” “reason,” “mind,” “knowledge,” and 
“prudence” (LWM 3 / ŒC 3: 728 / CW 9: 167). Rousseau’s association of wisdom and genius 
with the legislator would suggest that his greatness of soul does entail the latter, intellectual 
qualities. It is not clear that it entails the former, moral qualities, however.163 Rousseau does 
not attribute any moral virtue to the legislator other than wisdom, which is also an intellectual 
virtue. Three reasons suggest that this is intentional, that the greatness of the legislator’s soul 
does not consist principally in its morality. First, the heroic strength of soul that, as we 
speculated above may be equivalent to the greatness of the legislator’s soul, is an amoral virtue. 
It can substitute for the moral virtues, that is, it can prompt one who is “neither courageous, 
nor just, nor wise, nor moderate by inclination” to undertake actions that one who is would 
take. But it is not itself a moral virtue, in part because the strong-souled hero’s ultimate object 
in undertaking those actions is achieving glory for himself (VH / ŒC 2: 1273-74 / CW 4: 10).  
Second, despite Rousseau’s insistence that the legislator has no right to establish his 
laws by force, the examples of legislators in history that he gives suggest that the successful 
establishment of laws may inevitably, if not rightfully, involve the use of force.164 Although he 
identifies the peaceful Numa as “the true founder of Rome,” he concedes that the violent 
Romulus “laid” Rome’s “first foundations” (GP 2 / ŒC 3: 957-58 / CW 11: 172-73). In the 
Discourse on the Virtue Most Necessary for a Hero, he speaks of the heroic legislator who “first 
constrains men to bear the yoke of laws in order to subject them to the authority of reason in 
the end” (emphasis added) (VH / ŒC 2: 1264 / CW 4: 2). And he implies that “gentleness” 
is a defect in a legislator when he attributes Jesus’ failure to “raise up his people again, to make 
 
163 Pace Harvey, “Exemplarity and the Origins of Legislation,” 240. See Kelly, Rousseau as Author, 83-88 and 
Masters, Political Philosophy of Rousseau, 367.  
164 See Masters, Political Philosophy of Rousseau, 367. 
 131 
them once again a free people and worthy of being so” partly to his possession of this moral 
virtue (LF / ŒC 4: 1146 / CW 8: 269-70).165 
Third, given that the people whom the legislator must persuade have not yet 
undergone any kind of moral education, it is especially unlikely that they would be impressed 
by the greatness of the legislator’s soul if it consisted in the sort of moral virtues identified in 
the Letters Written from the Mountain.  But if the greatness of the legislator’s soul manifested itself 
in the amoral power and independence that, as we discussed above, Rousseau suggests human 
beings come to esteem early in their development, it may indeed impress the people. All this 
is to say that the greatness of the legislator’s soul is likely to make a greater impression on the 
people than the moral qualities to which Rousseau refers in the Letters Written from the Mountain. 
Even if the legislator’s great soul does not persuade many of the people when he first 
proposes his laws, it remains important that he have, and appear to have, such a soul. For, 
Rousseau suggests, the laws of a legislator who lacks such a soul and who gets the people to 
submit to his laws merely by performing ostensible miracles will not long endure. The question 
arises how does the greatness of the legislator’s soul contribute to his laws’ durability? Of 
course, it stands to reason that laws devised by a great soul would be better and, for that 
reason, more durable than laws devised by a poor soul. But this is not all that Rousseau has in 
mind here. His thought is also that the people’s memory of the legislator’s great soul will do 
more than their memory of his ostensible miracles to perpetuate his laws. One reason for this 
is that the persuasive power that Rousseau attributes to ostensible miracles derives largely from 
their effects on the senses of those who witness them. This means that their persuasive power 
tends to diminish with the passage of time. This tendency is compounded by two contrary 
problems. On one hand, ostensible miracles are, as Rousseau himself emphasizes in the Letters 
 
165 Rousseau claims that this “noble project” was Jesus’ Plan A, as it were, and that the transpolitical 
“revolution” in religion and morality that he succeeded in effecting was only his Plan B (LF / ŒC 4: 1146 / 
CW 8: 269-70). For an illuminating account of Rousseau’s understanding of Jesus, see Kelly, Rousseau’s 
Exemplary Life, 57-75. 
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Written from the Mountain, susceptible to doubt. On the other hand, they are, as Kelly points 
out, susceptible to being superseded by ostensible miracles performed later.166 The persuasive 
power of a great soul depends less upon its being witnessed through the senses. What is more, 
it tends to be amplified as it is remembered and passed down. The image of the legislator’s 
great soul and the passions it arouses may, in addition to persuading the people to submit to 
his laws in the first place, serve to perpetuate them after his departure from the scene, partly 
by reminding the people of their divine origin and partly by giving them a hero to emulate.167 
IV. THE FREEDOM OF THE CITIZEN REVISITED 
Now that we understand what is entailed in the legislator’s persuasive appeal to divine 
authority, we return to the problem to which the legislator was introduced as a solution. This 
is the problem that arises in Book II Chapter VI of the Social Contract where Rousseau turns 
from elaborating principles of political right to elaborating maxims of politics, the prudential 
guidelines by which the principles of political right might be put into practice. The problem 
is, as we explained in Chapter 1, that the bearers of legislative authority, i.e., the people, are by 
nature unable and unwilling to exercise that authority prudently or rightly, i.e., by enacting laws 
that effectively preserve the lives, goods, and freedom of them all. What Rousseau 
recommends as a solution to this problem is for an extraordinary individual, the legislator, to 
give the people laws that do this. The laws that the legislator gives them do this partly by 
establishing institutions and practices of civic education that, as we will see in the next chapter, 
will make them dutiful citizens. In getting the people to accept the gift of his laws, the 
legislator’s persuasive appeal to divine authority is a precondition for this solution. But, 
inasmuch as the people undergo a kind of civic education in being persuaded by the legislator 
 
166 Rousseau as Author, 65. 
167 See Kelly, Rousseau as Author, 65-66, 89-92. 
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to submit to his laws, his appeal to divine authority is not merely a precondition to but also a 
preliminary stage of a civic education that continues after the laws have been established. 
The questions arise in what ways and to what extent the legislator’s persuasive appeal 
to divine authority prefigures the civic education provided for in his laws. We raise this 
question with some trepidation. For what we have learned about this preliminary stage of civic 
education casts doubt on the freedom of the citizen. It suggests that, in moving from the state 
of nature to the civil state, man is less free than Rousseau suggests in his hypothetical account 
of that transition in Book I Chapter VIII of the Social Contract. It is clarifying to consider the 
condition of the man who has just been persuaded by the legislator to submit to his laws but 
who has not yet undergone the civic education prescribed in those laws, a man we might call 
the nascent citizen, in light of the conditions that Rousseau attributes to natural man and the 
mature citizen in Book I Chapter VIII.168  
In submitting to the legislator’s laws, the nascent citizen surrenders his natural 
freedom, his freedom to do whatever he is capable of. He does so freely in the sense that his 
submission to the legislator’s laws is voluntary. He is, and recognizes that he is, capable of not 
submitting to those laws, but still chooses to submit to them. The difficulty is that what leads 
him to make this choice is a sense of obligation to a divine will that transcends the general will. 
This is a difficulty most obviously because it means that his choice is predicated on a delusion. 
He is not, in fact, obligated to submit to the legislator’s laws because those laws do not, in fact, 
come from an authoritative divine will. Even more importantly, it means that, while the 
nascent citizen obeys the legislator’s laws with freedom, he does not thereby engage in, or 
conceive of himself as engaging in, an act of self-legislation.169 The law that he freely obeys is 
 
168 Our distinction between the nascent citizen and the mature citizen is consistent with Johnston’s observation 
that, “[g]iven that the skills and capacities of citizens take time to develop, there will be an indeterminate 
interval between the departure of the Legislator and the full-blown emergence of the citizen” (Encountering 
Tragedy, 50). 
169 Given this, it is at least not obvious that the problem that arises with the legislator’s appeal to divine 
authority might, as Riley suggests, be solved by the principle that the laws given by the legislator can 
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not quite a law that he prescribes for himself, which means that he does not quite possess the 
moral freedom that Rousseau tentatively attributes to the mature citizen. Given this, the 
legislator’s laws cannot, strictly speaking, be taken as expressions of the general will even if the 
people have voluntarily submitted to them. And this means that the nascent citizen’s freedom 
is not limited exclusively by the general will as the mature citizen’s freedom is. 
If the mature citizen is to have the freedom that Rousseau attributes to him in Book I 
Chapter VIII of the Social Contract, civic education proper must be more than a mere 
continuation of its preliminary stage. It must, among other things, somehow transform the 
people’s sense of obligation to the transcendent authority of God or the gods into a sense of 
obligation to the immanent authority of their own general will. Do the institutions and 
practices of civic education for which the legislator provides in his laws enable citizens 
ultimately to legislate according to the general will and to obey the laws that they enact in a 
way that is truly free? Or do they merely preserve the illusion of freedom fostered in the 
preliminary stage of civic education? In answering these questions, our examination of 
Rousseau’s writings on civic education promises to clarify the character and extent of the 
freedom and happiness of civic life. 
 
subsequently be altered, abolished, or added to by the citizens (“Possible Explanation of Rousseau’s General 
Will, 117). Citizens must somehow come to adopt this principle. 
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Chapter 4: Citizenship as Patriotism 
We turn, at last, to civic education proper. By contrast with the preliminary stage of 
civic education, which, as we have seen, is effected by the legislator directly, over a 
circumscribed period, i.e., the founding, civic education proper is effected by the legislator 
indirectly, through institutions and practices for which he provides in his laws but which are 
administered by magistrates, indefinitely, or for as long as the state perdures.170 While public 
schooling of the young makes up an important part of civic education—indeed it is “the most 
important business of the state” (DPE / ŒC 3: 261 / CW 3: 156)—it is by no means the 
whole of it. Civic education is conceived by Rousseau broadly, to include all manner of 
institutions and practices that form mœurs, customs, opinions in ways that generalize citizens’ 
wills and thus lead them voluntarily to fulfill their duties under the social contract. They range 
from instruction in the laws, mock government, ceremonies honoring national heroes, 
historical dramas, and athletic competitions, to song and dance. No less important than the 
characteristics of these institutions and practices is their ubiquity. For the most profound 
purport of civic education is to make the fatherland so pervasive in the lives of citizens that it 
becomes, in various ways, the whole of their existence. We will argue that, because they do 
this, certain institutions and practices of civic education ought to be understood not merely or 
even most importantly as means to dutiful citizenship, the realization of principles of political 
right, and the legitimation of human subjection, but as the ends of these things. 
 
170 Putterman’s recurring suggestion that the legislator’s work of civic education ceases with the founding, or 
upon the legislator’s departure from the state, does not adequately account for these institutions or practices or 
for the permanent necessity of generalizing citizens’ wills to which they are a response (“Rousseau on Agenda 
Setting”). As Strauss writes, “the transformation of natural man into a citizen is a problem coeval with society 
itself, and therefore society has a continuous need for at least an equivalent to the mysterious and awe-inspiring 
action of the legislator. For society can be healthy only if the opinions and sentiments engendered by society 
overcome and, as it were, annihilate the natural sentiments” (Natural Right and History, 287). See also Cullen, 
Freedom in Rousseau’s Political Philosophy, 100, 102. 
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I. THE UNITY AND COHERENCE OF ROUSSEAUIAN CIVIC EDUCATION 
Before turning to the substance of Rousseau’s conception of civic education proper, 
there is a preliminary question to which we would do well to attend. Are there grounds on 
which to speak of one Rousseauian civic education? Or is it not the case that there are many 
Rousseauian civic educations, which differ as widely as the peoples for whom they are 
designed? If, as Rousseau emphasizes, laws and forms of government ought to be adapted to 
the particular characteristics and conditions of peoples and ought therefore to differ from state 
to state,171 ought not the institutions and practices of civic education to be similarly adapted 
and therefore similarly to differ from state to state? The answer to this last question is yes. 
Indeed, it appears undeniable in light of the differences among Rousseau’s civic educational 
recommendations to the Poles, Corsicans, and Genevans. It may be partly for this reason that 
most of the scholarship on civic education in Rousseau’s thought has treated these 
recommendations distinctly.172  
Nevertheless, we would submit that, owing to the universality of its ultimate end—the 
generalization of citizens’ wills—and of the nature of the human beings that undergo it—
independent individuals with private wills—Rousseauian civic education has an essential 
character that is unified and coherent. In every instance, it works to denature human beings, 
or, to be more precise, to generalize their naturally private wills, principally by fostering 
patriotism among them. In the Discourse on Political Economy, the one sustained thematic account 
of civic education in Rousseau’s corpus that is not written with a view to a particular people, 
“love of the fatherland” is identified as “the most efficacious” “means” of teaching “citizens” 
to be “good” or “virtuous,” or of making their “private will[s]…conform in everything to the 
 
171 LD / ŒC 5: 60-61 / CW 10: 299; SC 2.8, 3.8 / ŒC 3: 384-85, 414-19 / CW 4: 157, 181-85. 
172 See, for instance, Hanley, “Enlightened Nation Building,” “From Geneva to Glasgow”; Schaeffer, 
“Attending to Time and Place,” “Realism, Rhetoric, and the Possibility of Reform”; and Smith, “Nationalism, 
Virtue, and the Spirit of Liberty,” “Nature, Nation-Building, and the Seasons of Justice.” For a rare book-
length treatment of Rousseauian civic education as a unified whole, see Trachtenberg, Making Citizens. 
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general will” (DPE / ŒC 3: 254 / CW 3: 150-51). And in the Government of Poland, Rousseau 
identifies the principal task of “education” as “[giving] national form to souls, and so 
[directing] their opinions and their tastes that they become patriots by inclination, by passion, 
and by necessity” (GP 4 / ŒC 3: 966 / CW 11: 179).173 In the Government of Poland, we find 
evidence of the essential unity and coherence of Rousseauian civic education not only in its 
resonance with the Discourse on Political Economy but also in its identification of a “spirit” that 
guided civic education in antiquity and that ought similarly to guide it in modernity (GP 2-4). 
Now, this is not to deny that Rousseau’s descriptions of civic education among the Jews, 
Spartans, and Romans indicate that ancient civic education was not simply or altogether 
monolithic. Nor is it to overlook the ways in which civic education in Poland or in any modern 
state will necessarily differ from civic education in antiquity. It is rather to argue that, for all 
the ways in which Rousseauian civic education varies from people to people, it has a certain 
essential character that is unvarying. And we would add that this essential character is best 
exemplified by the civic education of Lycurgus’ Sparta.174 What follows in this chapter is meant 
in part as a demonstration of this argument. In this section, we mean to offer no more than 
an indication of, and preliminary justification for, the approach we will be taking. 
Implicit in our approach is a dissent from the spirit of much of the more recent 
scholarship on Rousseau’s writings on civic education. As we noted in the Introduction, a 
number of scholars have recently argued that Rousseauian civic education does not consist 
simply or altogether in the radical psychic transformation that Rousseau associates with the 
denaturing institutions of Lycurgus’ Sparta. Ryan Patrick Hanley, in particular, has made this 
argument on the grounds that Rousseau adapts his civic educational recommendations to the 
 
173 Here, like Kelly and Bush in their translation (CW 11: 254n20) and Gourevitch in his (Social Contract, 
313n4.1), we follow editions prior to the Pléiade, in reading “la forrme nationale” rather than “la force nationale.” 
See, for example, Vaughan’s edition: Political Writings Vol. 2, 437.  
174 See E 1 / ŒC 4: 249-50 / CW 13: 164-65; GP 2 / ŒC 3: 957 / CW 11: 172; SD / ŒC 3: 187-88 / CW 4: 
62. 
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differing characteristics of the Poles, Corsicans, and Genevans, some of which are specific to 
them as modern peoples and thus different from Lycurgus’ Spartans. He contends:  
[S]o far from denaturing or transforming citizens, wise legislators meet them where 
they stand…[S]o far from revealing Rousseau as an advocate of political denaturing 
or the recovery of supposed ancient disinterestedness, [the Government of Poland and 
the Constitution for Corsica] suggest a more prudential approach to legislation. In each 
essay, Rousseau crafts solutions to the problems of existing regimes by appealing to 
and encouraging passions and prejudices endemic to those regimes.175 
Our difference with Hanley ultimately depends upon our understanding of the solutions that 
Rousseau crafts in these works, which we will elaborate later. For now, we limit ourselves to 
questioning his opposition of legislators’ meeting citizens where they are to their denaturing 
them. Legislators of course meet citizens where they are—at first. That legislators should do 
this is not evidence that, in appealing to citizens’ passions, they do not mean ultimately to 
transform citizens into something different. Furthermore, that Rousseau should recommend 
the “redirection” of “amour-propre…to the promotion of the common good” rather than its 
“eradication” does not count as evidence that his recommendations to the Poles and Corsicans 
are not denaturing.176 For amour-propre, as such, is not a natural passion and amour-propre, as 
redirected, is, as we will see, particularly unnatural. Nor, for that matter, is this passion peculiar 
to modern society and thus alien to Lycurgus’ Sparta, as Hanley implies.177 
We concede that Rousseau’s writings for the Genevans contain some statements that 
seem to support Hanley’s contention that Sparta “only serves as a standard to judge the 
distance of modernity’s departure from antiquity” and that “[a]s a guide to solving modern 
problems it is worthless.”178 In the Letters Written from the Mountain, Rousseau asserts, “ancient 
Peoples are no longer a model for the moderns; they are too foreign to them in every regard.” 
 
175 “Enlightened Nation Building,” 226. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid., 229; “From Geneva to Glasgow,” 186. 
178 “From Geneva to Glasgow,” 186. 
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He proceeds to admonish the Genevans against imagining themselves to be 
“Romans…Spartans…[or] even Athenians.” For they, by contrast with the ancients, are so 
“occupied with their private interests, their work, their trafficking, and their gain” that 
“freedom” for them is “only a means of acquiring without obstacle and of possessing in safety” 
(LWM 9 / ŒC 3: 881 / CW 9: 292-93). Considered in isolation, this statement seems simply 
and emphatically to support Hanley’s position. But, considered as part of the argument in 
which it appears and in relation to the Letter to D’Alembert, it does not. The Letters Written from 
the Mountain is an avowedly polemical work. In it, Rousseau is contrasting the Genevans with 
the ancients in order to rebut his antagonist’s argument that empowering the Genevan citizens’ 
assembly to supervise the magistrates’ execution of the laws will result in the fall of the 
republic, as the empowerment of the Tribunate allegedly did in Rome. The preoccupation with 
private life that characterizes the Genevans, as distinguished from the Romans and the 
ancients generally, will prevent them from abusing this power, Rousseau argues. While, on 
some level, Rousseau accepts that the Genevans will remain so preoccupied, he does not, as 
the statement quoted above might seem to suggest, do so without reservation. Indeed, the 
upshot of Rousseau’s account of Genevan political history in the Letters Written from the 
Mountain is that the private-spiritedness that distinguishes the Genevans from the ancients has 
kept them from vigorously defending the laws and from vindicating their rights and thus has 
brought them to the brink of subjugation.179 Hence, one cannot come away from the Letters 
Written from the Mountain simply, if at all, reassured that republicanism is viable in the absence 
of Spartan-style, denaturing civic education. 
That Rousseau does not recommend the institution of such an education in the Letters 
Written from the Mountain can be explained by the limited scope of this work. In Rousseau’s 
 
179 Thus, it is entirely consistent with Rousseau’s warnings against the evils of private-spiritedness in his 
critique of legislative representation in Book III Chapter XV of the Social Contract. 
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other major writing for the Genevans, the Letter to D’Alembert, he does look to Sparta as a model 
for civic education even as he recognizes the great distance that will always separate Geneva 
from it. As in the Letters Written from the Mountain, Rousseau notes that the Genevans’ private-
spiritedness distinguishes them from the Spartans. Whereas the Spartans were so public-
spirited that they could establish a theater without threatening their republic, the Genevans 
are not. Hence, Rousseau warns the Genevans against doing so (LD / ŒC 5: 61 / CW 10: 
300). Note that, while Rousseau begins by recognizing the Genevans’ lack of public-
spiritedness relative to the Spartans, his warning to them is animated by a concern to keep his 
countrymen from becoming less like the Spartans than they already are. In the same vein, 
Rousseau praises an informal Genevan institution, recreational and civic associations called 
“circles,” on the grounds that this institution “still preserve[s] among us some image of ancient 
mœurs” (LD / ŒC 5: 96 / CW 10: 328). Finally, when, at the conclusion of the Letter, he turns 
to suggesting entertainments that would not weaken but strengthen civic virtue, he commends 
the Spartan festival as “the example that we ought to follow” and the “model of [the festivals] 
that I would like to see among us” (LD / ŒC 5: 122, 123 / CW 10: 349, 350). Given all this, 
Rousseau’s writings for the Genevans are of a piece with the Government of Poland. They 
similarly lend support to our characterization of Rousseauian civic education as being 
essentially unified around the end of denaturing citizens, or of generalizing their wills, as in 
Lycurgus’ Sparta.180 
 Of the writings in which Rousseau offers practical political recommendations to 
modern states, the Constitution for Corsica would seem to present the best evidence against this 
characterization of Rousseauian civic education. For the model of citizenship held out in this 
work is that of the largely independent yeoman whose public-spiritedness is derivative of a 
 
180 For the reasons given in this paragraph, we conclude that Sparta is the much more important civic 
educational model for the Genevans than rustic Neufchatel. In this, we differ from Marks (Perfection and 
Disharmony, 78-79). 
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private-spirited attachment to agricultural life. Rousseau encourages the Corsicans to emulate 
this model without offering much in the way of recommendations for civic education of any 
kind, let alone the radically denaturing Spartan kind. Thus, he seems to imply that the latter is 
unnecessary for citizenship, at least in certain cases. And, to the extent that Corsica is identified 
in the Social Contract as the only European country “capable of legislation,” the case of Corsica 
might even seem to be somehow superior to those in which such civic education is in some 
measure necessary, e.g., Poland and Geneva (SC 2.10 / ŒC 3: 391 / CW 4: 162). Given this, 
the Constitution for Corsica gives Marks grounds on which to contend that the life of Rousseau’s 
citizen is modeled on the partly natural, partly unnatural savage of nascent society more than 
on the radically denatured citizen of Lycurgus’ Sparta.181 We will examine the case of Corsica 
in in the next section. For now, we limit ourselves to indicating the relation of this work to 
Rousseau’s other writings on civic education. Although, as we have already seen, the 
Constitution for Corsica throws light on important aspects of the psychology that informs 
Rousseauian civic education, it does not, by contrast with the Discourse on Political Economy, 
Government of Poland, and the Letter to D’Alembert, contain an account of the institutions and 
practices that compose that civic education. For, as we have begun to suggest, it contemplates 
conditions under which such institutions and practices are not immediately necessary. Now, 
to the extent that our argument is not only that Rousseauian civic education has a certain 
Spartan character but also that it is necessary for citizenship, we admit that this complicates 
our argument. Our discussion of patriotism in the next section will give us occasion to explain 
how it complicates our argument without contradicting it. 
The fostering of patriotism is, as we noted above, the principal means by which 
citizens’ wills are denatured or generalized in Rousseauian civic education. Indeed, as Marc 
Plattner observes, “Rousseau’s positive political teaching manifestly puts very great—one 
 
181 Marks, Perfection and Disharmony, 74-82, esp. 77-78. 
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might even say unprecedented—emphasis on the importance and desirability of 
patriotism.”182 The shift from the preliminary stage of civic education to civic education 
proper entails an important shift in the way that citizens are taught to conceive of their duty 
to obey the law. In civic education proper, the pious obedience to divine will that was fostered 
in the preliminary stage of civic education is recast as patriotic obedience to the law. Our 
leading concern in this chapter is to explain what patriotism is, how it is cultivated through the 
institutions and practices of civic education, and how it serves to make citizens virtuous by 
generalizing their wills. We will conclude by considering the character that civic life takes on, 
generally and particularly with respect to religion, as a result of citizens’ education to 
patriotism. 
II. LOVE OF THE FATHERLAND AS LOVE OF THE LAW 
Before defining patriotism, we must define the fatherland, the object of the patriot’s 
love. This task is complicated, at the outset, by differences in French and English etymology 
and compounded by the peculiar conceptual significance of the fatherland in Rousseau’s 
thought. Although the English word “patriotism,” like the French cognate “le patriotisme,” 
comes from the Latin word for fatherland, “patria,” it tends today to be taken to refer to a 
benign love of country, as distinguished from a malign love of fatherland. Because Rousseau 
draws an important conceptual distinction between “la patrie” (fatherland) and “le pays” 
(country),  “le patriotisme” (patriotism), as he uses it, must be taken to be synonymous with 
“l’amour de la patrie” (love of fatherland) as distinguished from “l’amour du pays” (love of 
country). Accordingly, in alternatively using “patriotism” and “love of fatherland,” we will be 
referring to the same concept. In quoting Rousseau, we will consistently translate “le 
patriotisme” as “patriotism” and “l’amour de la patrie” as “love of the fatherland.” 
 
182 “Rousseau and the Origins of Nationalism,” 189. 
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Rousseau’s distinction between fatherland and country serves as a good point of 
departure for our inquiry into his conception of patriotism. In Book V of the Emile, Emile 
receives an education in political theory largely consistent with the Social Contract. In the course 
of giving this education, the tutor distinguishes the “fatherland” from the “country.”  He draws 
this distinction in responding to an objection that he anticipates from Emile, namely, that he—
Emile—is not subject to “the duties of the Citizen” that the tutor has delineated, since he has 
no fatherland to which he could owe those duties. Without denying the premise that Emile 
lacks a fatherland—a premise that comports with an earlier observation of Rousseau’s that 
fatherlands have ceased to exist in modernity (E 1 / ŒC 4: 250 / CW 13: 165)—the tutor 
admonishes him that he “at least has a country” and has “lived tranquilly” under “a 
government and the simulacra of laws” and that he therefore is subject to the duties of the 
Citizen. The tutor’s admonition implies that the distinctive feature of the fatherland is the rule 
of laws, properly understood as acts of the “general will,” and thus the observation of the 
“social contract” (E 5 / ŒC 4: 858 / CW 13: 667). A fatherland is, in a word, a republic, 
which, for Rousseau, is identical to a legitimate state (SC 2.6 / ŒC 3: 379-80 / CW 4: 153). 
In this light, we see that, for Rousseau, love of the fatherland is connected, indeed, 
connected essentially, to republicanism.183 It is not, however, identical to the love of 
republicanism. The patriotic citizen does not love republicanism or republics so much as he loves 
his republic. For he conceives of his republic not merely as a republic but as his fatherland. What 
 
183 This is the most important reason that Rousseauian patriotism should not be conflated with nationalism. 
Nationalism of a certain kind, i.e., that which consists in citizens’ identifying with one another partly on the 
basis of shared national characteristics, is, as we will see, an important psychic element of Rousseauian 
patriotism. But it is not, contrary to Smith’s apparent suggestion, the whole or even the most important part of 
it (“Nationalism, Virtue, and the Spirit of Liberty,” 435). Rousseauian nationalism differs from blood-and-soil 
nationalism in the sense that this civic identification is not rooted fundamentally in blood or soil and also in the 
sense that it is subordinate to patriotism and therewith to republicanism. O’Hagan, too, distinguishes 
Rousseauian patriotism from “blood and soil” nationalism on the grounds that it is “mediated by recognition 
of the normative demands of just, self-imposed laws” (Rousseau, 161). On the senses in which Rousseau is and 
is not a proponent of “nationalism,” see Melzer, Natural Goodness of Man, 195-97 and Plattner, “Rousseau and 
the Origins of Nationalism.” 
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does it mean for the citizen to conceive of and love his republic in this way? How does his 
doing this make him a better citizen? 
The connection between patriotism and republicanism suggested by Emile’s political 
education is confirmed by Rousseau’s identification of the patriot with “the true republican” 
in the Government of Poland. His corresponding identification of the love of the fatherland with 
the love “of the laws and of freedom” presents a certain ambiguity, however (GP 4 / ŒC 3: 
966 / CW 11: 179). How does the citizen’s love of the laws relate to his love of freedom? 
How, in his mind and heart, do the laws relate to freedom? We would do well to reflect on 
these questions before taking up the question of what it means to identify the laws and 
freedom with a fatherland. Two alternative possibilities, which differ in their consistency with 
the principles of political right, or with true republicanism, come to mind. First, and more 
consistent with those principles, is the possibility that what the patriotic citizen loves most 
fundamentally is freedom, moral and civil. On this view, the patriotic citizen’s love of the laws 
is derivative of his love of freedom. He loves the laws because they express his general will 
and protect him against personal dependence. To the extent that they express his general will, 
and thus express his opinions about what ought to be commanded and forbidden, he loves 
them for their substance. But more important, more lovable, than their substance is their 
source and form. What the patriotic citizen most loves, on this view, is the rule of law as such, 
as distinguished from the rule of the particular laws that have been promulgated.  
A second possibility is that what the patriotic citizen loves most fundamentally are the 
particular laws that have been promulgated. On this view, the fact that the patriotic citizen 
might himself will the promulgated laws, the fact that they thus might express his will, is not 
why he loves them. It may be, as in the case of the nascent citizen at the end of the preliminary 
stage of civic education, that he loves them on the grounds that they express the authoritative 
will of God or the gods. Or it may be that he loves them because he has been otherwise 
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persuaded or convinced of the goodness of what they command and forbid. In any case, his 
love of the laws would not, as on the first view, be derivative of a more fundamental love of 
moral freedom. For he would not conceive of the laws as expressions of the general will, or 
thus of his will, even though he would, of course, will them himself if he were to have occasion 
to do so.  
This possibility is less consistent with the principles of political right inasmuch as it 
would mean that patriotism, like the legislator’s appeal to divine authority, would effectively 
keep citizens from exercising their right, as members of the sovereign, to alter, abolish, or 
perhaps even add to the promulgated laws. In view of Rousseau’s identification of patriotism 
with true republicanism, this would seem to argue for the former possibility. Yet Rousseau’s 
choice to speak of the laws as distinct from freedom and, relatedly, of the laws instead of law 
as such makes us hesitate to dismiss the latter possibility. Now, in contemplating this 
possibility, we are compelled to account for the love of freedom that is ascribed to the patriotic 
citizen. If he does not conceive of or love the laws as expressions of his freedom, in what way 
does he conceive of and love freedom? Here we would appeal to a modified definition of civil 
freedom: freedom as limited only by the positive laws, which, as in the ordinary—as 
distinguished from distinctively Rousseauian—conception, need not necessary express the 
general will. Even if the patriotic citizen does not conceive of the laws as expressions of the 
general will, it stands to reason that he would experience obedience to them differently, 
specifically, as free, or at least as more free, than he would experience obedience to the 
arbitrary private will of another. This is not only because he loves the laws and therefore would 
be inclined to obey them but also because the formal character of law is such as to protect 
those subject to it from many, if not all, kinds of subjugation. Thus, a patriotic love of the 
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particular laws that have been promulgated can conform partly, if not entirely, with a truly 
republican love of freedom.184 
Which of these alternatives Rousseau has in mind will become clearer once we 
establish what it means for the citizen to conceive of and love his republic as his fatherland. 
To this end, we would do well first to explain what this does not mean. Especially if we 
consider the grounds on which Rousseau argues for republicanism in the Social Contract, we 
might be led to think that the patriotic citizen loves the laws simply because they protect his 
life, goods, and, especially, his freedom or, relatedly, because they are just. Now, it is true that 
the laws, qua laws, do these things.185 And it is also true that their doing these things is part of 
what makes them lovable. If it were not, Rousseau would not be at pains, as he is in the 
Discourse on Political Economy, to convince magistrates that citizens will never love their 
fatherland “if they [do] not enjoy…civil safety there,” or if “their goods, their life, or their 
freedom [are] at the discretion of powerful men, without its being possible or permitted for 
them to dare invoke the laws,” or, relatedly, if their rights are not respected (DPE / ŒC 3: 
255-59 / CW 3: 152-54).186 In the same spirit, Rousseau argues that the promotion of 
patriotism among “serfs and commoners” in Poland depends upon “an exact observation of 
justice” toward them by nobles (GP 13 / ŒC 3: 1024 / CW 11: 226). Just as one cannot count 
on children to love their fathers if they abuse them, one cannot count on citizens to love their 
 
184 The extent of the conformity of this way of conceiving the relation of law to freedom to Rousseau’s 
republicanism can be seen in his treatment of these things in the Letters Written from the Mountain. See especially 
LWM 8 / ŒC 3: 841-43 / CW 9: 260-61. 
185 The immediately preceding discussion makes clear that the way in, or extent to, which the laws do these 
things depends in part upon what exactly is meant by laws. 
186 We are reminded here again of the important passage in the Second Discourse in which Rousseau contends 
that the peoples who first established government did so “in order to defend themselves against oppression, 
and to protect their goods, their freedoms, and their lives, which are, so to speak, the constituent elements of their 
being” and that “in relations between one man and another, the worst thing that can happen to one [is] to see 
oneself at the discretion of another” (emphasis added) (SD / ŒC 3: 180-81 / CW 56). 
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fatherlands, or, put differently, to love their countries as their fatherlands, if they abuse 
them.187 
While the justice inherent in the laws, or the laws’ efficacy in securing citizens’ lives, 
goods, and freedom, is, for this reason, a necessary condition for patriotism, it is not sufficient. 
Rousseau makes this clear in the first chapter of the Government of Poland. Having insisted that 
that “[t]here will never be a good and solid constitution other than the one in which the law 
reigns over the hearts of citizens,” he addresses himself to the question of how the law can be 
made to do this. For now, we limit ourselves to his explanation of how it cannot:  
[H]ow to reach hearts? It is this that our institutors, who never see anything but 
force and punishments, hardly think of, and it is to this that material rewards would 
perhaps not lead any better; justice, even of the greatest integrity, does not lead there 
because justice, like health, is a good that one enjoys without feeling it, that inspires 
no enthusiasm, and the value of which one feels only after having lost it. (GP 1 / 
ŒC 3: 935 / CW 11: 171) 
One simple consideration shows rather obviously that patriotism, as Rousseau conceives it, 
cannot consist merely or primarily in either the love of justice or the love of one’s life, goods, 
and freedom. To the extent that law, by definition, serves as the instantiation of justice and 
the means to the protection of citizens’ lives, goods, and freedom, love of it would follow 
from its mere existence. And the necessity of civic education, apart from the necessity of 
enlightening citizens about the good done by law, would be obviated.188 Given this, Rousseau’s 
insistence that the execution and preservation of law necessitates a civic education that fosters 
a love of the laws in the form of patriotism itself testifies to the insufficiency of the love of 
justice or the love of one’s life, goods, and freedom. As a corollary, we can say that the law 
 
187 Marks makes much of this in his reinterpretation of Rousseauian citizenship (Perfection and Disharmony, 81). 
He is correct to infer from this that the extent to which Rousseau’s citizens are transformed from naturally 
whole individuals into artificial parts of their political communities is limited. In emphasizing the denaturing 
character of Rousseauian civic education, we would not go so far as to suggest that such a transformation could 
ever be complete. 
188 In such a case, civic education could consist simply of delivering and substantiating such encomia to law as 
one finds Rousseau himself deliver in the Discourse on Political Economy (DPE / ŒC 3: 247-49 / CW 3: 145-46) 
or in Book II Chapter VI of the Social Contract (SC 2.6 / ŒC 3: 378-80 / CW 4: 152-53). 
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will exist or endure, provide for justice, and secure citizens’ lives, goods, and freedom only if 
citizens’ love of it encompasses more than the love of these things. The basic thought can also 
be expressed this way: Rousseau’s argument for the necessity of educating citizens to 
patriotism is predicated on his judgment that the motives and outlook of the parties to the 
social contract in his hypothetical analysis cannot, in practice, be relied upon as the psychic 
basis for citizenship.189 It follows from this that what Rousseau has in mind by patriotism must 
entail more than loving the laws merely as means to the preservation of individual lives, goods, 
and freedom.190 
 We discover, in synthesizing Rousseau’s various characterizations of civic education 
together with his reflections on patriotism in the revealing fragment “On the Fatherland,” that 
the patriotic citizen loves the laws, or his fatherland, not as means to the protection of his 
existence but rather as the very source of his existence, or at least of its worth. In “On the 
Fatherland,” Rousseau ponders the cause of “the affection that links us to our native country, 
to the fatherland properly so called.” Two facts strike him. The intensity with which human 
beings feel this affection varies—both over time in the same place and from place to place at 
the same time. But it does not vary according to the degree to or facility with which inhabitants 
are able to preserve themselves or fulfill their appetites for well-being. From these facts, he 
concludes: “What one loves in one’s country, what one properly calls the fatherland, is not 
therefore what relates to our appetites and the habits that arise from them; it is not simply 
 
189 On this point, we are in agreement with Cohen (Rousseau, 95-96). 
190 In our view, the characterization of the psychic basis of Rousseauian citizenship given by Smith in his 
interpretation of the Government of Poland goes astray partly because it does not adequately account for this 
thought. According to Smith, the civic education that Rousseau recommends to the Poles and associates with 
the ancients fosters a love of collective freedom principally by appealing to citizens’ concern to preserve their 
freedom as individuals (“Nationalism, Virtue, and the Spirit of Liberty,” esp. 422). By our lights, Smith 
understands Rousseauian civic education principally to entail a permanent fostering of the self-regarding 
passions that, in Rousseau’s hypothetical analysis, give rise to the social contract. The soundness of our critique 
of Smith depends ultimately upon the soundness of our alternative understanding of the elements of civic 
education, which we will indicate in what follows. We limit ourselves here, then, to noting the basic character 
of our disagreement.  
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place; it is not simply things. The object of this love is closer to us” (PF 11.1 / ŒC 3: 535-36 
/ CW 4: 58).  
The next section of the fragment, in which Rousseau identifies the object of the 
patriot’s love, bears quoting in full. 
If citizens draw from her [the fatherland]191 all that can give value to their own 
existence—wise Laws, simple mœurs, necessities, peace, freedom, and the esteem of 
other peoples—their zeal for such a tender mother will be ignited. They will know 
no other true life than the one that they take from her, no other true happiness than 
to use that life in her service; and they will count among its benefits the honor of 
spilling all their blood for her defense if needed. (PF 11.2 / ŒC 3: 536 / CW 4: 58)  
Here we are presented with a concise but rich articulation of the patriotic outlook inculcated 
in citizens through civic education. Over the course of the remainder of this chapter, we will 
explicate this statement, alongside passages from other works in which Rousseau dilates on 
patriotism and civic education, with a view to elaborating this outlook and identifying the 
means by which it is to be inculcated. 
We note at the outset that the statement might be taken to contradict our argument 
that the patriot understands the fatherland to consist principally in the laws and, accordingly, 
loves the fatherland principally for its laws. For the laws comprise only one of the many aspects 
of the fatherland that give value to the citizen’s existence. We would submit, however, that 
this apparent contradiction can be resolved in a way that serves rather to clarify our argument. 
To the extent that the fatherland is constituted as a fatherland by the laws, every aspect of it 
that gives value to citizens’ existences is an effect of the laws. Indeed, each of the aspects 
identified in the statement can be attributed partly, if not wholly, to the laws. Rousseau’s 
placement of the laws first in the list of these aspects may be intended to reflect this. 
Regardless, the conclusion we draw from our consideration of this statement in light of the 
 
191 In context, the antecedent is clearly the fatherland, which, oddly, is a feminine noun in French. If it were 
not for the maternal characterization of the fatherland that follows, the feminine pronoun “elle” would be more 
appropriately, and less confusingly, translated “it.” For more of this gender-bending, see DPE / ŒC 3: 258 / 
CW 3: 153. 
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passages we treated above is this: To be a patriot is to love the laws, specifically, as the essential 
cause of a fatherland that gives value to his existence. Various aspects of the fatherland other 
than the laws contribute to the value of the citizen’s existence. And the citizen loves the 
fatherland partly on account of those things. But, to the extent that all aspects of the fatherland 
can ultimately be attributed to the laws, there is an important sense in which the love of it can 
be understood as love of the laws. 
There are grounds for reflection on this question in the alternative varieties of 
patriotism exemplified in Rousseau’s writings by the Spartans, Romans, and old Swiss. 
Rousseau’s fragmentary writings contain intriguing reflections on the similarities and 
differences between the ways that the Spartans and Romans conceived of and loved their 
respective fatherlands.192 While Rousseau attributes “the same enthusiasm for the fatherland” 
to the Spartans and Romans (PF 12.1 / ŒC 3: 539 / CW 4: 61), he indicates that their 
conceptions of their fatherlands were not identical: “Always ready to die for his country, a 
Spartan loved his Fatherland so tenderly that he would have sacrificed freedom itself in order 
to save it. But the Romans never imagined that the Fatherland could outlive freedom or even 
glory” (PF 12.3 / ŒC 3: 543 / CW 4: 63). The examples of the Spartans and the Romans thus 
show that different peoples love the different elements that make up the fatherland in different 
relative measures. Rousseau’s formulation here suggests that the Romans’ unwillingness to 
sacrifice freedom for the fatherland testifies less to a lack of patriotism than to an identification 
of the fatherland with freedom. Given their conception of their fatherland, Romans would 
consider it impossible to save Rome by sacrificing freedom, or glory, for that matter. For to 
sacrifice either of the latter would be to sacrifice the former. 
 
192 Kelly has helpfully offered a corrective to the tendency to conflate Rousseau’s Spartans and Romans. In 
what follows, we seek to build on, and partly to challenge, his illuminating account of their similarities and 
differences. See Rousseau as Author, 33, 122-25. 
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The question arises, if the fatherland for the Romans was, above all, their freedom and 
glory, what was the fatherland, above all, for the Spartans. For which of the elements of the 
fatherland identified in the passage quoted above would the Spartan have been willing to 
sacrifice his life and even freedom? Rousseau’s consistent emphasis on the Spartans’ love of 
the laws implies that the fatherland for them was above all its laws. Kelly attributes the 
difference that Rousseau sees in Spartan and Roman conceptions of the fatherland to the 
difference in the relative statuses of laws and mœurs in Sparta and Rome.193 Whereas, in Sparta, 
the laws determined mœurs, in Rome, mœurs determined the laws.194 In this regard, the differing 
circumstances and characters of the Spartan and Roman foundings prove to be of decisive 
importance. The receiving of laws was more important in the foundation of the Spartan 
republic than in the foundation of the Roman republic. In his fragmentary “History of 
Lacedaemonia,” Rousseau explains that, immediately prior to being given laws by Lycurgus, 
the Spartans had fallen into a state of anarchy, the evils of which put them in need of law.  
The Kings preferred to take from the Law a certain and moderate authority than to 
have a precarious one, absolute in appearance but without any power in effect; and 
the people, preferring impartial Laws to wicked or useless kings, found themselves 
only too happy to renounce the power of offending another in order no longer to be 
offended oneself. (PF 13 / ŒC 3: 548 / CW 4: 67)195 
This receptivity to the rule of law was subsequently reinforced by the educational features of 
the particular laws given by Lycurgus, which resulted in the Spartans’ coming to love these 
laws as the fundamental cause of a fatherland that gave value to their existence. In the 
 
193 Rousseau as Author, 33, 122-25. 
194 DPE / ŒC 3: 261-62 / CW 3: 156-57; PF 3.20, 5.3 / ŒC 3: 488, 503 / CW 4: 26, 36; SD / ŒC 3: 187-88 
/ CW 4: 62. 
195 It is worth noting that the grounds on which the Spartans desired to be subject to law resemble the second, 
less truly republican way of conceiving of and loving the laws that we sketched above. For it does not appear to 
entail any notion that the laws express the general will or that legislation entails the exercise of moral freedom. 
It is also worth noting that, while this way of conceiving of and loving the laws admits of the notion that the 
laws express, and derive their legitimacy from, authoritative divine will, the Spartans’ desire to be subject to law 
on these grounds raises the possibility that Lycurgus’ appeal to this notion was not simply or altogether 
necessary in order to get the Spartans to submit to his laws. 
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Government of Poland, Rousseau indicates that the establishment of laws was much less 
important because much less necessary in the founding of Rome than in the founding of 
Sparta. He explains:  
It was Numa who rendered [Romulus’ imperfect work] solid and durable in uniting 
[the Romans] in an indissoluble body, in transforming them into Citizens, less by 
laws, of which their rustic poverty had hardly any need yet, than by mild institutions 
that attached them to one another and all to their soil in finally rendering their city 
sacred by apparently frivolous and superstitious rites. (GP 2 / ŒC 3: 957-58 / CW 
11: 172-73)196 
Because of the Romans’ history, a body of particular promulgated laws—in a word, a 
constitution—did not become as fundamental to their conception or love of their fatherland 
as it was to the Spartans’.  
Kelly contends that this made the Romans freer than the Spartans in Rousseau’s 
judgment. We would agree in one part and disagree in another. The Romans were freer than 
the Spartans in the sense that their patriotism permitted them more fully to exercise their right 
to alter, abolish, and add to the promulgated laws than the Spartans’ patriotism enabled them 
to do. Recall, in this connection, Rousseau’s account of the Decemvirs’ obtaining the Romans’ 
consent to new laws in keeping with the principles of political right (SC 2.7 / ŒC 3: 382-383 
/ CW 4: 156). There is no comparable episode in Spartan history, at least not in Rousseau’s 
presentation of that history. Roman patriotism was more truly republican in the sense that it 
enabled citizens to become legislators themselves in a way that Spartan patriotism did not. 
However, this is not the sense in which Kelly argues that Roman patriotism made the Romans 
freer than the Spartans. He argues that it made them more vigorous in protecting the laws 
against violation by the government. He is quite right to note that the examples of citizens 
who do this that Rousseau cites in his writings are Romans rather than Spartans. And he is 
 
196 This complicates Rousseau’s characterization of the Romans’ patriotism as “innate” in the Discourse on 
Political Economy (DPE / ŒC 3: 262 / CW 157). For it suggests that it had to be made innate artificially by 
Numa. 
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quite right to infer from this that Roman patriotism contributed to civil freedom.197 But we 
would emphasize that the absence of examples of Spartans’ protecting the laws against 
violation by the government does not necessarily imply that they were any less vigorous in 
their protection of the laws. Indeed, we would suggest that it implies, rather, that Spartan 
patriotism made it less necessary for citizens to show such vigor. The centrality of the love of 
the laws to the Spartans’ conception and love of the fatherland meant that Sparta had fewer 
Brutuses and Catos than Rome because it had fewer Tarquins and Caesars than Rome. If or 
insofar as Rousseau regards the violation of promulgated laws, understood in the ordinary 
sense articulated above, by the government as a greater danger to freedom than the failure of 
citizens to exercise their right to alter, abolish, or add to such laws in accord with the general 
will, an argument for the superiority of Spartan to Roman patriotism then can be made in 
terms of freedom. 
The foregoing exposes a tension between two aspects of republican freedom that 
tends, in practice, to be insoluble. The freedom from subjection to the arbitrary private wills 
of others depends upon the vigorous protection of promulgated law above all against violation 
by the government. And this is served by, and may even depend upon, a love of the particular 
laws that have been promulgated. Yet the love of these laws will tend to keep citizens from 
fully exercising their right to legislate in accord with the general will as members of the 
sovereign, that is, free of constraint by the promulgated laws. Under the conditions under 
which the necessity of establishing laws is particularly great, e.g., those that prevailed in Sparta 
prior to Lycurgus’ legislation, it will also be necessary to promote a conception of the 
fatherland in which the established laws are more fundamental. To the extent that this will 
inhibit citizens from fully exercising their rights, republicanism might be thought to flourish 
more fully under the alternative conditions of the Romans. But the vulnerability of the laws to 
 
197 Rousseau as Author, 123-25. 
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governmental violation in Rome prevents us from concluding that, under such conditions, it 
will flourish more fully in every way. In advancing this argument, we mean to throw Rousseau’s 
praise of Spartan patriotism in a new light—a light that reflects both his principled 
republicanism and his moderate recognition of the practical obstacles to the complete 
achievement of republicanism—without denying the radicalism of the civic education that he 
judges to be necessary for its promotion.198  
Regardless of Rousseau’s relative estimation of Spartan and Roman republicanisms, 
his consistent association of civic education principally with Lycurgus’ Sparta suggests that the 
patriotism to be fostered through civic education is more Spartan than Roman, i.e., more 
centered on the love of particular promulgated laws. One way of putting the thought is that, 
under conditions under which civic education is more necessary, patriotism that consists 
especially in love of particular promulgated laws is the kind of patriotism that ought to be 
fostered. The question then is not whether civic education ought to foster Spartan-style or 
Roman-style patriotism but whether republicanism tends to flourish more fully under 
conditions under which it depends more upon civic education or under conditions under 
which it depends less upon civic education. 
Our discussion thus far has excluded a third variety of patriotism, which is exemplified 
by the old Swiss, as described in the Constitution for Corsica. In this work, Rousseau recommends 
measures to the Corsicans that are aimed ultimately at the preservation of their recently-won 
independence from foreign powers and at the establishment of peaceful freedom under law 
among themselves. The effect of these measures, taken together, is to attach the Corsicans to 
their fatherland, and thus to foster a kind of patriotism among them, by attaching them in 
various ways to an agricultural—as distinguished from commercial—way of life. In 
 
198 Here, we mean to differ particularly with Trachtenberg who, in our view, is insufficiently sympathetic in his 
understanding of Rousseau’s thought and, for that reason, fails to consider what reasons Rousseau might have 
for praising this kind of patriotism and this kind of civic education despite their limits, limits of which 
Trachtenberg assumes Rousseau is unaware (Making Citizens, Chap. 6).  
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recommending these measures to the Corsicans, Rousseau urges them to “follow” the 
“model” of the old Swiss, that is, the Swiss as they were prior to becoming mercenaries and 
turning to commerce. Rousseau explains that the old Swiss were “[forcefully] attached 
to…their fatherland” by their “laborious and independent lives” as farmers and herders. Their 
patriotism manifested itself in “agreement in resolutions,” “courage in combat,” “constant 
union,” and thus, we would note, in some of the essential marks of good citizenship. Yet they 
were “almost without laws” and entirely without education and virtue. Because, as individuals, 
or rather as families, they were self-sufficient, independent, and good, they had almost no need 
of laws, education, or virtue in order to live happily among themselves. And because they were 
so powerfully motivated to preserve the goods that they had in common, namely, their 
agricultural and pastoral way of life and their independence, they had almost no need of laws 
or education in order collectively to defend them against foreigners (CC / ŒC 3: 914-15 / 
CW 11: 134-35).  
What we see in Rousseau’s portrait of the old Swiss are human beings whose private 
wills so little oppose one another and so little oppose their general will to the common good 
that it is unnecessary for them to have recourse to such artificial devices as the social contract, 
law, or civic education. In obvious ways, they could not differ more from the Spartans. Given 
this, and given that it is the old Swiss, and not the Spartans, that Rousseau commends as 
models to the Corsicans, there would seem to be grounds to follow Marks in doubting the 
essentially Spartan character of Rousseauian citizenship.199 We would readily concede that the 
old Swiss do serve as kinds of models of Rousseauian citizens. But we would just as readily 
insist that, in the vast majority of cases, these models can be approximated only through the 
artificial devices that the old Swiss could do without. We would emphasize, furthermore, that 
the accidental transformation of the old Swiss into the new Swiss shows that they could do 
 
199 Perfection and Disharmony, 77-78. 
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without laws and civic education only for so long. Recognizing this, Rousseau recommends 
that the Corsicans adopt laws that, in various ways, attach them more securely to the way of 
life that the Swiss ultimately abandoned. We would concede that these laws do not provide 
for the educational institutions and practices reminiscent of Lycurgus’ Sparta that Rousseau 
recommends to the Poles and Genevans. They provide, rather, for the social, economic, and 
political conditions under which the patriotism of the old Swiss might flourish among the 
Coriscans. Much like the example of the old Swiss, then, Rousseau’s recommendations to the 
Corsicans point to the possibility of patriotic citizenship in the absence of Spartan-style civic 
education. But, also much like this example, these recommendations point to the elusiveness 
of this possibility. Not only are the conditions under which it might be realized hard to come 
by, they are also hard to sustain. Indeed, they are ultimately impossible to sustain. For, as 
Rousseau warns, the successful implementation of his recommendations will eventually result 
in such an extensive increase in Corsica’s population that it will be incapable of maintaining 
the exclusively agricultural way of life that underlies its patriotism (CC / ŒC 3: 906-907 / CW 
11: 128).200 We would submit that this warning implies that the endurance of citizenship 
among the Corsicans would require that they ultimately turn to at least a more Spartan-style 
education to patriotism. 
III. EDUCATING PATRIOTIC CITIZENS 
To the extent that patriotism consists in loving the fatherland as that which gives value 
to one’s existence, it would seem that civic education should entail teaching citizens that their 
fatherland gives value to their existence. We will see that civic education can, indeed, be 
conceived in this way. The first building block of civic education, thus conceived, is making it 
 
200 For interpretations of the Constitution for Corsica that are especially attentive to this problem, see Schaeffer, 
“Attending to Time and Place” and Smith, “Nature, Nation-Building, and the Seasons of Justice.” Neither 
draws the conclusion that we do, however. 
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so that the lives of citizens are pervaded by the fatherland from cradle to grave. Rousseau 
praises all the “ancient Legislators” for doing this in Chapter II of the Government of Poland. But 
none is presented as having laid this foundation as solidly as Lycurgus, who “ceaselessly 
showed [the Spartan people] the fatherland in its laws, in its games, in its home, in its loves, in 
its feasts.” Indeed, Lycurgus “did not leave it a moment of relaxation to be alone by itself; and, 
from this continual constraint, ennobled by its object, arose in it that ardent love of the 
fatherland that was always the strongest or rather the only passion of the Spartans, and which 
made them beings above humanity” (GP 2 / ŒC 3: 957 / CW 11: 173). The importance of 
thus making the fatherland ubiquitous in the lives of citizens, of what J.S. Maloy dubs the 
“environmental [principle],”201 is suggested by the fact that, of the three ancient peoples 
Rousseau describes in this chapter, i.e., the Jews, the Spartans, and the Romans, only the 
Spartans are explicitly characterized as patriotic. Of course, this is by no means to suggest that 
the Jews and Romans were unpatriotic, or that Moses and Numa did not also take care to 
suffuse their peoples’ lives with the fatherland. It is rather to suggest that the more citizens’ 
lives are suffused with the fatherland, the more patriotic they will become. Hence, the Spartans 
best exemplify patriotism. 
Accordingly, we find that, when Rousseau turns to offering recommendations for 
educating the Poles to patriotism, he urges that “[a] child upon opening its eyes ought to see 
the fatherland and until death ought to see nothing but it.” Rousseau’s characterization of the 
patriotism that will result from this closely resembles the outlook articulated in the fragment 
“On the Fatherland.” Speaking of the citizen whose life has always been pervaded by the 
fatherland, Rousseau contends, “[The love of the fatherland] makes up his whole existence; 
he sees only the fatherland, he lives only for it; as soon as he is alone, he is nothing: as soon 
as he has no more fatherland, he is no longer, and if he is not dead, he is worse than dead”  
 
201 “Very Order of Things,” 245. 
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(GP 4 / ŒC 3: 966 / CW 11: 179).202 Note the implicit premise that constant exposure to the 
fatherland will produce love of the fatherland, indeed, a love of the fatherland that is so 
consuming that it somehow becomes life itself. The question arises how does mere exposure, 
even constant exposure, to the fatherland produce such love. Or, rather, in what ways must 
citizens be constantly exposed to the fatherland if they are to come to love it in this way? 
A. Learning Patriotism 
First, the fatherland is presented, in various ways, to citizens as an object of knowledge 
and esteem. To the very limited extent that book-learning in schools plays a role in Rousseau’s 
conception of civic education, it is meant to do this.203 As part of his recommendation that 
the Poles be given a “national education,” Rousseau writes:  
I wish that, in learning to read, [the Pole] might read things about his country; that, at 
ten years, he might be familiar with all its products, at twelve, all the provinces, all 
the roads, all the cities; that, at fifteen, he might know all its history, at sixteen all the 
laws; that there not have been in all of Poland either a beautiful action or an 
illustrious man with which his memory and heart are not full, and about which he 
cannot give an account at a moment’s notice. (GP 4 / ŒC 3: 966 / CW 11: 180) 
Note that citizens are not to learn about their fatherland in a spirit of academic detachment. 
They are to learn not only what their fatherland is, but also, and just as if not more importantly, 
that it is estimable and lovable. Passages elsewhere in the Government of Poland and in Rousseau’s 
other works suggest that, of the subjects delineated here, the laws and history are the most 
important. One of the reasons for their importance is that knowledge of them is essential to 
crucial aspects of patriotism.204 
 
202 This generic example of the patriotic citizen also bears a close resemblance to Cato, as described in the 
Discourse on Political Economy (DPE / ŒC 3: 255 / CW 3: 151). 
203 Rousseau’s reference to learning how to read in the passage below is the only explicit indication, of which 
we are aware, that books are to play any role in civic education. Note, however, that this uncharacteristic 
allowance of reading is later qualified by a characteristic attack on teaching children through books (GP 4 / ŒC 
3: 968 / CW 11: 181). Trachtenberg, Making Citizens, 234-35. 
204 Note that, in keeping with the argument of his First Discourse, Rousseau excludes the arts and sciences from 
the curriculum he recommends. See FD / ŒC 3: 15-25 / CW 2: 12-19. 
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1. Learning and Loving the Laws 
Citizens’ education in the laws is, in a way, the most complex aspect of civic education. 
The character and, even more, the cause of its complexity is obscure in the few passages in 
which Rousseau treats it, however. We mean to clarify these things by considering these 
passages in light of the argument made for the necessity of the legislator in Book II Chapter 
VI of the Social Contract. Recall that, as we saw in our examination of this argument in Chapter 
1, the problem that necessitates the legislator is twofold—partly moral, partly intellectual. The 
people cannot be relied upon to will generally or to know what the common good consists in 
or requires. The task of the legislator, therefore, is to move citizens to will generally and to 
enlighten them about the common good. As an education to patriotism, civic education proper 
is, as we have begun and will continue to see in this chapter, addressed principally to the moral 
dimension of the problem. This is the dimension of the problem that is contemplated in 
Rousseau’s characterizations of civic education as a process of denaturing. For the end of that 
process is a transformation of the will, as distinguished from the intellect. How does the 
legislator address the intellectual dimension of the problem? In Book II Chapter VI of the 
Social Contract, Rousseau presents the legislator as a bringer of enlightenment. Is he? 
Rousseau presents the legislator as having knowledge of what the common good 
consists in and requires and as giving the people laws that are informed by this knowledge. If 
or insofar as this is true, after the legislator has given the people his laws, the common good 
will be served principally by the execution and preservation of those laws. And if or insofar as 
the love of the laws inculcated in citizens as part of their education to patriotism will lead them 
to identify the good of the fatherland with those laws, they will, as an effect of their moral 
education, come to seek the common good in accordance with, if not necessarily on the basis 
of, knowledge. We hasten to acknowledge a massive difficulty that keeps us—and, for that 
matter, Rousseau himself—from regarding this as a perfect solution to the intellectual 
 160 
problem. The limits inherent in law—and, relatedly, the limits inherent in any merely human 
lawgiver, no matter how knowledgeable he may be—mean that, especially over time, the 
common good will not be simply or altogether served by the preservation and execution of 
the legislator’s laws. The common good will at times require that the legislator’s laws be altered, 
abolished, or added to.205 At the conclusion of the last chapter and then again in our discussion 
of patriotism in this chapter, we noted the difficulty that non-rational attachment to particular 
promulgated laws poses in terms of political legitimacy. Here, we see that it also poses a 
difficulty in terms of political efficacy. In light of these difficulties, we come to see the 
importance of the manner in which citizens are to be educated in the laws. 
Rousseau’s statements on this important subject are neither numerous nor extensive. 
We saw above that he suggests that Polish citizens be educated so that they know all the laws 
by sixteen. In the fragment “On Laws,” Rousseau lays even greater emphasis on the 
importance of learning the laws than he does in the Government of Poland. He writes: 
The only study suited to a good People is that of its Laws. It is necessary that it 
meditate on them incessantly in order to love them, in order to observe them, even 
in order to correct them with the precautions that a subject of this importance 
demands, when the need to do so is very pressing and well proven. Every state 
where there are more laws than the memory of each Citizen can contain is a poorly 
constituted State, and every man who does not know the laws of his country by heart 
is a bad Citizen; hence, Lycurgus wished to write only in the hearts of the Spartans. 
(PF 4.6 / ŒC 3: 492 / CW 4: 29) 
Note that the study of the laws is appropriate not for schoolchildren alone but for citizens at 
every stage of life. Here, then, is one concrete way that the fatherland is to be made ubiquitous 
in the lives of citizens; the laws are to be studied incessantly. This raises the possibility that, while 
Polish citizens might know all the laws at sixteen, their study of them will not then be 
complete. As in the passage quoted above, Rousseau emphasizes that knowledge of the 
fatherland is to be inculcated so that love of it might be inculcated. The citizen must hold the 
 
205 See Rousseau’s defense of dictatorship in Book IV Chapter VI of the Social Contract. 
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laws in his head in order also to hold them in his heart. That Rousseau should go as far as to 
identify the study of the laws as the only study suited to a good people, which is to say, further 
than he goes in the Government of Poland, underscores the centrality of the particular 
promulgated laws to citizens’ understanding and love of the fatherland. 
 The education in the laws that is described in this passage is likely to appear to many 
readers as an exercise in indoctrination, one that would stand in the way of citizens’ 
knowledgeably exercising their right to alter, abolish, or add to the laws as the common good 
might demand. Yet when one considers it in relation to the preliminary stage of civic 
education, wherein the laws were presented as expressions of authoritative divine will, it 
appears rather as a considerable advancement toward their doing this. For it admits that 
citizens may rightfully alter, abolish, or add to the laws as the common good might demand. 
That citizens are not to be kept from recognizing this is implicit in the concern to keep them 
from exercising this right recklessly. 
It might be objected that this education in the laws engages the memory and the heart 
without seriously engaging the mind.206 But Rousseau speaks of citizens’ meditating on the laws, 
which at least raises the possibility that their love of the laws will arise at least partly from 
thoughtful reflection on them. That Rousseau means for citizens’ love of the laws to issue, at 
least partly, from at least some thoughtful reflection on them is made clear in the Discourse on 
Political Economy. There he writes: 
The power of the laws depends even more on their own wisdom than on the severity 
of their ministers, and the public will derives its greatest weight from the reason that 
dictated it: It is because of this that Plato looked upon it as a very important 
precaution always to put at the head of edicts a reasoned preamble which shows their 
justice and utility. (DPE / ŒC 3: 249 / CW 3: 147) 
 
206 Trachtenberg objects to Rousseau’s conception of civic education on these grounds (Making Citizens, 231-
33, 237, 244). And Shklar holds that “[t]here is, above all, no time for reflection, idleness, and intellectuality in 
the good society” (Men and Citizens, 160). 
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Here we get an indication of how exactly the laws might be studied by citizens throughout 
their lives. The convention to which Rousseau here refers is introduced by the Athenian 
Stranger in Book IV of Plato’s Laws (719e-24a). Rousseau’s praise of this convention is an 
intriguingly rare instance in which he endorses a rationalizing improvement on classical 
political practice suggested by classical political theory.207 It suggests that, in his view, the 
Spartans’ education in their laws would have been improved if it had included study of rational 
arguments in favor of their justice and utility.208 Thus, it suggests that citizens’ education in 
the laws ought to entail a kind of education in principles of political right and maxims of 
politics. For it implies that citizens’ obedience to the laws will arise partly from the rational 
conviction that the laws are consistent with those principles and those maxims. We are put 
back in mind of the promise of the heroic legislator who “constrains men to bear the yoke of 
laws in order to subject them to the authority of reason in the end” (VH / ŒC 2: 1264 / CW 
4: 2). 
 There is a way in which citizens’ reflecting on rational arguments for the justice and 
utility of the laws opens the door to their exercising their right to alter, abolish, or add to the 
laws as the common good might demand. For implicit in those arguments is the principle that 
the legitimacy of the laws is conditional on their justice and utility, that the common good is 
more fundamental than the particular promulgated laws. The preambles present citizens with 
considerations that might lead them to alter, abolish, or add to the laws. We would be going 
too far if we were to suggest that the preambles do more than open the door to this possibility, 
however. Recall that the grounds on which Rousseau recommends the preambles is that they 
 
207 On the relation of Rousseau’s understanding of the proper place of reason in politics to that of the Platonic 
Socrates, see Orwin, “Rousseau’s Socratism.” 
208 Then again, in the First Discourse, he much more characteristically praises Sparta for “its happy ignorance” 
and “the wisdom of its Laws” (FD / ŒC 3: 12 / CW 2: 9). 
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will effectively encourage citizens, in their capacity as subjects, to obey the laws.209 It stands to 
reason that, if or insofar as the preambles do this, they will also effectively discourage citizens, 
in their capacity as members of the sovereign, at least from altering or abolishing, if not also 
from adding to, those laws. One might say, then, that the effect of the preambles is to open 
the door to citizens’ exercising their right to legislate anew while at the same time warning 
them against walking through that door. This is not necessarily problematic in terms of 
legitimacy or efficacy, however. For, if or insofar as the laws are just and useful and citizens 
are truly convinced of their justice and utility, citizens’ affirmation of the laws would be an act 
of freedom that effectively promoted the common good. 
Now, one might doubt that citizens would, in their reflections on the preambles, be 
sufficiently dispassionate or critical to arrive at rational convictions or knowledge of the laws’ 
justice and utility. This is hardly the spirit fostered by most of Rousseauian civic education. It 
is evident from Rousseau’s writings in general and on civic education in particular that, in his 
judgment, the political disadvantages of this spirit outweigh its advantages. The two sides of 
the task that falls to the legislator are in some tension with one another. For the rational spirit 
that citizens would have to possess in order truly to know what the common good might 
consist in or require is in tension with the passionate spirit that they would have to possess in 
order to will generally. One might, then, think that, in practice, citizens’ education in the laws, 
even as accompanied by rational arguments for their justice and utility, would still amount to 
a kind of indoctrination. 
 
209 It is worth noting that the preambles articulated by the Athenian Stranger in the Laws are not mere 
apologies for the laws to which they are appended. They also are not obviously designed simply to convince 
citizens to love the laws. This is, to be sure, part of the Athenian Stranger’s intention, but he seems also, and 
more importantly, to intend to provoke at least some citizens to reflect critically on the laws and ultimately on 
law as such. Thus, they are not simply meant as a “precaution.” There is no direct evidence that, in making 
recommendations for civic education, Rousseau is animated by such an ulterior philosophic motive. Indeed, we 
would submit that this is among the most important differences between the Rousseauian and Socratic 
treatments of civic education. Scholars who do not recognize this important but understated aspect of the latter 
have been more impressed by its similarity to the former, e.g., Maloy, “Very Order of Things,” 258-60. 
 164 
Yet, even if citizens are indoctrinated in the laws, they are not made simply or 
altogether thoughtless or docile, as some scholars have suggested.210 While citizens’ education 
in the laws might not lead them actively to exercise their right to alter, abolish, or add to the 
laws, it will lead them actively to enforce and defend the laws over and against those who 
would violate them. In emphasizing the active dimension of Rousseauian citizenship, Kelly 
observes that “[f]ocus on the formative role of governments can distract attention from what 
is, in fact, a constant feature of Rousseau’s thought: a radical suspicion of all governments.”211 
To be sure, such focus can do this. But it need not. For if, in focusing on the formative role of 
governments, one recognizes that governments form citizens into patriotic lovers of the laws, 
one will see that, precisely in forming citizens, governments plant the seeds for precisely such 
a radical suspicion of themselves. 
Relatedly, Rousseau speaks favorably of civic educational institutions and practices 
that entail the exercise and cultivation of the prudence necessary for actively enforcing and 
defending the laws. Praise for educational institutions wherein the young are given practice in 
interpreting, applying, and executing the laws recur in Rousseau’s writings.212 Granted, these 
institutions are more obviously designed for the education of magistrates than for that of 
simple citizens. And one of them is limited to a class of hereditary nobility.213 But there is 
nothing in Rousseau’s praise of this institution to suggest that he approves of it because of its 
exclusivity. Rousseau’s praise for this institution and for others like it give no reason to doubt 
that, in a well-ordered republic in which magistracy is open to all citizens, all citizens should 
 
210 For scholarship that emphasizes the thoughtlessness and docility of Rousseauian citizenship, see Crocker, 
Rousseau’s “Social Contract”; Cullen, Freedom in Rousseau’s Political Philosophy, esp. 27-30; Johnston, Encountering 
Tragedy; Shklar, Men and Citizens, esp. 180-83; and Trachtenberg, Making Citizens, 230-46. 
211 Rousseau as Author, 121. 
212 In reference to the Spartans and Xenophon’s Old Persians, see FD / ŒC 3: 24-25n2 / CW 2: 18n2. In 
reference to the Romans, see E 4 / ŒC 4: 544 / CW 13: 406-407. And, in reference to a modern people, the 
Bernese, see (GP 4 / ŒC 3: 968-69 / CW 11: 181-82). Rousseau recommends the adoption of this Bernese 
practice to the Poles. 
213 This leads Trachtenberg to criticize Rousseau’s approval of this institution as inegalitarian (Making Citizens, 
283n21). Cf. Gourevitch, “Recent Work on Rousseau,” 552. 
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be given practice in the interpretation, application, and execution of the laws. The character 
and extent of the activity and independent judgment entailed in citizenship is well reflected in 
the inclusion in Rousseau’s civic educational recommendations of institutions that give citizens 
practice in these things and the exclusion from those recommendations of institutions that 
might give citizens comparable practice in making laws, e.g., mock legislative assemblies. 
Rousseau’s praise for Geneva’s informal recreational and civic associations, the circles, 
serves as further evidence that there is a place in his conception of civic education for the 
exercise and cultivation of the prudence necessary for actively enforcing and defending the 
laws. The spirit of the circles, which originally was more recreational, became more civic in 
reaction to certain “civil discords” that beset Geneva. They became the site of cold-blooded 
deliberations, of “grave and serious discourse” about, among other things, “the fatherland” 
and “virtue” wherein their members’ “mind[s] acquired precision and vigor” and a “tone of 
sense and reason [were] made to reign” (LD / ŒC 5: 90, 96 / CW 10: 323-24, 328). Admitting 
that Rousseau’s praise for the circles, thus characterized, is at odds with his thesis that 
“cognitive development is not the goal of public education at all,” Trachtenberg dismisses this 
praise as the exception that proves the rule.214 This dismissal is unsustainable, and this thesis 
is therefore too extreme, in light of Rousseau’s recommendations that reasoned preambles be 
attached to the laws and that young citizens be given practice in interpreting, applying, and 
executing the laws. It would be more accurate to say that, while cognitive development is a 
goal of public education, it is subordinate to the moral development required for the 
generalization of citizens’ wills. Citizens’ intellects are to be developed to the point that they 
become capable of prudently attending to the interpretation, application, and execution of the 
 
214 Making Citizens, 231-32, 237. 
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legislator’s laws but not to the point that they become capable of engaging in deeply critical 
reflection on those laws.215 
2. Honoring, Taking Pride in, and Emulating National Heroes 
Educating citizens to patriotism entails suffusing their lives not only with the laws but 
also with the history of their fatherland. Rousseau indicates the principal intended effect of 
citizens’ education in history at the end of the passage quoted above from the Government of 
Poland: There ought not to “have been in all of Poland either a beautiful action or an illustrious 
man with which [the Pole’s] memory and heart are not full, and about which he cannot give 
an account at a moment’s notice” (GP 4 / ŒC 3: 966 / CW 11: 180). What the citizen is to 
know thoroughly, and be moved by profoundly, about his fatherland’s history are, in a word, 
its heroes and their heroic deeds.216 Every citizen is, as Smith puts it, “to major in the subject 
of Polish heroism.”217 Adhering to Rousseau’s characterization of patriotism as love of the 
laws, we can identify multiple distinct but related ways that learning about these parts of history 
serves to intensify citizens’ love of the laws and, crucially, to bring that love into action. 
First, the fatherland’s heroes and their deeds testify, in different ways, to the goodness 
of its laws. Let us recall the indispensable contribution to the establishment and the endurance 
of the laws made by the great soul of the legislator (SC 2.7 / ŒC 3: 384 / CW 4: 157). Whether 
citizens continue to take the greatness of the legislator’s soul as evidence of the divinity of the 
laws or come to take it as evidence of the human wisdom and genius with which they were in 
fact devised, knowing of his great soul will inspire love of the laws. Knowledge of citizens 
 
215 For a study of Rousseauian civic education that argues for the importance of cultivating independent 
judgment in citizens, but which, at least in terms of emphasis, goes further in this direction that we do here, see 
Schaeffer, Rousseau on Education, Freedom, and Judgment, Chap. 8. 
216 In the fragment “History of Lacedaemonia,” Rousseau contends, over and against the morally detached 
spirit of modern historians, that “the principal utility of history” is “to make all good people loved with ardor 
and all wicked people hated” (PF 13 / ŒC 3: 545 / CW 4: 65). For an extensive treatment of heroism in 
Rousseau’s thought on which we draw amply in what follows, see Kelly, Rousseau as Author, Chap. 4. 
217 “Nationalism, Virtue, and the Spirit of Liberty,” 426. 
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who, following the founding, performed great, and especially sacrificial, deeds in defense of 
the laws inspires love of the laws by testifying to their goodness in two other ways. First, such 
knowledge shows that the laws are so good as to have formed such estimable men. Second, it 
shows that the laws are so good as to have inspired these estimable men to perform great and 
even sacrificial deeds in their service.  The study of history and the study of the laws reinforce 
one another in fostering patriotism. Persuaded, and to some extent convinced, of the goodness 
of the laws by their study of them, citizens will esteem those in their history who established 
and preserved the laws. (Thus, study of the laws helps to guard against a politically problematic 
tendency, which Rousseau explores in the Discourse on the Virtue Most Necessary for a Hero, of 
human beings to esteem as heroic those who display such beautiful qualities as independence 
and power in unjust ways.) At the same time, the knowledge that these figures who had 
estimable qualities apart from patriotism, e.g., power and independence, were formed by and 
devoted themselves to the laws will cause citizens to esteem the laws still more highly. 
The study of the fatherland’s heroic history fosters patriotism in another way that is 
supportive of, but less immediately tied to, citizens’ love of the laws. In explaining how 
patriotism might be fostered in Poland, Rousseau urges, “always begin by giving the Poles a 
great opinion of themselves and their fatherland.” He goes on to recommend that this be 
done, specifically, by celebrating the Poles who defended the fatherland against Russia (GP 3 
/ ŒC 3: 961 / CW 11: 175).218 This advice is informed by the psychological principle 
articulated in the Constitution for Corsica that members of a people can take pride in their 
 
218 Rousseau insists that all of Poland’s defenders in this episode, “even those who subsequently might have 
betrayed the common cause,” be celebrated (GP 3 / ŒC 3: 961 / CW 11: 175). From this, Smith concludes 
that the civic education that Rousseau recommends to the Poles “presents a soldier’s virtues in times of danger 
as being far more important than other virtues, including justice and even civic attachment itself” 
(“Nationalism, Virtue, and the Spirit of Liberty,” 426). Thus, he suggests, contrary to our argument above, that 
citizens’ education in honoring heroes is in tension with their education in loving the laws. Perhaps, there is 
something to this. Then again, it stands to reason that these heroes will be honored not only for the soldierly 
virtues but also for the justice and civic attachment that they displayed in this episode. Even eventual traitors will 
be honored because, in the moment of the fatherland’s greatest need, they were just and civically attached. 
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collective independence and power (CC / ŒC 3: 938 / CW 11: 154). And it is dictated, partly, 
by the imperative of inducing citizens to conceive of themselves as parts of the whole 
constituted by their fatherland so that their wills might be generalized. To the extent that 
presenting the fatherland to citizens as independent and powerful will induce them to conceive 
of themselves in this way by appealing to their pride, the study of its heroic history will serve 
to generalize wills. And to the extent that citizens have been persuaded that the good of the 
whole depends upon the laws, the study of this will thereby foster love of the laws. This is one 
way in which pride, which might otherwise discourage human beings from obedience to law, 
can be manipulated to encourage it. 
Second, and partly because the study of history thus intensifies citizens’ love of the 
laws, this study will help to bring this love into action. Inculcating knowledge of and esteem 
for national heroes is one of the ways that a spirit of what Rousseau calls “emulation” is to be 
fostered in citizens. The spirit of emulation, which Rousseau’s recommendations in the 
Government of Poland are particularly designed to foster,219 can be understood as a civically 
salutary form of amour-propre, which, when properly directed through civic education, leads 
citizens voluntarily to fulfill their duties. It is constructed out of the moral ideas according to 
which human beings esteem themselves and others, e.g., merit and beauty; the desire to be 
estimable; the desire to be esteemed by, and therefore to seem estimable to, others; and the 
imagination. Human beings are moved to emulation in the following way. One encounters 
another whose qualities one esteems and are esteemed by others. Moved by the desires to be 
similarly estimable and to be esteemed, one imagines that one is that man or at least that one 
possesses his estimable and esteemed qualities. And one seeks to fulfill those desires by striving 
to become the man whom one imagines oneself to be. 
 
219 It also plays a part in Rousseau’s recommendations to the Corsicans (CC / ŒC 3: 919 / CW 11: 138-39). 
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 In the spirit of emulation, we are confronted with a concrete instance of the denaturing 
entailed in civic education. Tellingly, Emile’s study of history is designed precisely to prevent 
him from having the psychic experience that gives rise to this spirit. After acknowledging, in 
a gesture to the alternative represented by civic education, that fostering a spirit of emulation 
through the study of history “has certain advantages that [he does] not deny,” Rousseau insists, 
“as for [his] Emile, if it happens even once that, in these parallels, he should like to be another 
more than himself, be that other Socrates, be he Cato, all is lost; the man who begins to 
become a stranger to himself does not take long to forget himself entirely” (E 4 / ŒC 4: 535 
/ CW 13: 398-99). The effect of self-alienation that Rousseau attributes to this pedagogical 
practice and here presents as a grave danger for Emile is precisely what recommends it for 
citizens. In the spirit of emulation, we also find further evidence for our argument that the 
denaturing entailed in civic education extends the denaturing effects of history. All the 
unnatural psychic components of this spirit are generated by historical accidents that give rise 
to or follow from the emergence of nascent society. The task of the civic educator is to select 
and effectively expose citizens to edifying models of emulation. 
Kelly points out that Rousseau’s understanding of the psychic dynamic at work in the 
spirit of emulation and of its promise for civic education comes, at least partly, from his own 
lifelong experience of reflecting on the heroes of antiquity, which he relates in Book I of the 
Confessions and the fragment “Parallel between the Two Republics of Sparta and Rome.”220 He 
writes in the latter: 
I please myself in turning my eyes to these venerable images of antiquity where I see 
men elevated by sublime institutions to the highest degree of greatness and virtues 
that human wisdom might reach. The soul is raised in its turn and courage is 
inflamed in wandering through these respectable monuments; one participates in 
some way in the heroic actions of these great men, it seems that the meditation on 
their greatness communicates a part of it to us, and one could say about their person 
 
220 Kelly, Rousseau as Author, 88-89. 
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and their speeches what Pythagoras said about the simulacra of the Gods, that they 
give a new soul to those who approach them in order to collect their oracles. (PF 
12.1 / ŒC 3: 538 / CW 4: 60) 
In the Confessions, Rousseau indicates more clearly what it means to be given a new soul in this 
way. He attributes his “free and republican spirit,” his “untamable and proud character,”221 
and his “[impatience] with yoke and servitude” to reading Plutarch’s Lives and discussing them 
with his father (C 1 / ŒC 1: 9 / CW 5: 8). Thus, Rousseau knows from experience that the 
study of heroic figures from history can have morally transformative effects, and, in particular, 
can foster the vigorous love of freedom necessary for citizenship. 
We can identify multiple conditions under which the effectiveness of this study will be 
enhanced. First, citizens whose heroes come from their own nation’s history will be able more 
easily to identify with, imagine themselves as, and emulate their heroes than Rousseau. 
Accordingly, while appeals to the heroes of antiquity are hardly absent from the Government of 
Poland, Rousseau urges the Poles, as we noted above, to look to themselves, specifically, to the 
Confederates of Bar who, in 1768, “saved the dying fatherland” by resisting would-be Russian 
despots, for their heroes (GP 3 / ŒC 3: 961 / CW 11: 175).222 Second, the overwhelming 
power of public opinion in a well-ordered republic will be such as to prevent citizens from 
encountering alternative models of emulation by which they might win esteem. Third, citizens 
will have regular occasion to emulate their heroes in practice, partly in response to political 
necessity and partly through participation in various communal activities that, as we will 
discuss below, are designed to prepare citizens to respond to such necessity and to foster 
patriotism. Fourth, and finally, the formal and informal distribution of honor for virtuous 
 
221 Note that these are the very two same qualities that Rousseau attributes to the men who first established 
nascent government and who, he argues, could not conceivably have voluntarily submitted to the will of 
another without reservation (SD / ŒC 3: 180 / CW 3: 56). 
222 Kelly, Rousseau as Author, 75, 109; Schaeffer, “Realism, Rhetoric, and the Possibility of Reform, 394; 
Trachtenberg, Making Citizens, 237. 
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conduct will give grounds for citizens to hope that, in emulating their heroes, they, too, will 
be esteemed. 
This last consideration brings us to the question of how citizens will be taught about 
their national heroes. Merely being taught about national heroes gives citizens some ground 
to hope that, in emulating their heroes, they, too, will be esteemed. For from this they can 
infer that virtuous citizens are honored partly by the mere fact that they are not forgotten after 
their deaths. Of course, prudent legislators and magistrates will take care to show citizens that 
the virtuous are honored by being not merely remembered but admired by the public after 
their deaths. For this reason, as well as for others, it is not principally through the reading of 
books as schoolchildren that citizens will learn about their history. Far better are public 
ceremonies and spectacles in which citizens gather together to celebrate their heroes. For, at 
such ceremonies and spectacles, citizens witness one another honoring national heroes. 
Accordingly, Rousseau recommends that the Poles make it a practice to hold such a ceremony 
in honor of the Confederates of Bar (GP 3 / ŒC 3: 961 / CW 11: 175-76). And he praises the 
ancient legislators for instituting “spectacles that, in recalling to them the history of their 
ancestors, their misfortunes, their virtues, their victories, interested their hearts, enflamed 
them with a lively emulation, and strongly attached them to that fatherland with which they 
were ceaselessly occupied.” The examples Rousseau goes on to give, i.e., of public recitations 
of “the poems of Homer” and of public performances of “the tragedies of Aeschylus, of 
Sophocles, and of Euripides,” make clear that citizens ought to learn their history through, or 
as, poetry (GP 2 / ŒC 3: 958 / CW 11: 173). Dramatized by poets, history will be more 
engaging and edifying to citizens.223 Imparting scientific knowledge of historical fact is beside 
 
223 We note with some surprise that in this chapter in which Sparta is featured as a model of civic education, 
Rousseau praises Athenian tragedy. This is a rare, albeit implicit, suggestion from Rousseau that more thought 
can be tolerated, or even encouraged, in a good political community than was tolerated or encouraged in 
Sparta. And it qualifies the apparently unqualified critique of Athens relative to Sparta in the First Discourse (FD 
/ ŒC 3: 12-13 / CW 2: 9). We also note, with less surprise, that Rousseau does not include Athenian comedy 
in the ancient spectacles that he here endorses. 
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the point. Rousseau’s praise of the civic use to which poetry was put among the ancients, 
underscores the fact that it is not art as such but rather art, as practiced and promoted among 
the moderns, that he is attacking in the First Discourse and the Letter to D’Alembert.224 
On the basis of our discussion in this section, we can identify multiple distinct ways 
that pride can be appealed to for the promotion of dutiful citizenship. First, we saw that pride 
can, in encouraging citizens to conceive of themselves as parts of an independent and powerful 
fatherland, effectively generalize wills. Second, we saw that the desire to take pride in oneself 
and to be esteemed by one’s fellow citizens as a distinct individual can, when guided by edifying 
models, lead citizens to fulfill their duties under the social contract. Now, to the extent that, 
in this latter case, it is with a view to winning esteem for themselves as individuals, i.e., as 
distinguished from their fellows and from the fatherland, that they fulfill their duties, one 
might doubt their patriotism. Indeed, in the Government of Poland, Rousseau recognizes that, 
should his recommendations be adopted, many Poles will fulfill their duties merely as a means 
to winning honor for themselves (GP 11). His plan for a meritocratic system for advancement 
in governmental service is meant partly to appeal to such amour-propre as it is, especially at first. 
Rousseau explains: “Not being able to create new citizens at a stroke, one must begin by 
making use of those that exist; and to offer a new route to their ambition is the means of 
disposing them to follow it” (GP 15 / ŒC 3: 1040-41 / CW 11: 240).225 
Two considerations serve to qualify the impression given by this statement. First, as 
Rousseau notes elsewhere, the efficacy of appeals to individual amour-propre as means to the 
promotion of dutiful citizenship is predicated upon there being a certain number of citizens 
 
224 One finds, upon examination of the Second Part of the First Discourse, that Rousseau’s critique of the arts is 
far more limited than his critique of the sciences (FD / ŒC 3: 17-25 / CW 2: 12-19). And, in the Letter to 
D’Alembert, little examination is required to see that, much of Rousseau’s case against the introduction of the 
theater to Geneva consists in showing the moral and civic inferiority of modern French drama to ancient 
drama (LD / ŒC 5: 25-53, esp. 31, 48-50 / CW 10: 270-93, esp. 275, 289-91). See Kelly, Rousseau as Author, 73-
74. 
225 Recommendations in this spirit are also present in the Constitution for Corsica (CC / ŒC 3: 919, 925, 934 / 
CW 11: 138-39, 143-44, 151). 
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who are so virtuous as to esteem dutiful citizenship (GP 13 / ŒC 3: 1022 / CW 11: 225). 
Second, the institutions and practices of civic education that Rousseau recommends—along 
with the meritocratic system for advancement in governmental service—to the Poles are 
meant not merely to appeal to but to transform citizens’ amour-propre.226 This is not to say that 
they will cease in their desire to take pride in themselves or to be esteemed by their fellow 
citizens as distinct individuals. But it is to say that they will desire these things in a different 
spirit.227 It will not be an utterly selfish desire to be esteemed by anyone and everyone that 
motivates them but the patriotic desire to be esteemed, specifically, by their fellow citizens or 
their fatherland. Much like the romantic lover’s desire to be loved by his beloved, which arises, 
in part, from his love of his beloved, this desire arises in part from their esteem for their fellow 
citizens or their fatherland.228 This points to another distinct but closely related way that 
presenting the fatherland in an estimable light can foster patriotism by appealing to citizens’ 
pride. In this case, the citizen’s esteem for his fatherland induces him not to conceive of 
himself as part of the fatherland but to desire and seek out its esteem through emulation. He 
does so for himself as an individual, but still he is a patriot. While these kinds of pride can be 
distinguished from one another analytically, it is surely the case that, in the psyches of actual 
citizens, they coexist, albeit in different measures.  
 
226 On the relation between these two parts of what Rousseau recommends to the Poles, see Schaeffer, 
“Realism, Rhetoric, and the Possibility of Reform.” 
227 On one hand, Hanley’s and Smith’s interpretations do not adequately emphasize this. See, respectively, 
“Enlightened Nation-Building,” 228-30 and “Nationalism, Virtue, and the Spirit of Liberty” 428-31. On the 
other hand, Trachtenberg goes too far in suggesting that the citizen’s “amour-propre” will “be directed” not at all 
toward himself “as an individual” but only toward himself “as a member of [his] community” (Making Citizens, 
133). 
228 In the Discourse on Political Economy, “the love of the fatherland” is compared to “that of a mistress.” 
Rousseau reports that the former is “one hundred times more lively and delightful” than the latter (DPE / ŒC 
3: 255 / CW 3: 151). We would suggest that this is because patriotism can stimulate amour-propre much more 
intensely than romantic love. And, as we have seen, Rousseau rates the power of this passion much more 
highly than the others that make up romantic love. 
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B. The Civic Festival 
The public manner in which citizens are to celebrate national heroes points us to 
another important way that they are to be exposed to the fatherland and made into patriots. 
In attending these ceremonies and spectacles, citizens are exposed not only to the heroes who 
have formed and been formed by the fatherland but also to one another in their unity as a 
people, specifically, with respect to their opinions about who and what is estimable. Thus, the 
fatherland is manifest not only before citizens in whatever dramas are acted out, songs sung, 
symbols displayed, or speeches delivered but also around them in one another. The fatherland 
is both being represented to citizens and present in the citizens themselves. 
Exposing citizens to the fatherland by exposing them to one another in various 
communal practices is a crucial part of fostering patriotism. Hence, Rousseau recommends, in 
addition to the ceremonies and spectacles we have just described, amusements such as singing, 
dancing, and game-playing, physical exercises, and athletic competitions.229 These practices are 
the elements out of which the ultimate institution of civic education—the festival—is 
composed. In this section, we will show how the festival, which Starobinski has recognized as 
“one of the key images in Rousseau’s work,”230 complements citizens’ instruction in the laws 
and history of their fatherland to foster patriotism. First, we will show how it reinforces the 
edifying effects of celebrating national heroes by giving citizens occasion and additional 
encouragement to esteem and emulate qualities essential to obeying, enforcing, and defending 
the laws of the fatherland, e.g., patriotism, vigor, and docility. Second, we will show how, in 
engaging citizens in practices by which they can extend and sense their existences through 
activity, it attaches them to the public life of the fatherland. Third, we will show how it causes 
citizens to conceive of themselves as parts of the fatherland in an alternative way, namely, by 
 
229 DPE / ŒC 3: 259-62 / CW 3: 154-57; GP 2, 3, 4 / ŒC 3: 958, 962-64, 966-70 / CW 11: 173, 176-78, 179-
82; LD / ŒC 5: 114-25 / CW 10: 343-52. 
230 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 93.  
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extending their beings, or selves, to, and identifying with, one another. Finally, we will 
conclude by arguing that, in doing all these things, the festival does not merely serve as an 
institution of civic education and thus as a means to the promotion of dutiful citizenship, but 
also and more importantly constitutes the peak of civic life. 
1. Pride and Emulation 
The cultivation of patriotic pride and emulation through public ceremonies and 
spectacles honoring national heroes is reinforced in multiple distinct but related ways by other 
communal practices, above all, athletic competitions, that take place at the festival. Before 
discussing the educational significance of these particular practices, we would do well to note 
the close connection, in Rousseau’s thought, between amour-propre and the festival. The festival 
is almost as ancient as human society itself. Recall the scenes of the savages of nascent society, 
at their leisure, singing and dancing together around trees that we encountered in the Second 
Discourse and the Essay on the Origin of Languages. In those scenes, we witnessed the first festivals. 
To recognize this is to detect an important similarity between the relatively natural way of life 
of savage nascent society, and also, for that matter, of its later iteration in rustic peasant society, 
and the otherwise unnatural way of life of civil society.231 The full significance of this similarity 
will come to light gradually over the course of our discussion of the festival. For now, we limit 
ourselves to the observations that it was romantic love that engendered the primitive festival 
and that it was in the primitive festival that incipient amour-propre finally reached maturity.232 
We see, in this light, that the development of the festival and the development of amour-propre 
are bound up with one another. 
 
231 Shklar, Men and Citizens, 110-11; Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Chap. 5. 
232 Amour-propre is emphasized in the Second Discourse whereas romantic love is emphasized in the Essay on the 
Origin of Languages. Compare SD / ŒC 3: 169-70 / CW 3: 47 and EOL 9 / ŒC 5: 405-406 / CW 7: 315. 
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So, in recommending the institution of festivals with a view to directing amour-propre 
to civic ends, Rousseau is effectively recommending the restoration or preservation of the 
stage on which this passion most naturally, and happily, plays. Given that human beings in 
society take to the festival of their own accord, instituting it is primarily a matter of preventing 
other forces from opposing this tendency, by, for example, preventing the introduction of 
alternative entertainments such as the theater to civil society. Indeed, in the Letter to D’Alembert, 
Rousseau suggests that, in a prosperous republic, it suffices simply to erect a pole and gather 
citizens around it in order for them to give themselves over to singing and dancing (LD / ŒC 
5: 115 / CW 10: 344). The human penchant for the festival is partly a manifestation of the 
desire to be esteemed by others. Simply by allowing citizens to follow this penchant, the 
legislator facilitates their subjection to one another’s opinions and, in so doing, contributes to 
the formation of a uniform public opinion. His provision for the celebration of national heroes 
augments this penchant to the extent that, in giving citizens a great opinion of themselves and 
their fatherland, it intensifies their desire to be esteemed by their fellows. 
But Rousseau recommends that the legislator do more than merely allow citizens to 
follow their penchant for the festival in pursuit of esteem. He recommends the institution of 
particular practices that lead citizens to esteem and be esteemed by one another in ways that 
foster patriotism and other essential civic qualities. In the Government of Poland, as well as in the 
Letter to D’Alembert, Rousseau recommends all manner of public games, especially athletic 
competitions. In one of his “Fragments on Ancient History,” Rousseau observes that “the 
Olympic games” were “one of the means that preserved the love of freedom in Greece for 
the longest time” (PF 14.6 / ŒC 3: 550 / CW 4: 69). What follows will explain the thought 
underlying this observation. 
There are multiple ways that public athletic competitions reinforce the patriotic pride 
and spirit of emulation fostered by the study and celebration of national heroes. First, they 
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intensify the hope of being esteemed, as well as, for that matter, the fear of being disesteemed, 
by showing citizens that public esteem is regularly attainable during their lives, not only after 
death. Consider, in this connection, Rousseau’s recommendation that the physical education 
of children take the form of games played before the public, by whose “judgment and 
acclamation” the “prizes and recompenses of the victors” are to be “distributed.” Thus, 
citizens are to be “[accustomed] early…to living under the eyes of their fellow citizens and of 
desiring public approbation.” The importance of accustoming citizens to this can, as 
Trachtenberg observes, be seen in Rousseau’s insistence that children must always play 
together and in public and that parents who might educate their children domestically in other 
matters must send them to participate in public games (GP 4 / ŒC 3: 968 / CW 181).233 
Second, they present citizens with models to emulate that they can see with their own eyes, 
and need not imagine, in the form of the honored victors. Thus, they help to accomplish the 
central civic educational task of forming citizens’ opinions about what is estimable. Third, they 
give citizens regular occasion to practice emulating these models in the hope of being similarly 
esteemed themselves.234 
Although, in an obvious way, public athletic competitions reinforce citizens’ natural 
conceptions of themselves as individuals, they do so in a way that is relatively safe for civic 
life. For, even as they divide participants in compelling them to relate to one another as others, 
as givers of and rivals for an esteem that they desire for themselves as individuals, they bind 
them to one another by increasing the extent to which they depend on one another for the 
fulfillment of their desires. At the same time, they support the opinion, especially among 
spectators but also among participants, that the fatherland is estimable by putting its members’ 
 
233 Making Citizens, 235. 
234 In emphasizing the pride and spirit of emulation fostered by public athletic competitions, we conceive of 
their principal educational effects rather differently from Smith, who argues that they are designed principally 
to foster, among the many, who are weak, a sense of vulnerability and dependence on the few, who are strong, 
and therewith an inclination to obey those few (“Nationalism, Virtue, and the Spirit of Liberty,” 426). 
 178 
excellent qualities on display. In doing this, they reinforce the effects of celebrating national 
heroes. They can encourage citizens to conceive of themselves as parts of the fatherland by 
appealing to their pride. And they also can further intensify their desire to be esteemed by the 
fatherland as individuals. 
The qualities in which the victors of athletic games will tend most obviously to excel 
and which will therefore tend most obviously to be honored and emulated by other citizens 
are well captured in the formulation “strength and skill [la force et l’adresse],” which recurs 
throughout the discussion of athletic competitions in Chapter III of the Government of Poland. 
Citizens who most excel in physical strength and the capacity, arising from intelligence and 
coordination, to exercise that strength effectively will tend to be victorious in such athletic 
competitions as bullfighting, for which Rousseau praises the Spanish, horsemanship, which he 
recommends to the Poles, and the medieval knight’s tournament, the obsolescence of which 
he laments (GP 3 / ŒC 3: 963 / CW 11: 177). This applies also to the athletic competitions 
that Rousseau goes on to recommend for the physical education of schoolchildren (GP 4 / 
ŒC 3: 967-68 / CW 11: 181). Peoples among whom such competitions are regularly held and 
who consequently come to emulate these citizens, will make for more effective soldiers and 
thus better defenders of the fatherland and its laws. 
There is another, less obvious but more important, way that the institution of such 
public athletic competitions makes for better citizens. It fosters the youthful vigor that is, as 
we discussed in Chapter 2, necessary for the preservation of freedom under law. “It is above 
all because of the soul,” Rousseau contends, “that the body must be exercised, and this is what 
our petty wise men are far from seeing.” The painful exertions entailed in athletic competition 
strengthen the soul along with the body. Specifically, they habituate citizens to foregoing 
objects of their various appetites for well-being, objects for the sake of which they otherwise 
might be disinclined to obey, enforce, or defend the laws. Rousseau indicates that his 
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recommendation that citizens be kept occupied with physical exercises is meant to protect 
them against the corruption caused by intellectual leisure just as much as, if not more than, 
that caused by indulgence in sensual pleasures: “[T]he taste for bodily exercises turns one away 
from a dangerous idleness, effeminate pleasures and the luxury of the mind” (emphasis added) 
(GP 3 / ŒC 3: 964 / CW 11: 177-78).235 We are put in mind of the First Discourse’s attack on 
scientific and artistic leisure for its degradation of martial vigor (FD / ŒC 3: 22-24 / CW 2: 
16-17). All this helps to explain why Rousseau, in insisting on the importance of the physical, 
as distinguished from the intellectual, education of the young, characterizes this education as 
“negative” (GP 4 / ŒC 3: 968 / CW 11: 181). It prevents their natural vigor from being 
corrupted by, among other things, academic study.236 Now, we should add that public games 
foster this vigor not only by preventing that vigor from being corrupted or habituating citizens 
to undertaking strenuous and even painful physical exertions, but also by teaching citizens that 
having and demonstrating this quality is estimable and publicly esteemed. Seeing that the 
honored victors of public athletic competitions excel in a spiritual vigor that disposes them to 
forego well-being will induce citizens to strive to emulate them in this quality. 
Recall from our discussion of the qualities that render peoples suitable for legislation 
in Chapter 2 that vigor must be balanced with docility. As we have begun to see, the former 
quality figures much more prominently than the latter in Rousseau’s writings on public games. 
This is partly for the obvious reasons that physical exercises and athletic competitions foster 
vigor more than docility and that there are other aspects of civic education, e.g., the study of 
the laws, that do more to foster docility. We would submit that it is also because the tendency 
of human beings in society, even a well-ordered one, is to become excessively docile. Hence, 
 
235 Statements such as this lend support to Shklar’s exaggerated contention that there is “no time for reflection, 
idleness, and intellectuality in the good society” (Men and Citizens, 160). 
236 In this hardly unimportant respect, civic education is not simply or altogether denaturing and thus is not, 
contra Shklar (Ibid.), simply or altogether opposed to the education elaborated in the Emile, the prepubescent 
stage of which is characterized as “purely negative” (E 2 / ŒC 4: 323 / CW 13: 226). 
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there is a greater need to foster vigor and a lesser need to foster docility through civic 
education. 
Nevertheless, docility is not totally absent from the qualities fostered by the public 
games that Rousseau recommends. To desire and depend upon public esteem is, of course, to 
be docile in an important way. And to play games under public supervision is, of course, to be 
compelled to play by rules. Hence, “regulation” is one of the things to which children are to 
become accustomed in their public games. Recall that, as we noted above, these public games 
are to make up all their play. Playing “separately as they fancy” is not to be permitted (GP 4 / 
ŒC 3: 968 / CW 11: 181). Note that, if this maxim were followed perfectly—which, it should 
be acknowledged, would require that children be constantly supervised—children would know 
no amusement in which they were not subject to rules of some kind.237 To the habitual 
inclination to obedience that would arise from this, we can add the force of emulation. If or 
inasmuch as spectators recognize and honor as victors only those participants who play by the 
rules, children will come to esteem and emulate the same spirit of obedience to law required 
of them as citizens. This is another way in which civic education guards against the tendency 
of human beings to esteem as heroic those who are independent and powerful but not just. 
The ingeniousness of educating children for citizenship by having them play games 
with rules comes to sight when one recognizes that, at the same time as children are habituated 
and given a desire to play by rules themselves, they are also habituated and given a desire to 
obey nothing other than regulations that are promulgated and apply equally to all and, 
furthermore, to enforce rules against those who would disobey them. In this way, subjecting 
children to rules in the games they play fosters both docility and vigor. It complements their 
study of the laws by disposing them, by habit, esteem, and emulation, to obey, enforce, and 
 
237 This maxim might be adduced as evidence against Maloy’s claim that Rousseauian civic education is simply 
or altogether “mild” in its “character” and “methods” (“Very Order of Things,” 249-50). 
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defend the laws and thus to fulfill some of the essential duties of citizenship.238 Note, however, 
that it does nothing to dispose them to alter, abolish, or add to the laws and thus to exercise 
one of the essential rights of citizenship. In this way, too, it complements citizens’ study of 
the laws, which, as we have seen, is meant to make citizens reluctant to exercise this right, or, 
rather, to exercise it principally by affirming established laws. While Rousseau’s principles of 
political right might suggest that this is a limit of public games, the spirit of his writings on 
civic education suggest, on the contrary, that this, too, is a sign of their genius. 
 Thus far, we have shown that regular participation in public athletic competitions will 
foster some of the most important capacities and qualities that citizens need, along with 
patriotism, in order to obey, enforce, and defend the laws. This is not the only reason that 
Rousseau favors public athletic competitions for the promotion of a spirit of emulation, 
however. He does so also on the grounds that they are likely to produce a just consensus 
concerning the distribution of public honors.  
Now, two considerations might seem to argue against the importance of this. First, a 
just consensus concerning the distribution of honor will emerge almost inevitably in the case 
of most athletic competitions, which tend to end with clear winners and losers. Second, the 
tendency, arising from the desire for esteem, to defer to and adopt for oneself the opinions of 
others about what is estimable results, as we explained in Chapter 2, in relative uniformity of 
opinion in societies. Neither of these considerations, whether taken on its own or together 
with the other, suffices to dispense with the problem, however. For, in the first place, if the 
citizens who are honored in society are those who are victorious in public competitions, it is 
important that the achievement of victory in those competitions testify to qualities that are 
estimable. Otherwise, the distribution of public honor would be regarded, at best, with 
 
238 Scholarly treatments of the children’s games that Rousseau recommends to the Poles have not adequately 
accounted for this aspect of their educational function and thus have tended to overstate the extent to which 
they are meant to foster docility. See, e.g., Smith “Nationalism, Virtue, and the Spirit of Liberty,” 426; 
Trachtenberg, Making Citizens, 235-37. 
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indifference or, at worst, with indignation. In either case, the hope for public esteem would 
not be felt intensely enough to inspire the spirit of emulation required for good citizenship. 
Now, one might appeal to the second consideration and object that most human beings will 
be moved by the desire for esteem, which, in most, is much more powerful than the desire to 
be estimable, to accept as estimable whatever qualities are testified to by victory and come to 
be esteemed. There may be something to this, assuming, that is, that Rousseau is correct in 
attributing so much more power to the desire to be esteemed than the desire to be estimable. 
Then again, the former desire, precisely because it is so powerful, can, as we saw in Chapter 2, 
move human beings indignantly to claim esteem when it has been denied to them. And while 
Rousseau’s description of this phenomenon suggests that human beings need not have strong 
grounds in order to be moved to make such claims, it stands to reason that the greater the 
divergence between what is esteemed by the public and what human beings are disposed to 
find estimable there is, the more frequent and violent the making of such claims will be. 
 There is reason, then, to think that a just, or seemingly just, consensus concerning the 
distribution of honors will emerge if the achievement of victory in public competitions testifies 
to qualities that human beings are disposed to find estimable. When we recall that it was man’s 
consciousness of his strength and skill relative to that of other animals that caused the first 
movements of pride in him or, relatedly, that “there is nothing more really beautiful than 
independence and power,” we can see that athletic games are particularly well chosen 
competitions (SD / ŒC 3: 165-66 / CW 3: 43-44; CC / ŒC 3: 938 / CW 11: 154). For the 
victors in such competitions, and therefore some of the most honored citizens, are likely to 
be widely regarded as estimable in important respects and therefore deserving of their honors. 
This points to an important way in which the inclusion of athletic competitions in the festivals 
that Rousseau recommends for the civil state improves on the festival of nascent society, from 
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which such competition seems to be absent. It serves to regulate amour-propre in a way that 
guards against the violent and cruel vengeances that this passion produced as soon as it arose.  
2. Self-Extension through Activity and Identification 
In our discussion of civic education thus far, we have focused on the ways that citizens 
can be brought to love and seek the good of their fatherlands through institutions and practices 
that appeal to their amour-propre. In this section, we will show how citizens can be brought to 
do these things through institutions and practices that appeal to their self-love, or, more 
specifically, to the drive to extend themselves, or their existences, through the activity of their 
faculties and through identification with one another.239 Thus, we will show that the psychic 
basis for dutiful citizenship laid by civic education is made up of a mutually reinforcing 
combination of pride in oneself, both, as we have now seen, as a part of one’s fatherland and 
as an individual, and self-extension through activity and identification.240 
We begin with a brief account of Rousseau’s conception of self-extension, as disclosed 
in the Emile. Recall that, in the pure state of nature, human life mainly entails acting with a 
view to the preservation of one’s existence and sensing one’s existence at rest and in 
solitude.241 Although Rousseau’s famous account of his own experience recovering the 
sentiment of existence in the Reveries suggests that rest, or relative rest, and solitude are essential 
to it,242 one learns in the Emile that human beings can also extend and sense their existences 
through the activity of their faculties and through identification with others. Indeed, Rousseau 
here holds that it is in activity that man exists most fully and therefore senses his existence 
 
239 Here, then, we differ from scholars who have suggested that the citizen is possessed exclusively of amour-
propre. See, e.g., Cooper, Rousseau, Nature, and the Problem of the Good Life, 25; Shklar, Men and Citizens, 21. 
Trachtenberg rightly characterizes patriotism as entailing an “integration of amour de soi and amour-propre” 
(Making Citizens, 134). 
240 For studies that emphasize the psychology of self-extension in Rousseau’s thought more broadly, see 
Cooper, Rousseau, Nature, and the Problem of the Good Life and Melzer, Natural Goodness of Man. 
241 See SD / ŒC 3: 144 / CW 3: 28 and EOL IX / ŒC V: 401n / CW VII: 310n. 
242 R 5 / ŒC 1: 1045, 1047-48 / CW 8: 45, 47-48. 
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most fully. He sets this down a guiding principle of the education that he elaborates in this 
work, admonishing parents that it is “not enough” to “think only of preserving [their] child” 
in the sense of sparing him from death. He writes:  
It is less a matter of preventing him from dying than of making him live. To live, that 
is not to breathe, that is to act; that is to make use of our organs, of our senses, of 
our faculties, of all the parts of ourselves which give us the sentiment of our 
existence. The man who has lived the most is not the one who has counted the most 
years, but the one who has felt life the most. (E 1 / ŒC 4: 253 / CW 13: 167) 
This thought informs the subsequent account of “human wisdom or the route to true 
happiness” given in Book II. It specifically informs Rousseau’s qualification of his argument 
that happiness consists in, or arises from, an equal proportion of “faculties” to “desires.” 
Rousseau denies that human wisdom, or the route to true happiness, lies straightforwardly in 
“diminishing our desires” on the grounds that, “if they were beneath our power, a part of our 
faculties would remain idle, and we would not enjoy our whole being” (E 2 / ŒC 4: 303-304 
/ CW 13: 211). Thus, Rousseau implies that man senses his existence not only after he has 
acted to preserve it but also in acting to preserve it. The imperative arising from man’s love of 
his existence, and the sentiment of his existence, to exercise all his faculties drives him to 
engage in activity even when he wants for nothing. Hence, when man is in a state of psychic 
strength, that is, when his faculties outstrip his desires, he is driven to engage in activity simply 
to extend his being, as it were. Seemingly any activity can, in principle, satisfy this drive to self-
extension. As children develop, for example, they are driven to change the things around them, 
at first more destructively and then more constructively (E 1 / ŒC 4: 289 / CW 13: 197). 
Eventually, the imperative can take the form of thought (E 3 / ŒC 4:  / CW 13: 312). 
 This drive to self-extension can also take the form of identification with others. The 
psychology of this form of self-extension is more complicated and more significant for the 
promotion of patriotism. It will, accordingly, take up most of our attention in this section. But, 
before turning to this other form of self-extension, we note that many of the communal 
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practices that make up the festival, especially physical exercises and athletic competitions, serve 
as a civically salutary outlet for the drive to self-extension through activity. In addition to 
appealing to citizens’ amour-propre in the ways that we described above, athletic competitions 
engage citizens by enabling them to exercise their faculties and, in so doing, to extend and 
sense their existences. This element of Rousseau’s psychology figures much less prominently 
in his writings on civic education than pride and identification, but it is not altogether absent 
from them. Rousseau points to it when he argues for educating children through physical 
exercises on the grounds that such exercises will “please them in satisfying their bodies’ need 
to act while they are growing” (GP 4 / ŒC 3: 968 / CW 11: 181). Understanding the drive to 
self-extension through activity thus helps us to understand how citizens can be voluntarily 
engaged in communal practices that foster patriotic pride, patriotic identification, and other 
qualities essential to good citizenship. While appealing to this aspect of the human psyche thus 
tends to foster patriotism indirectly, it can also do so directly by fostering a love of the 
common life of the fatherland. Citizens will love the fatherland for the common life it affords 
them partly on the grounds that, in that life, it gives them occasion to act in ways that enable 
them to extend and sense their beings. 
As we have indicated, the drive to self-extension can also lead human beings to identify 
with one another. In order to understand the psychology of identification, we turn once again 
to Emile’s pubescent education and romantic love. The motivating force of romantic love, as 
Rousseau conceives it, does not derive exclusively from sexual need. It derives also from the 
drive to self-extension. In the pubescent youth, “a superabundance of life seeks to extend itself 
outward.” This explains how the tutor is able temporarily to substitute friendship for romantic 
love when Emile reaches puberty (E 4 / ŒC 4: 502 / CW 13: 371). If his desire for another 
were born exclusively of his sexuality, then it could not be satisfied, even temporarily, by 
friendship. A man extends his being to his friend in identifying himself with, or in, his friend. 
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When he encounters another with whom he can identify, i.e., one who seems similar to him 
in some way, he pours the being that is overflowing in him into that other. Having thus 
extended his existence to his friend, he loves his friend as he loves himself and loves their 
friendship because he, among other things, senses his existence through it. Emile’s education 
in friendship, thus conceived, serves as the foundation for his education in humanity and 
justice. Rousseau makes the moral and political significance of self-extension clear at the 
culmination of his treatment of this education:  
when the strength of an expansive soul makes me identify myself with my fellow 
[semblable] and I feel that I am, so to speak, in him, it is in order not to suffer that I 
do not want him to suffer; I interest myself in him for the love of myself, and the 
reason for the precept is in Nature herself, which inspires in me the desire for my 
well-being in whatever place I feel myself exist…Love of men derived from love of 
self is the principle of human justice.243 (E 4 / ŒC 4: 523n / CW 13: 389n) 
It is not surprising, then, that strengthening citizens’ souls and inducing them to extend their 
beings to, and identify with, one another should make up an important part of civic education. 
 The way that Emile, whose soul is strengthened over the course of his prepubescent 
education, is induced to identify with others is by being exposed to human suffering. It is as a 
fellow sufferer that Emile identifies with his fellow man. Compassion is the basis of his 
friendship, his humanity, and his justice. One is struck, in turning from the Emile to Rousseau’s 
writings on civic education, then, that the communal practices recommended there do not 
obviously involve fostering compassion by exposing citizens to one another as sufferers.244 
One can, upon reflection, see that some of these practices, e.g., physical exercises and athletic 
 
243 See, in the same vein, Rousseau’s account of natural right in the Preface to the Second Discourse (SD / ŒC 3: 
126 / CW 3: 15) and his description of self-love, as distinguished from amour-propre, in the same work (SD / 
ŒC 3: 219nXV / CW 3: 91n12). One can also see how self-extension gives rise to humanity in Rousseau’s final 
reflections on himself in the Reveries, e.g., R 7 / ŒC 1: 1056 / CW 8: 54. The Savoyard Vicar explains God’s 
justice along these lines (E 4 / ŒC 4: 588-89 / CW 13: 444). 
244 Smith sees one of the agricultural practices that Rousseau recommends to the Corsicans as being designed 
to foster compassion (“Nature, Nation-Building, and the Seasons of Justice,” 45-46). It may well be designed to 
do this. But, then—if this practice can be regarded as an element of civic education—we would say that it is the 
exception that proves the rule.  
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competitions, do involve various kinds of suffering. Participating in them may, then, foster 
identification in the form of compassion. But Rousseau never indicates that they are meant to 
do this. What is more, he so emphasizes, as we will see below, the joy that citizens are to take 
in practices that make up the festival as to cast doubt on this speculation. How, then, will the 
communal practices of the festival foster identification among citizens? 
 Rousseau asserts it as a maxim that “It is not in the human heart to put itself in the place of 
people who are happier than we, but only in those who are more pitiable.” But, in his explanation of this 
maxim, he admits:  
One is touched by the happiness of certain conditions, for example, of the rustic and 
pastoral life. The charm of seeing these good people happy is not poisoned with 
envy, one truly interests oneself in them. Why is that? Because one feels that one is 
master of descending to that condition of peace and innocence and of enjoying the 
same felicity. (E 4 / ŒC 4: 506 / CW 13: 375) 
The happiness of others keeps us from identifying with them only insofar as we think that we 
cannot share in that happiness. While civic life is distinct from the rustic and pastoral life to 
which Rousseau here refers,245 the happiness of both lives, specifically, the happiness taken in 
the festival, is, as we will explain below, inclusive. Therefore, it, too, can serve as a basis on 
which citizens might identify with one another. (Of course, the happiness of civic life is 
inclusive only for citizens and is exclusive for all others.) 
What is more, the citizen’s experience of identifying with a happy comrade can, like 
the pitier’s experience of identifying with a sufferer, appeal to his amour-propre. Although 
compassion depends upon the pitier’s having experienced suffering in the past and therefore 
upon his not being simply or altogether strong, one cannot pity another while one is suffering. 
Inasmuch as compassion therefore involves being conscious of one’s relative strength, it 
appeals to amour-propre (E 4 / ŒC 4: 503-504 / CW 13: 373). When a citizen encounters other 
 
245 For examples of this life and its happiness, see Rousseau’s descriptions of Clarens (J 5.7), Neufchatel (LD / 
ŒC 5: 55-57 / CW 10: 295-96), and Corsica and old Switzerland (CC / ŒC 3: 913-16 / CW 11: 133-35). 
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citizens who are partaking in a happiness that he, too, can partake in because he, too, is a part 
of the fatherland, his experience of identification with them, too, will be appealing to his amour-
propre.246 In this way, patriotic pride and patriotic identification are mutually reinforcing. 
In addition to making identification with their comrades more pleasant by thus 
appealing to their amour-propre, signs of national distinctiveness make it more likely that citizens 
will identify with one another—and not with foreigners—in the first place. Note that while 
we have “a natural repugnance to seeing any sensitive being perish or suffer,” we feel it 
“principally” toward “our fellows [semblables]” (SD / ŒC 3: 126 / CW 3: 15). Although 
Rousseau is referring to pity when he offers this observation, it stands to reason that the 
principle is true of all forms of identification. Human beings will more readily identify with 
one another, whether in their misery or their happiness, to the extent that they are similar to 
one another. A distinct but related condition favorable to identification is the frequency with 
which human beings encounter one another. Although identification works through the 
faculty of imagination, it is activated by the senses. “Existence is,” as Melzer writes, “somehow 
given and received primarily through the eyes.”247 All things being equal, we are more likely to 
identify with one who is present to our senses than one who is not. And we are still more likely 
to do so with one who is present to our senses frequently. 
These are among the considerations that inform Rousseau’s preference for small, 
distinctly homogeneous, and closed political communities. To the extent that all citizens in 
such communities habitually see one another and can easily see themselves in one another, 
patriotic identification is more likely to flourish in them. Rousseau praises the smallness of 
Geneva partly on the grounds that it makes possible “that sweet habit of seeing and knowing 
 
246 For an example of this, see Rousseau’s description of his father’s proudly patriotic reaction to the 
experience of witnessing his fellow citizens’ joyfully identifying with one another, and of identifying with them 
himself (LD / ŒC 5: 123-24n / CW 10: 351n). 
247 Natural Goodness of Man, 194. 
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one another” that “[makes] love of the Fatherland love of Citizens rather than that of the 
land” (SD / ŒC 3: 112 / CW 3: 3-4).248 And, in the Government of Poland, he admonishes the 
Poles, over and over again, to preserve and augment their national distinctiveness.249 It is no 
accident, then, that the one ancient people that is explicitly described in Chapter II of the 
Government of Poland as being united by “bonds of fraternity,” i.e., the Jews, is also the people 
whose legislator is most emphatically described as giving his people “mœurs and usages 
incompatible with those of other nations” and “particular rites and ceremonies,” i.e., Moses 
(GP 2 / ŒC 3: 956-57 / CW 11: 172). In artificially enhancing the distinctiveness of the Jews’ 
mœurs, Moses increased their similarity to one another and their dissimilarity to Gentiles in a 
way that made them more apt to identify closely with one another. 
It is striking that all the conditions favorable to identification that we have 
delineated—nationally distinctive homogeneity, a small population distributed over a small 
territory, and the inclusive happiness of rustic and pastoral life—obtain in nascent society.250 
These are some of the characteristics of peoples that retain “the simplicity of nature” that 
make those peoples especially suitable to receiving legislation (SC 2.10 / ŒC 3: 391 / CW 4: 
162). In recognizing this, we recognize again that the task of the legislator is partly to preserve 
or restore certain aspects of the state of nature, albeit in its final and thus least natural stage. 
Rousseau makes this explicit in a fragment on Corsica, in which he observes that “[t]he 
Corsicans are almost still in the natural and healthy state” and advises that “much art” will be 
required “to keep them there” (CC / ŒC 3: 950 / CW 11: 164). And, in the text, he urges 
 
248 See also DPE / ŒC 3: 254-55 / CW 3: 151. Note the partly explicit, partly implicit critique of blood-and-
soil nationalism contained in this statement. Patriotism ought not to be based on love of the soil. And the 
fraternity that it ought to be based on ought to arise from habitual encounters rather than from kinship. 
249 This theme runs throughout Chapters II-IV but is particularly emphasized in Chapter III. See also CC / 
ŒC 3: 913 / CW 11: 133. 
250 Note that these conditions tend not to obtain, at least not all together or to a high degree, in most modern 
nation-states. Along with Rousseau’s insistence on patriotism’s essential connection to republicanism, this 
consideration casts doubt on the extent to which Rousseau might have hoped for a revival of citizenship on the 
basis of nationalism. See note 183 above. 
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them to “return to [their] primitive state” (CC / ŒC 3: 915 / CW 11: 125). This helps to 
explain Rousseau’s singling out of Corsica as “the one country [in Europe] capable of 
legislation” immediately after he summarizes the qualities that a people must have in order to 
be so capable in the Social Contract. The quality that Rousseau explicitly attributes to the 
Corsicans when he does this is the vigor with which they had lately recovered and defended 
their freedom. Given that Rousseau attributes this same quality to the Poles and, largely for 
that reason, evinces hope for them, too, the question arises why does he not identify Poland, 
too, as a European country capable of legislation. We would suggest that it is largely, though 
not entirely, because the relatively natural conditions characteristic of nascent society that are 
favorable to identification do not obtain in Poland to the same degree as they obtain in 
Corsica.251 This difference is reflected in Rousseau’s emphasis on the promotion of patriotic 
pride in his educational recommendations to the Poles. To the extent that conditions there do 
not favor identification, pride must be relied upon for the promotion of patriotism.252 
Given the conditions that we have identified as favorable to identification, we can 
understand why Rousseau insists upon the importance of holding regular festivals in his 
writings on civic education. For the festival brings all citizens together, reminds them of their 
similarities, and gives them occasion to share in a common happiness.253 We need now to 
clarify the source of this common happiness. We acknowledge at the outset that, inasmuch as 
festivals are made up in no small part of athletic competitions, the happiness to be found in 
them is not simply or altogether inclusive.254 But, while the citizens who win these 
 
251 Smith speculates that, between the time that Rousseau wrote the Social Contract and the time that he wrote 
the Government of Poland, he had “become much less pessimistic about modern man’s prospects” (“Nationalism, 
Virtue, and the Spirit of Liberty,” 410). We accept that the Poles’ defense of their freedom made Rousseau less 
pessimistic about this, or, to be more precise, we accept that this effectively exempted the Poles from 
Rousseau’s general pessimism about modern man’s prospects. 
252 For a comparison between Corsica and Poland that puts greater weight on their similarities, see Plattner, 
“Rousseau and the Origins of Nationalism,” 191-92. 
253 On equality in the festival, see Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 97-104, esp. 100. 
254 This is an important premise in Smith’s alternative account of the educational effects of public athletic 
competitions with which we took issue above. See note 234 above. 
 191 
competitions will be happier than the others, the others will not be unhappy.  The spectators 
will be amused in watching the competitions. And the sight of their fellow citizens displaying 
excellent qualities will give them grounds to take collective pride in their fatherland. As for the 
participants, all will be pleased to exercise their faculties, and thus to extend their beings 
through activity.255 The other elements of the festival that we have so far discussed—
ceremonies and dramatic spectacles celebrating national heroes—serve as another source of 
collective pride. And dramatic spectacles serve as a source of common entertainment. 
Rousseau’s discussion republican entertainments in the Letter to D’Alembert suggests 
that the common happiness of the festival is to be found especially in the simple song and 
dance that have been at the heart of the festival since its origin in nascent society. For song 
and dance are, implicitly or explicitly, at the heart of the festival that Rousseau recommends 
to the Genevans as an alternative spectacle to the theater, a festival that he fondly recounts 
having witnessed in Geneva as a child, and the practice that he identifies as best exemplifying 
the Spartan festival, i.e., the model festival (LD / ŒC 5: / CW 10: 344, 351n, 350-52). In our 
treatment of the primitive festival so far, we have emphasized the close connection between 
song and dance and amour-propre. While the concern with esteem is hardly absent from 
Rousseau’s description of festive singing and dancing in the Letter to D’Alembert, it is, as we will 
now explain, accompanied by a common happiness that is at once a cause and an effect of 
identification.  
Let us consider the festival that Rousseau recommends to the Genevans as an 
alternative spectacle to the theater. He writes: 
What! Must there be no Spectacle in a Republic? On the contrary, there must be 
many of them! It is in Republics that they were born; it is in their midst that one sees 
them shine with a truly festive air. To what peoples is it better suited to assemble 
often and to form among themselves sweet bonds of pleasure and of joy than to 
 
255 For a discussion of the way that happiness through activity will foster identification in Corsica, see Smith, 
“Nature, Nation-Building, and the Seasons of Justice,” 43-45, 46. 
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those who have so many reasons to love one another and to remain ever united? 
(LD / ŒC 5: 114 / CW 10: 345) 
At this point in the passage, it is not yet clear that the spectacle that Rousseau is recommending 
to the Genevans is the festival. But this will become clear as the passage continues. We begin 
here to be confronted with an important ambiguity, to which we will return below, namely, 
whether the festival is properly understood as an institution of civic education and, thus, as a 
necessary condition for republicanism or rather as felicitous outcome of republicanism. Our 
concern with civic education has led us, thus far, to approach it as the former. We have 
emphasized passages, especially from the Government of Poland, in which it is presented in this 
way. But the festival here comes to sight as an outcome of republicanism at least as much as 
a condition of it. The festival is possible in well-ordered republics because citizens have 
reasons for loving one another and remaining ever united—the most basic being that their 
lives, goods, and freedom are commonly preserved in such republics. Yet the passage also 
suggests, in keeping with Rousseau’s insistence that the justice and utility of the laws are not 
themselves sufficient to produce love of the laws, or patriotism, that it is at the festival that 
they finally come to love and unite with one another most fully. It is at the festival that the 
sweet bonds of pleasure and joy are formed. Why? What does the festival add to citizens’ 
preexisting reasons for loving and uniting with one another? 
Rousseau continues: 
But what finally will be the objects of these spectacles? What will be shown in them? 
Nothing, if you please. With freedom, wherever the crowd prevails, well-being 
prevails there also. Plant a stake crowned with flowers in the middle of a square, 
gather the people there, and you will have a festival. Do better still: make the 
Spectators a Spectacle; make them actors themselves; do it in such a way that each 
sees and loves himself in the others so that all might be better united. (LD / ŒC 5: 
115 / CW 10: 344) 
Here, it becomes clear that the spectacle that Rousseau is recommending is the festival. The 
description evokes the primitive festival of nascent society, as described in the Second Discourse 
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and the Essay on the Origin of Languages, as well as the rustic festival at Clarens, as described in 
Julie.256 Thus, it strongly implies that what citizens will do once they are gathered together 
around a stake is sing and dance. This is supported by Rousseau’s suggestion that the citizens 
will themselves constitute the spectacle. They will watch one another sing and dance while 
they sing and dance themselves.257 Thus, it resonates with Rousseau’s subsequent descriptions 
of the Genevan festival that he witnessed as a child and the Spartan festival, in both of which 
song, or, more broadly, music, and dance feature prominently.258 
It is noteworthy, however, that Rousseau refrains from explicitly stating that they will 
sing and dance or, for that matter, do anything other than watch one another. We would 
submit that he thus abstracts from their activity in order to focus our attention on their 
identification with one another and to suggest that this is itself an important source of the 
happiness of the festival.259 They may be singing and dancing together, but the important thing 
to be recognized is that, in doing so, they are extending their beings to one another and giving 
themselves over to the sentiment of their communal existence. Precisely because of its 
abstractness, this description brings to light a dimension of the festival that is left in the dark 
in the descriptions of the primitive festival of nascent society. For, as we have seen, those 
descriptions emphasize that the festival-goers are moved in their singing and dancing by 
romantic love and amour-propre. Now, surely, these motives would not be absent from the 
festival that Rousseau envisions for the Genevans. Indeed, both are present and important in 
 
256 See, respectively, SD / ŒC 3: 169 / CW 3: 47; EOL 9 / ŒC 5: 406 / CW 7: 314; J 5.7 / ŒC 2: 609-611 / 
CW 6: 499. In recognizing the similarity between the festival that Rousseau recommends to the Genevans and 
the festival at Clarens, we follow Starobinski (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 94-97). Starobinski’s brilliant account of the 
festival—in Julie particularly and in Rousseau’s writings generally—to which we refer throughout this section, 
should be consulted. 
257 Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 96-97. 
258 In the Genevan festival that Rousseau witnessed as a child, only some of the citizens were both actors and 
spectators. Others, such as Rousseau himself, were only the latter. 
259 In reference to the festival at Clarens in Julie, Starobinski observes, “[h]ere people are not happy because 
they have come to a [festival]; rather the [festival] is the visible manifestation of the joy they feel in being 
together” (Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 92-93). 
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the more concrete descriptions of the Genevan festival that Rousseau witnessed as a child and 
the Spartan festival to which we have been referring. Taken together, Rousseau’s various 
descriptions of the festival suggest that what the activity of singing and dancing entails 
psychically is some combination of romantic love, amour-propre, and self-extension, not only, 
we should add, through identification but also through activity. Here, we mean to suggest that 
even just this part of the festival, not to mention the festival as a whole, engages a range of 
psychic forces conducive to citizenship that extends beyond identification.260 
It is no accident that Rousseau emphasizes identification to a greater degree in his 
descriptions of civic festivals than in his descriptions of primitive festivals. To the extent that 
citizens can, partly because of other elements of civic education, take pride in themselves as 
parts of their fatherland, their amour-propre is less divisive and therefore does less to oppose 
their extending their beings to and identifying with one another. In this light, we can see how 
man’s denaturing through civic education, his reconception of himself as a part of a whole, 
makes it possible for him to experience again, albeit in an artificial way, the natural sentiment 
of existence to which he might otherwise lose access because of the denaturing he experiences 
at the hands of history. 
 The meaning of Rousseau’s indications that civic education entails transforming 
human beings in such a way that they come to depend, or come to feel as though they depend, 
upon the fatherland for their very existence is clearer in light of the account we have given of 
the festival. When, through regular participation in the communal practices of the festival, the 
citizen becomes habituated to extending his existence to his fellows and sensing his existence 
in the whole that they compose, he comes to “[believe] that he is no longer one but part of 
the unity and no longer feels except in the whole” (E 1 / ŒC 4: 249 / CW 13: 164). It is partly 
 
260 Scholarly treatments of the festival tend—not without reason—to focus especially on identification and 
thus to understate some of its more active dimensions. See, e.g., Cullen, Freedom in Rousseau’s Political Philosophy, 
135; Melzer, Natural Goodness of Man, 194-95. 
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in this sense that the man who has undergone civic education and become a citizen 
“receives…his life and his being” from the “whole” of which he is a part (SC 2.7 / ŒC 3: 381 
/ CW 4: 155). This is part of why, for the patriotic citizen who loves the fatherland as the 
source of all that gives value to his existence, life apart from or contrary to the ways of the 
fatherland is not a “true life” (PF 11.2 / ŒC 3: 536 / CW 4:58). It is a diminished existence. 
This is not only because he is divided from his fellow citizens, in whom he senses his being, 
but also because he is deprived of the various activities by which he habitually exercises his 
faculties and extends and senses his being. He is also deprived of the source of the pride that 
he takes in himself, not only as a member of the fatherland but also as an individual. In this 
light we see how communal practices that variously foster pride and self-extension work 
together to foster patriotism, generalize citizens’ wills, and make virtue reign. 
Scholars have insightfully noted a connection between the festival, as characterized in 
the Letter to D’Alembert, and the public person generated by the social contract. Starobinski 
writes that “[t]he festival expresses, in the ‘existential’ realm of emotion, what the Social Contract 
formulates on the theoretical realm of law.” The dual and reciprocal character of the festival-
goers—at once actors and spectators—is analogous to the dual and reciprocal character of 
citizens—at once participants in sovereignty and subjects.261 Cullen and Melzer have gone 
further than Starobinski, arguing that the festival is not merely an analog to but somehow the 
realization of the public person. According to Cullen, “[t]he festival accomplishes on the level 
of feeling what the general will aims at on the level of political right.”262 Melzer, for his part, 
writes that “[t]he ‘real civil person’ is one, not as a common enterprise but as a festival: a 
community united by nothing more than being together—living and feeling a common 
existence.”263 
 
261 Starobinski, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 96-97. 
262 Cullen, Freedom in Rousseau’s Political Philosophy, 135.  
263 Melzer, Natural Goodness of Man, 195.  
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Modifying Cullen’s formulation, we would say that the festival accomplishes on the 
level of feeling what the social contract—as distinguished from the general will—aims at on 
the level of political right: It brings forth a public person, the existence of which is the 
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the general will. There is an important 
difference in its genesis, however. In Rousseau’s analysis of the social contract, the public 
person is, as we explained in Chapter 1, born from the convergence of individuals’ private 
wills in relation to a common object, namely, the preservation of their lives, goods, and 
freedom. Thus, the public person emerges, in this analysis, as a means to private ends which 
happen to coincide. Viewed in light of the social contract, then, the public person does 
appear—to draw on Melzer’s formulation—as a common enterprise, specifically, as the 
collective pursuit of collective preservation. The public person appears rather differently in 
light of the festival because, in the festival, existence is not being preserved. Rather, having 
been preserved, it is being felt.  
The complexity of the status of the festival in Rousseau’s political thought is this: In 
accomplishing on the level of feeling what the social contract aims at on the level of right, that 
is, in generating a public person on the level of feeling, the festival is at once a means to the 
end of the social contract and itself the end of the social contract. This will become clearer in 
light of the ideal image of the legislative assembly portrayed in Book IV Chapter I of the Social 
Contract: 
As long as several assembled men consider themselves as a single body, they have 
only a single will, which relates to their common preservation, and to the general 
well-being. Then all the springs of the State are vigorous and simple, its maxims are 
clear and luminous, it has no intertwined, contradictory interests, the common good 
appears everywhere as evident, and requires only good sense in order to be 
perceived…A State governed in this way needs very few Laws, and, to the extent 
that it becomes necessary to promulgate new ones, this necessity is universally seen. 
The first who proposes them does nothing but say what all have already felt, and 
there is no question of either tactics or eloquence to have passed into law what each 
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has already resolved to do as soon as he is sure that the others will do as he does. (SC 
4.1 / ŒC 3: 437 / CW 4: 198) 
To the extent that citizens’ conceiving of themselves as one body is a sufficient condition for 
the expression of the general will through legislation, and to the extent that the festival leads 
citizens to do this by giving them the sense of being one body, the festival serves as a crucial 
institution of civic education and thus as  a means to the end of the social contract. In addition 
to inclining citizens to legislate in accord with the general will, the patriotism fostered in the 
festival inclines them to obey, enforce, and defend the laws. Loving one another as themselves 
and loving their communal existence, they will be inclined to obey, enforce, and defend laws 
that, as they conceive them, express their communal will to the preservation of their communal 
existence. It is telling, in this connection, that Rousseau should locate this image of the ideal 
legislative assembly in a relatively natural rustic condition.264  It is a “[troop] of peasants” that 
he sees thus “regulating affairs of State under an oak and always conducting themselves 
wisely.” In appealing to this condition, and, by extension, to nascent society, where the festival 
originated, Rousseau gestures toward the connection between the identification induced in the 
festival and that required for legislation. Indeed, especially given his indication that these 
peasants are “among the happiest people of the world,” one imagines them having turned to 
lawmaking from singing and dancing around their oak, festival turned legislative assembly (SC 
4.1 / ŒC 3: 437 / CW 4: 198). 
The complexity of the festival becomes clear in light of Rousseau’s indication that the 
peasant-citizens he describes rarely engage in the legislative activity for which their festivals 
effectively educate them. Because of the happy conditions in which they find themselves, 
conditions of which their festivals are at once a cause and an effect, they rarely confront the 
problems that would compel them to engage in such activity. Here, we see that the realization 
 
264 On similarities between “the society of Clarens” and “the society of the Social Contract,” see Starobinski, 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 85. 
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of the public person in the festival obviates the necessity underlying the social contract, albeit 
only partly or temporarily. One might then say that the festival is not so much a means to the 
solution to the fundamental problem as the solution to that problem. Or rather it is both.265 
The festival contributes to the solution to this problem by at once lessening the necessity of 
legislation and disposing citizens to meet that necessity in accordance with right when they do 
face it.  
Note that the festival disposes them to do this in a way that obviates the necessity for 
the self-mastery that Rousseau tentatively ascribes to the citizen in Book I Chapter VIII of the 
Social Contract. For, in leading him to sense his existence in and conceive of himself as a part 
of the whole that he constitutes with his fellow citizens, the festival effectively redirects his 
inclinations from their natural object, i.e., his private good, to the common good. Thus 
denatured, he has no inclinations to master in order to fulfill his duties. If civic education were 
to entail the fostering of patriotic identification exclusively, it would be more accurate to say 
that it makes goodness reign than to say that it makes virtue reign.266  
Now, as we have seen, civic education does not entail this exclusively. For, of course, 
it is impossible to induce citizens to sense their existences in or conceive of themselves as 
parts of the whole completely or permanently.267 Yet it is not at all clear from our study of 
Rousseau’s civic educational writings that, on those occasions on which citizens do not sense 
their existences in or conceive of themselves as parts of the whole, citizens will legislate in 
accord with the general will or obey, enforce, or defend the laws by exercising moral freedom. 
Our study has suggested that, on those occasions, Rousseau envisions citizens’ doing these 
 
265 In a similar vein, O’Hagan observes that good mœurs are good not only as means but also as ends (Rousseau, 
155). 
266 It is worth noting, in this connection, that Rousseau’s definition of virtue in the Discourse on Political Economy 
as “only” the “conformity of the private will to the general” does not determine whether this conformity entails 
citizens’ mastering their inclinations to their private goods or whether it entails citizens’ inclinations’ being 
redirected from their private goods to the general good (DPE / ŒC 3: 252 / CW 3: 149). 
267 SW / ŒC 3: 68 / CW 11: 68. 
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things out of a passionate desire to take pride in themselves and to be esteemed by their fellow 
citizens. To put the point somewhat differently, Rousseauian civic education, as we have come 
to understand it, aims to limit the occasions on which citizens have no passionate inclination 
to fulfill their duties, that is, occasions on which the fulfillment of their duties depends upon 
their exercising moral freedom.268 It remains for us now to discuss one last civic educational 
measure that Rousseau recommends to this end: civil religion. 
IV. CIVIL RELIGION 
Thus far, our examination of civic education has shown how, in Rousseau’s view, 
citizens can be taught to fulfill their duties under the social contract—especially to obey, 
enforce, and defend the laws—voluntarily, and even enthusiastically, by being taught to love 
their fatherland. Let us now conclude that examination with a consideration of civil religion. 
In doing so, we return to the question with which we concluded our examination of the 
preliminary stage of civic education in the last chapter. What becomes of the problematic 
belief, of which the legislator persuades the people in giving them his laws, that citizens are 
obligated to enact and obey the laws because those laws express an authoritative divine will, 
as distinguished from their own general will? 
The answer is, in a word, that it disappears. In the second stage of civic education, it 
is effectively superseded as the basis for dutiful citizenship by patriotism. This is not to say 
that religious belief disappears altogether from the outlook of the citizen. It is to say, rather, 
that the religion of the citizen undergoes, or at least is meant to undergo, a transformation in 
the movement from the first to the second stages of civic education. In this section, we will 
 
268 Marshall has advanced the argument that the statement on moral freedom in Book I Chapter VIII of the 
Social Contract is meant as a rhetorical appeal to pride (“Art d’écrire et pratique politique” Pt. I, 255-61). On this 
view, the opinion that one has mastered one’s inclinations and passions and lives freely in accord with one’s 
reason is itself a delusion of pride. Evaluating this intriguing argument would compel us to go far beyond the 
scope of our study and examine Rousseau’s other writings on moral freedom. Given this, we limit ourselves to 
the observation that our understanding of Rousseauian civic education is not inconsistent with and might even 
be taken to support Marshall’s argument. 
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characterize this transformation and its significance with respect to the limits and possibilities 
of citizenship by examining Rousseau’s account of the civil profession of faith in Book IV 
Chapter VIII of the Social Contract. 
Rousseau is so well known for his attack on the irreligious tendency of early modern 
political philosophy and for his insistence that religion is a necessary part of politics that one 
is in danger of misunderstanding religion’s status in his conception of civic education. This 
danger can be avoided partly by recognizing some of the differences between the teachings of 
the first and second stages of civic education. We note at the outset one simple way in which 
one might expect them to be more similar than they are. Inasmuch as the legislator is effective 
in persuading the people that they are obligated to enact and obey his laws on the grounds 
that those laws express authoritative divine will, one might expect that reminding citizens of 
this teaching and persuading future generations of it would feature prominently in Rousseau’s 
writings on civic education. But it is absent, even, as we will see, from those writings in which 
he specifically treats civil religion. In the many passages in which he insists upon the necessity 
of educating citizens to love the laws, he never identifies the belief that the laws express the 
authoritative will of God or the gods as a resource that might be drawn on to this end. It is as 
if that resource is unavailable or to be avoided after the laws have been established. To this, 
we would add that even the alternative beliefs comprised in the civil religion that Rousseau 
elaborates in Book IV Chapter VIII of the Social Contract do not feature prominently in his 
writings on civic education—in the Discourse on Political Economy, the Government of Poland, or the 
Letter to D’Alembert. Those beliefs have not come up in our discussion of those writings until 
now not because we have abstracted from them but because they are largely absent from those 
writings, at least explicitly. To be clear, our point, again, is not that religion is absent from 
Rousseau’s writings on civic education proper but that it is treated largely in isolation from the 
other parts of civic education, which, by contrast, are treated together, as we have seen. 
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Rousseau’s manner of treating civil religion in relation to the other parts of civic 
education is reflective of the merely supplemental role that it takes on in the movement from 
the first stage to the second stage of civic education. The exact outlines of that role are 
ambiguous, but its concrete core is clearly identified in Book IV Chapter VIII of the Social 
Contract as the teaching, and profession by citizens of, certain “dogmas of Religion,” or, rather, 
“sentiments of sociability,” in which human beings must have “faith” if they are “to be good 
Citizen[s]” and “faithful subject[s]” (SC 4.8 / ŒC 3: 468 / CW 4: 22).269 Let us set aside for 
now the important question of the spirit in which citizens are to have faith in these dogmas, 
or sentiments, in order, first, to identify them and determine why holding them is necessary 
for being a good citizen and faithful subject. 
Rousseau states six such dogmas—five “positive” and one “negative,” which are, as 
he insists they “ought to be,” “simple, few in number, enunciated with precision without 
explanations or commentaries.” (He refers to them as “dogmas” rather than “sentiments” 
when he finally states them.) For now, we limit ourselves to the positive dogmas: “[1] The 
existence of a powerful, intelligent, beneficent, foresighted and providential Divinity, [2] the 
life to come, [3] the happiness of the just, [4] the punishment of the wicked, [5] the sanctity of 
the social Contract and the Laws” (SC 4.8 / ŒC 3: 468 / CW 4: 223, bracketed numbers 
added). Although Rousseau refrains from explicitly relating the dogmas to one another, one 
can easily construct a civically edifying whole out of all the parts. The just—those who obey 
the sacred social contract and laws—are happy in an afterlife, if not in this life, and the 
wicked—especially, if not exclusively, those who disobey the sacred social contract and laws—
are punished in an afterlife, if not in this life, because there is a god who, by dint of his 
 
269 For a brief survey of some of Rousseau’s other statements on the content of civil religion and an 
explanation of the differences among them, see Kelly, Rousseau as Author, 37-38. 
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attributes, is able and willing to maintain a moral order wherein justice ultimately, if not 
immediately, redounds to happiness. 
Rousseau’s project in the Social Contract is, as he announces it in its first sentences, to 
discover a “legitimate and sure rule of administration,” the institution of which would result 
in the coincidence of “justice and utility” in “the civil order” (SC 1 / ŒC 3: 531 / CW 4: 131). 
The importance of thus demonstrating the unity of justice and utility, or, rather, the possibility 
of their unity, is explained with greater clarity and at greater length at the outset of the Geneva 
Manuscript. If human beings are to be just, it is not sufficient that they be taught “what justice 
is,” they must also be shown “what interest [they] have in being just.” Rousseau explicitly 
arrays himself against those who would show this by taking recourse to religion: “Let us…set 
aside,” he urges, “the sacred precepts of the various Religions the abuse of which causes as 
many crimes as their use can spare us of, and return to the Philosopher the examination of a 
question that the Theologian has never treated except to the prejudice of the human race” 
(GM 1.2 / ŒC 3: 286 / CW 4: 80). What are we to make of the fact that Rousseau’s 
philosophic examination of this question in the Social Contract concludes, as we have just seen, 
with the argument that good citizenship, and therewith the efficacy of the social contract, 
depends upon faith in the religious dogma that the happiness of the just is guaranteed by divine 
providence? Is this not a massive concession to the very theologians Rousseau attacks in this 
passage? 
Again, a passage from the Geneva Manuscript that Rousseau chose to omit from the 
Social Contract is revealing. Indeed, we would submit that, in the first paragraph of the account 
of civil religion in the Geneva Manuscript, we find the key to unlocking the intention behind the 
civil profession of faith. Rousseau writes: 
As soon as men live in society, they must have a Religion that maintains them there. 
Never has a people subsisted, nor will subsist, without Religion, and if it were not 
given one, it would make one for itself or would soon be destroyed. In every state 
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that can demand of its members the sacrifice of their life, anyone who does not 
believe in the life to come is necessarily a coward or a madman; but we know only 
too well to what point the hope for the life to come can commit a fanatic to despise 
this one here. Take away this fanatic’s visions and give him this same hope as the 
prize for his virtue and you will make a true citizen of him. (GM / ŒC 3: 336 / CW 
4: 117) 
Rousseau here indicates the precise duty that citizens will not fulfill unless they hold to the 
dogmas contained in the civil profession of faith. They will not voluntarily give their lives in 
obedience to, or in enforcement or defense of, the laws. To the extent that justice, conceived 
as obedience to and enforcement and defense of the laws, requires that citizens at times risk 
and, in effect, give their lives, it does not obviously redound to happiness. Subjection to the 
laws does not obviously result in the preservation of all. Hence, if citizens are to be just, they 
must be persuaded that, should they give their lives justly, they will live again and then be 
happy. The dogmas of the civil profession of faith are dictated, to a large extent, by this 
necessity. As reflected by its placement relative to the other dogmas, the happiness of the just 
is central. If [3] the just are happy, and if [5] justice entails obedience to and enforcement and 
defense of the sacred laws or, more fundamentally, the sacred social contract, which 
sometimes entails giving one’s life, then there must be [2] an afterlife and [1] a god of such a 
character as to be able and willing to assure that the loss of happiness incurred by those who 
justly give their lives is compensated for in that afterlife. It is necessary that citizens also believe 
that the wicked are punished lest they come to think that happiness can alternatively be 
achieved through injustice. 
What are we to make of the limits and possibilities of civic education in light of the 
contention that citizens must have faith in an afterlife in which the just are happy if they are 
to fulfill their duty to risk and even give their lives for the fatherland? Are the motives fostered 
by the institutions and practices of civic education that we described above too weak to 
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overcome the need of self-preservation?270 While this contention would seem to imply that 
the answer is yes, we would suggest a qualification. The need of self-preservation is so strong 
that the patriotism constituted out of these motives cannot alone be relied upon always to move 
citizens to fulfill the duty to risk one’s life for the fatherland.  
It should be said at the outset that Rousseau’s statement in the Geneva Manuscript 
exaggerates man’s natural aversion to death. We come back to his distinctive conception of 
the need of self-preservation, which we elaborated in Chapter 1 on the basis of his suggestion 
in the Second Discourse that man is driven by this need not only to avoid death but also to remain 
free and that human beings, taken as they are by nature, like animals, will risk and even give 
up their lives lest they be subjugated (SD / ŒC 3: 180-82 / CW 3: 56-57). In preserving and 
strengthening man’s natural vigor, civic education can effectively motivate citizens to risk and 
even give their lives when their freedom under law is threatened.  
This is not sufficient, however. For there are occasions on which citizens are, and must 
be, called upon by the fatherland to give their lives when they might be able to live and even 
live freely if they shirked their duty. The natural need of self-preservation, even as Rousseau 
conceives it, could not be relied upon on these occasions. But the institutions and practices of 
civic education work to limit these occasions and to give citizens more reliable motives when 
those occasions cannot be avoided. By habitually engaging citizens’ drive to self-extension, 
through activity and identification, in distinctive communal practices, civic education makes it 
so that citizens derive so much of their existence from and sense so much of their existence 
in the fatherland that life apart from it or contrary to its ways would be so diminished as not 
to be worth living. Consequently, deserting the fatherland in order to avoid dying in its service 
will be unattractive. It will be still more unattractive to the extent that citizens are educated to 
 
270 In the necessity for civil religion, Melzer similarly sees evidence of the limits of the denaturing that can be 
achieved through civic education (Natural Goodness of Man, 197-98; “Origin of the Counter-Enlightenment” 
345). 
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derive their self-esteem from their membership in and service to the fatherland. What is more, 
the pride they take in themselves and the honor they hope to win from others for serving the 
fatherland after the fashion of national heroes give them positive motives for dying for the 
fatherland even in the absence of hope for an afterlife.271 Recall the power that, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, Rousseau attributes to amour-propre relative to man’s other needs, including his need 
of self-preservation. All these motives are at work in the outlook that, as we noted above, 
Rousseau ascribes to the patriotic citizen: 
If citizens draw from her [the fatherland] all that can give value to their own 
existence—wise Laws, simple mœurs, necessities, peace, freedom, and the esteem of 
other peoples—their zeal for such a tender mother will be ignited. They will know 
no other true life than the one that they take from her, no other true happiness than 
to use that life in her service; and they will count among its benefits the honor of 
spilling all their blood for her defense if needed. (PF 11.2 / ŒC 3: 536 / CW 4: 58)  
This statement strongly suggests that, in Rousseau’s view, the citizen who has been educated 
to patriotism does not need to believe in an afterlife in order to risk or even give his life for 
the fatherland. Given this, the belief in the afterlife and the other dogmas of the civil 
profession of faith ought, in our view, to be regarded as necessary supplements to civic 
education.272 While it may be possible to educate some citizens in such a way that they might 
willingly risk or even give their lives for their fatherland, doing so is extraordinarily difficult. It 
also takes time. And the security of the fatherland may require citizens to believe in this and 
the other dogmas of the civil profession of faith for generations before they become such 
patriots as to be able to dispense with them. 
In support of this argument, we observe that the dogmas of the civil profession of 
faith are carefully composed so that they effectively supplement patriotism as needed without 
 
271 If or insofar as the honor citizens hope for is partly posthumous, the hope for honor fostered in their 
education to patriotism may not be entirely separable from a hope to live on in an afterlife. 
272 In our view, then, Strauss overstates the importance of civil religion when he writes that “[o]nly” it “will 
engender the sentiments required of the citizen” (Natural Right and History, 288, emphasis added). We would 
say, instead, that only civil religion will guarantee those sentiments. 
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in any way disturbing the primacy of the fatherland in citizens’ hearts. In this way, the dogmas 
are dictated by Rousseau’s concern to keep citizens from coming under the sway of those 
fanatical visions of the afterlife, and the happiness to be enjoyed therein, that would lead them 
to despise this life.273 Note, for instance, that the afterlife is not described. Note also that the 
happiness of the just is a distinct dogma from the afterlife. Citizens are not to believe that the 
just are happy only in the afterlife. They are to believe, rather, that those whose justice 
effectively detracts from their happiness in this life, by compelling them to give up this life, 
will be duly compensated in an afterlife. There is no indication that the happiness of the 
afterlife surpasses that of this life in quality or in degree. There is no indication that those of 
the just who are not similarly compelled to give up their lives for the laws will even live on 
after death. For it does not necessarily follow from the dogma that there is an afterlife that all 
will experience it. Those of the just who are happy in this life and whose justice does not 
compel them to give their lives prematurely will have no need of the afterlife. And, if citizens 
should ever come to believe that justly dying for the fatherland is not an evil, none of the 
dogmas of the civil profession of faith will require them to hold that the just live on after 
death. Now, this is not to argue that Rousseau thinks that, as a practical matter, it is likely that 
citizens will come to adopt such an outlook, certainly not in all its particulars. It is rather to 
argue that, inasmuch as the civil profession of faith would, in principle, admit of such an 
outlook, the profession does not necessitate that citizens become very otherworldly in spirit. 
It is telling that the civil profession of faith does not include the dogma that the soul 
is immortal. Its omission is made conspicuous by Rousseau’s reference to it in a footnote 
appended to his characterization of the dogmas of the civil profession of faith as “sentiments 
of sociability.” In the footnote, we learn that such exemplary citizens as Cato and Cicero held 
 
273 Here, we take issue with Gildin’s claim that the civil profession of faith might foster a “predominant 
concern with the afterlife [that would lead] to a depreciation of this life and, since political life is part of this 
life, to a depreciation of political society as well” (Rousseau’s “Social Contract”, 188). 
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that “the dogma of the mortality of the soul” is “pernicious to the State” and opposed Caesar’s 
attempt to establish it. Evidently, Rousseau disagrees. Or it is evident at least that he does not 
believe that the opposite dogma is so beneficial to the state as to include it in the civil 
profession of faith. Now, one might object that the immortality of the soul is implicit in the 
dogma of the afterlife. But the Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar makes clear that, to 
believe in an afterlife in which the happiness of the just is assured is not necessarily to believe 
that the soul is immortal or that its afterlife is eternal (E 4 / ŒC 4: 589-90 / CW 13: 445). 
There is, in the civil profession of faith, a concession to the theologians: there must be 
an afterlife ordered by a powerful, intelligent, beneficent, foresighted, and provident god if 
justice is to coincide with happiness in every case. But this concession is limited. It does not 
concede that human beings naturally or necessarily long to transcend the mundanity or the 
finitude of their lives. The dogmas of Rousseau’s civil religion neither express nor appeal to 
any longing for such transcendence.274 
The this-worldliness of Rousseau’s civil religion appears still more extreme when one 
considers the spirit in which citizens are to profess it and to be held to account for professing 
it. Recall that, as we noted in passing above, Rousseau initially equivocates on whether the 
articles of the civil profession of faith are “dogmas of Religion” or “sentiments of sociability.” 
He writes, “[t]here is…a purely civil profession of faith the articles of which it belongs to the 
Sovereign to fix, not precisely as dogmas of Religion, but as sentiments of sociability without 
which it is impossible to be a good Citizen or a faithful subject.” Here we see that it would be 
more accurate to say that Rousseau corrects his initial characterization of these articles. They are 
not so much dogmas of religion as sentiments of sociability. The exclusively civil character of 
the profession is remarkable. The articles’ origin, i.e., with the sovereign or the citizens 
 
274 In this respect, the civil profession of faith resembles the Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar from 
which, as Melzer has shown, this central feature of orthodox Christianity is extirpated (“Origin of the Counter-
Enlightenment,” 354-55). 
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themselves, and their end, i.e., making good citizens and faithful subjects, are purely civic. The 
footnote in which Rousseau describes Cato and Cicero’s opposition to the establishment of 
the dogma of the mortality of the soul resolves any possible doubt that this means that the 
grounds on which citizens will, or ought, to hold these sentiments are that they are civically 
edifying. For, in it, we learn: “in order to refute [Caesar], Cato and Cicero did not waste time 
philosophizing. They contented themselves with showing that Caesar spoke as a bad Citizen 
in advancing a doctrine pernicious to the State. This in effect was what the Senate of Rome 
had to judge, and not a question of theology (SC 4.8 / ŒC 3: 468n / CW 4: 222). To the 
extent that the sovereign can, as Rousseau emphasizes, rightly demand that citizens profess 
and act in accord with only those dogmas or sentiments that bear on whether citizens will 
fulfill their duties, it may seem obvious that citizens should conceive of these dogmas or 
sentiments in this way. But, upon reflection, one is led to wonder how effective the teaching 
and professing of these dogmas or sentiments will be if they are conceived of in this way. In 
order to be effective sentiments of sociability, do they not need to be held as true dogmas of 
religion? Do they not need to be held on the grounds that they are true rather than merely 
edifying?275 Otherwise, will they amount to anything more than “a highly attenuated phantom 
religion”?276 
We would submit that understanding Rousseau’s other writings on civic education is 
essential to resolving this perplexity. If or insofar as citizens have been educated to love the 
fatherland in the ways that we have described, there will be no more compelling testimony to 
the truth of a proposition than that it is civically edifying. Hence it is precisely because the 
dogmas contained in the civil profession of faith are effective sentiments of sociability that 
 
275 There is surely something to Kelly’s contention that “Rousseau’s primary concern is that citizens show 
respect for certain doctrines” and that he “is less concerned about whether every single citizen actually believes 
them” (Rousseau as Author, 39). But Rousseau would not be concerned that citizens show respect for these 
doctrines if he did not think that it was important for at least some, if not most, actually to believe them.  
276 Beiner, Civil Religion, 15. 
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citizens will have faith in them as religious dogmas. Our argument, then, is that the civil 
profession of faith ought to be understood not only as a supplement to but also as a kind of 
effect of civic education.277 Citizens who have been educated to love the fatherland in the ways 
that we have elaborated will be inclined to believe the dogmas that Rousseau includes in the 
civil profession of faith, or at least something akin to them. To the extent that it serves as an 
element of civic education, it is ultimately more negative than positive in character. It is meant 
to prevent citizens from adopting alternative dogmas that might undermine their patriotism, 
i.e., the end of the positive elements of civic education that we discussed above.278 
Our thought is this: Citizens who have undergone the civic education that we have 
described but have not become so patriotic that they would be willing to die for the fatherland 
without hope of an afterlife would be so patriotic that they nevertheless would deeply regret 
divergences between the demands of justice and the demands of happiness. The patriotism 
fostered by their civic education would incline them, or at least make them receptive to, the 
hope that these demands might somehow converge, that to die justly for the fatherland would 
be to live on happily, for a time, in an afterlife. And this hope for an afterlife would suffice to 
generate a belief in it. In sketching this line of thought, we again draw insight from the 
psychology of the Savoyard Vicar. The Vicar professes that his hope that the divergence 
between justice and happiness in this life might ultimately be rectified suffices to persuade him 
that there is an afterlife, or that the soul, as immaterial, survives the body, at least for a time: 
“If I had no other proof of the immateriality of the soul than the triumph of the wicked and 
the oppression of the just in this world, this alone would prevent me from doubting it” (E 4 
/ ŒC 4: 589 / CW 13: 445). If the hope to be both just and happy is so strong in the Vicar, 
 
277 This is to differ from most scholars, who treat civil religion as an element of civic education. See, e.g., 
Gildin, Rousseau’s “Social Contract”, 182; Maloy, “Very Order of Things,” 246; Trachtenberg, Making Citizens, 240, 
242. 
278 Hence, it is not a problem that the civil profession of faith is, as Beiner observes, incapable of “positively 
build[ing] republican citizenship” (Civil Religion, 15). 
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in a man who has not undergone a civic education, as to move him to believe that the condition 
on which its fulfillment is predicated obtains, it will a fortiori be strong enough to move the 
citizens to believe this. 
The Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar also lends support to our insistence that 
citizens will not, in holding the articles of the civil profession of faith, necessarily live in hope 
of happiness in another life. For we see in the Vicar’s Profession of Faith that he lives in such 
hope because he sees that justice and happiness diverge in “the present state of things” (E 4 
/ ŒC 4: 589 / CW 13: 444). And the state of things in the Vicar’s time, in eighteenth-century, 
monarchical Europe, differs radically from the state of things in well-ordered republics where 
justice and happiness converge to a much greater degree. To the extent that it is because justice 
and happiness diverge in most of modern Europe that the Vicar lives in hope of the afterlife 
and that the tutor teaches Emile that “death is the end of life for the wicked and the 
commencement of that of the just” (E 4, 5 / ŒC 4: 604-605, 820 / CW 13: 457, 635), the 
citizen need not live in such hope or believe that his life will begin only with his death. In this 
light, we see more clearly that holding the beliefs required by the civil profession of faith is, 
for well-educated citizens in a well-ordered republic, compatible with a worldly patriotism. 
We add, in support of our argument that civil religion is not only a supplement to but 
also an effect of civic education, that Rousseau never refers explicitly to citizens’ being taught 
the dogmas of the civil profession of faith, by the legislator, by the magistrates, or by anyone 
for that matter. Indeed, he indicates nothing about their origin. His reticence on this question 
reflects an important change of subject that occurs in Book IV Chapter VIII. Rousseau makes 
a point of indicating that, in turning to elaborating a civil profession of faith, he is “return[ing]” 
from “political considerations” to “right” (SC 4.8 / ŒC 3: 467 / CW 4: 222). The implication 
is that he is concerned not with what, as a matter of prudence, ought to be done but rather 
with what, as a matter of right, may be done. His elaboration of the civil profession of faith, 
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accordingly, begins and is guided by the question of what the sovereign, i.e., all the citizens 
legislating in accord with the general will, may rightly demand of themselves as subjects with 
respect to religion. Of course, inasmuch as this elaboration is also guided by Rousseau’s 
conception of what citizens must believe if they are to fulfill their duties, maxims of politics 
have not been set aside altogether. From a certain point of view, the distinction blurs to the 
point of almost vanishing. 
Still, in our view, his choice to draw this distinction is not insignificant. Most obviously, 
it marks off the account of the civil profession of faith from the historical analysis of religion 
and politics that precedes it in Book IV Chapter VIII. There are two other, less obvious, ways 
in which it is significant, which are more important for our purposes. First, it underscores the 
fact that Rousseau is not treating the question of how citizens are to come to learn and profess 
the dogmas that he elaborates. Thus, it raises the question of civic education. Second, and 
partly by doing this, it reminds us of the legislator. For it was with the introduction of the 
legislator in Book II Chapter VI that Rousseau turned from treating principles of political right 
to maxims of politics. Although principles of political right are not set aside altogether in the 
intervening chapters, they do give way, as the theme of those chapters, to maxims of politics. 
Rousseau’s indication that he is returning to principles of political right prompts us to recall the 
point at which he turned from them, which is to say, the point at which he introduced the 
legislator and his work of civic education. So, we take this indication as being intended partly 
to prompt us, first, to wonder how citizens are to come to establish and profess the dogmas 
that Rousseau articulates and, second, to look to the account of the legislator and his work of 
civic education for the answer. 
The answer may at first seem to be supplied straightforwardly by the persuasive appeal 
to divine authority by which the legislator gets the people to submit and thus effectively to 
consent to his laws. Indeed, all, or at least almost all, of the positive dogmas of the civil 
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profession of faith are present in the teaching of divine authority that we constructed in the 
last chapter. There is a certain ambiguity in the case of the fifth positive dogma—“the sanctity 
of the social Contract and the Laws”—however. The ambiguity concerns the basis of the laws’ 
sanctity. According to the legislator’s persuasive appeal to divine authority, the laws are sacred 
because they express the will of transcendently authoritative divinity. The association of the 
laws and their sanctity with the social contract and its sanctity implies, rather, that the laws are 
sacred because they express the general will that is made authoritative by the social contract. 
Note, in this connection, that the first dogma does not characterize God as the author of the 
laws. Taken together, the dogmas of the civil profession of faith imply that God merely 
supports the laws by attending to the fate of the just and the wicked in the afterlife and that 
he does this because even he recognizes and is moved by the sanctity of the general will, or 
the social contract that authorizes it. Hence, in prompting us to reflect on the relation between 
the appeal to divine authority by which the legislator subjects the people to his laws and the 
civil profession of faith, Rousseau leads us to recognize that, as we argued in the last chapter, 
the religious opinions fostered by that appeal oppose the full realization of his principles of 
political right and must therefore be modified after the founding.279 
Thus, the Social Contract concludes with a final subtle indication that, in order to 
complete one’s understanding of the limits and possibilities of civic life, as Rousseau conceives 
them, one is required to turn especially to his writings on civic education. For, as we have 
shown, it is in these writings that Rousseau discloses how the problematic foundation for 
citizenship laid in the preliminary stage of civic education might be replaced by a more 
legitimate and more sure foundation in civic education proper, how citizenship founded on 
dutifulness to divine authority might give way to citizenship founded on patriotism.  
 
279 Here, we would modify O’Hagan’s suggestion that the fifth positive dogma of the civil profession of faith 
“endows the legitimate political order with a continuing sanctity inherited from the Foundation Myth of the 
Lawgiver” (Rousseau, 227). It does this, but it implies a reconception of the basis of its sanctity. 
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Conclusion 
The practical realization of political right depends upon the transformation of human 
beings into patriotic citizens. If they are reliably to exercise their rights and fulfill their duties 
under the social contract—under the convention that would effectively legitimate human 
subjection—citizens must be educated to conceive of and love their republic as their 
fatherland, that is, as the source of their existence, or of the value of their existence. More 
specifically, they must be educated to conceive of and love the laws of their republic as the 
fundamental cause of their fatherlands, and therewith of their existence or the value of their 
existence. This is, in a word, Rousseau’s teaching on the importance of civic education. Now 
that we have elaborated this teaching and uncovered its grounds, it remains for us briefly to 
reflect on what this teaching means for us, for liberal democrats discontented with civic life in 
our republic. 
First, and most basically, it should lead us to reflect on the possibility that some of the 
problems about which we are discontented might be the effects, at least in part, of our 
characteristic inattention to the moral character and civic knowledge of citizens. The 
overwhelming emphasis of education in the United States, from kindergarten to the university, 
is on the development of cognitive skills, such as the much-vaunted capacity for critical 
thinking, and the accumulation of technical knowledge. For its overwhelming goal is to enable 
men and women to find employment in a highly competitive, global economy and, in so doing, 
to make livelihoods for themselves and their families. To the extent that supporting oneself 
and, thus, not burdening one’s fellow citizens is an important part of what it means to be a 
good citizen in a republic, this kind of education is hardly without a civic purpose. But to the 
extent that this is only part and not the whole what it means to be such a citizen, it is, at best, 
incomplete.  
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What is worse, this kind of education can foster the excessive private-spiritedness, 
vanity, and love of material well-being that threaten to prevent citizens in modern societies 
from exercising their rights and fulfilling their duties. This means that the kind of education 
that prevails in America today stands in need not only of being completed but also of being 
counteracted. The challenge entailed in counteracting a regime’s excessive or defective 
tendencies is great. The particular challenge entailed in counteracting the moral excesses and 
defects of contemporary liberal democracy is especially great. For liberal democracy tends to make 
citizens averse to public efforts at moral formation, even as directed toward liberal-democratic 
civic ends. This is itself one of liberal democracy’s characteristic excesses or defects. 
In addition to having civically deleterious moral effects, the overwhelming emphasis 
on the development of cognitive skills and the accumulation of technical knowledge leaves 
little time for education that is civic in content. Most learn little about our republic, about the 
principles of right underlying it, about its Constitution, about its history and its heroic 
statesmen and citizens. And the spirit in which the young are taught about these things often 
discourages patriotism more than it encourages it. Now, to be clear, this is not to argue for 
simply or altogether ignoring or denying the aspects of our republic and its history that have 
been or still are unlovable. It is to argue rather that our recognition of these things ought 
always to be qualified by a recognition of the many aspects of our republic and its history that 
are lovable, and, no less importantly, by a recognition of the remarkable ways in and extent to 
which our republic has, over the course of its history, rid itself of what is unlovable about it 
by drawing on what is lovable about it. 
Our awareness of the civically problematic character of the kind of education that 
prevails in America today has been made more acute by our study of Rousseau’s writings on 
civic education. For an elemental argument of these writings is, as we have seen, that the kind 
of education upon which republican citizenship most depends is that which attends to the 
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moral formation and transmission of civic knowledge that we tend, at best, to neglect and, at 
worst, to undermine. One might here object that this criticism is inapposite: The republican 
citizenship that depends upon the kind of education that does attend to these things differs 
from liberal-democratic citizenship. We readily grant that there is something to this objection. 
But we just as readily would insist that, in at least some ways and to at least some extent, 
liberal-democratic citizens must, like the citizens contemplated in Rousseau’s republicanism, 
will the common good and somehow recognize what it consists in or requires. If or insofar as 
Rousseau conceives of civic education as a means of getting citizens to do these things, the 
critical light that his thought sheds on contemporary American education is not rendered 
inapposite by his other criticisms of liberal democracy. 
What we propose is that we look to Rousseau not so much for a program of civic 
education that might be enacted in all its particulars as for a spirit that might guide us in 
remedying some of the liberal-democratic pathologies that afflict American education. This 
spirit would point us in the direction of the kinds of remedies that might be in order. 
Characterized generally, these remedies would include educational measures that appeal to 
citizens’ passions in ways that lead them to conceive of themselves as parts of a national 
community and that lead them to esteem and love this community and, in turn, to look to it 
for esteem and love. In doing these things, these measures would always put republicanism 
and the Constitution at the heart of citizens’ conception of the national community. 
No less important than the practical guidance that we might thus take from Rousseau’s 
writings on civic education is awareness of the necessary limits of citizenship in liberal 
democracy, which we also can take from these writings. To the extent that we, as modern 
liberal democrats, are unable or unwilling to undertake the kind of civic education elaborated 
by Rousseau, our public-spiritedness will fall short of the models of citizenship held out by 
him. It may be that this is a price worth paying for all the good things that come with liberal 
 216 
democracy, or that it is a price that we cannot help but pay given our circumstances. Still, it is 
important for us as citizens and as human beings to be clear-sighted about the limits and 
possibilities of our regime and its way of life. That the study of Rousseau’s thought should 
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Note on the Citation of Rousseau’s Works 
 
The translations of Rousseau’s works quoted herein are my own. However, I cite the 
English translation in the Collected Writings of Rousseau in addition to the original French from 
the standard Pléiade edition. The titles of Rousseau's works are abbreviated as indicated 
below. To explain my system of citation by way of an example, the citation (SC 1.8 / ŒC 3: 
365 / CW 4: 142) refers to a passage from Book I Chapter VIII of the Social Contract which 
can be found in the original French on page 365 of Volume III of the Œuvres Complètes and 
in English translation on page 142 of Volume IV of the Collected Writings. Where I refer to 
entire works or subsections of works, I cite the works or subsections without identifying 
pagination in English or French.  




CC- Plan for a Constitution for Corsica 
 
D- Rousseau Judge of Jean-Jacques: Dialogues 
 
DM- Dictionary of Music 
 




EOL- Essay on the Origin of Languages 
 
FD- First Discourse 
 
GM- Geneva Manuscript 
 
GP- Considerations on the Government of Poland and Its Planned Reformation 
 
J- Julie, or the New Heloise 
 
LD- Letter to D’Alembert 
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LF- Letter to Franquières 
 
LM- Letters to Malesherbes 
 
LV- Letter to Voltaire 
 
LWM- Letters Written from the Mountain 
 
PF- Political Fragments 
 
PN- Preface to Narcissus 
 
R- Reveries of the Solitary Walker 
 
SD- Second Discourse 
 
SC- Social Contract 
 
SW- State of War 
 
VF- Various Fragments  
 
VH- Discourse on the Virtue Most Necessary for a Hero 
